THE GENERAL BOARD

United States Forces, European Theater

ADMINISTRATIVE OPERATIONS OF INSPECTORS GENERAL IN THE THEATER

MISSION: Prepare a Report and Recommendations Relating to Administrative Operations of Inspectors General in This Theater.

The General Board was established by General Orders 128, Headquarters European Theater of Operations, US Army, dated 17 June 1945, as amended by General Orders 182, dated 7 August 1945 and General Orders 312 dated 20 November 1945, Headquarters United States Forces, European Theater, to prepare a factual analysis of the strategy, tactics, and administration employed by the United States forces in the European Theater.

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THE GENERAL BOARD
UNITED STATES FORCES, EUROPEAN THEATER
APO 408

ADMINISTRATIVE OPERATIONS OF INSPECTORS GENERAL IN THE THEATER

Prepared by:

Colonel Nyal L. Adams, 0-7471, Chief, section in charge.
Lieutenant Colonel Samuel G. Eddy, 0-283950, Inspector General's Section.
Lieutenant Colonel Richard A. Nott, 0-292244, Inspector General's Section.
Warrant Officer (Junior Grade) Ross King, W-2120048, Inspector General's Section.

Principal Consultants:

Lieutenant General Lucian K. Truscott, 0-7096, Commanding, Fifth United States Army.
Major General Everett S. Hughes, 0-2333, Inspector General, United States Forces, European Theater.
Major General Edward H. Brooks, 0-6657, Commanding VI Corps.
Major General Walter M. Robertson, 0-3378, Commanding XV Corps.
Major General John E. Dahlquist, 0-7120, Commanding 36th Infantry Division.
Brigadier General Oliver L. Haines, 0-4670, Inspector General, United States Forces, European Theater prior to 8 May 1945.
Brigadier General Don E. Carleton, 0-15415, Chief of Staff, Fifth United States Army.
Brigadier General John M. Willems, 0-16176, Chief of Staff, Seventh United States Army.
Colonel F. G. Ringland, 0-4572, Inspector General, 12th Army Group.
Colonel W. R. Watson, 0-8354, Inspector General, 6th Army Group.
Colonel G. W. Greathouse, Inspector General, First Airborne Army.
Colonel C. C. Park, 0-7176, Inspector General, Third United States Army.
Colonel R. H. Barrett, 0-3505, Inspector General, Seventh United States Army.
Colonel S. G. Saulnier, 0-5826, Inspector General, XIX Corps.
Colonel G. W. Lester, 0-4801, Inspector General, Ninth Air Force.
Colonel J. W. McGilvray, Inspector General, XXI Corps.
Lieutenant Colonel C. R. Hill, 0-243924, Inspector General, 12th Armored Division.
Lieutenant Colonel J. T. Phillip, Inspector General, 10th Armored Division.
Lieutenant Colonel L. L. Morse, 0-174546, Inspector General, 100th Infantry Division.
Lieutenant Colonel K. F. Glos, Inspector General, 3d Infantry Division.

Principal Consultants (Continued)

Lieutenant Colonel J. E. Bishop, 0-222952, Inspector General, 106th Infantry Division.

Lieutenant Colonel L. P. Hanover, Inspector General, 14th Armored Division.

Lieutenant Colonel Lewis D. Strom, 0-304577, Assistant Inspector General, Fifteenth United States Army.

Lieutenant Colonel Duane M. Witt, 0-1283181, Inspector General, 70th Infantry Division.

Lieutenant Colonel T. A. Beaudry, 0-270008, Inspector General, 16th Armored Division and 1st Infantry Division.

Lieutenant Colonel C. E. Johnson, 0-303693, Inspector General, 84th Infantry Division; Assistant Inspector General, Ninth United States Army.

Major H. C. Hershey, 0-343406, Inspector General, 63d Infantry Division.

Major J. R. Moss, 0-304558, Inspector General, 4th Infantry Division.

Major M. G. Duwe, 0-367081, Assistant Inspector General, 5th Armored Division.

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ADMINISTRATIVE OPERATIONS OF INSPECTORS GENERAL IN THE THEATER

PART ONE

ADMINISTRATIVE OPERATIONS

CHAPTER 1

HISTORY AND ORGANIZATION

SECTION 1

HISTORY

1. The Theater Inspector General's Section, Headquarters United States Army Forces in the British Isles was established 4 April 1942, in London, England. On 8 June 1942 the headquarters was redesignated Headquarters European Theater of Operations United States Army. In January 1944 the Inspector General's Section of Headquarters Services of Supply, European Theater of Operations was absorbed by the Theater Headquarters Section and thereafter the Theater Inspector General served both headquarters. In September 1944 the office of the Theater Inspector General was moved to Paris when the Headquarters European Theater of Operations was established there.

2. The Inspector General's Section, Headquarters Services of Supply came into being with the organization of the headquarters 24 May 1942 in London, England. The moving of this headquarters on 19 July 1942 to Cheltenham, England, marked the beginning of Inspector General activities in Services of Supply. The section continued to function until January 1944 when, as a result of a partial consolidation of Headquarters Services of Supply with Headquarters European Theater of Operations, it was absorbed by the Theater Inspector General's Section.

3. Inspector General activities in the Air Forces began with the arrival of the Eighth Air Force in the British Isles in April 1942. The Ninth Air Force arrived from North Africa in September 1943. These two were organized in January 1944 under a headquarters designated United States Strategic and Tactical Air Force. This new headquarters contained an Air Inspector's Section in which the Air Inspector was also the Inspector General.

4. Activities of Inspectors General in Ground Forces in the European Theater of Operation began with the arrival of corps and divisions in the United Kingdom in the first quarter of 1942. With the invasion of North Africa, 7 November 1942 ground force units in the British Isles having inspectors general were reduced. In September 1943 Headquarters First United States Army arrived, and shortly thereafter Headquarters of 1st U.S. Army Group (later became 12th Army Group) was activated. Both of these headquarters included an Inspector General's Section.

The Third United States Army arrived in March 1944 and with the First Army was placed under the new group headquarters. Following the invasion of southern France 15 August 1944, the 6th Army Group came under the control of the European Theater of Operations. In the months leading up to V-E Day, 8 May 1945, the 12th Army Group and the 6th Army Group headed up ground force troops in the European Theater.

SECTION 2

ORGANIZATION

5. Theater and Communication Zone Inspector General's Sections. On 7 January 1944 the Theater Inspector General's Section absorbed the Services of Supply Inspector General's Section and the two functioned as one organization in the European Theater of Operations. The Theater Inspector General, operating under the Theater Commander, established policies and obtained personnel for the Ground and Air Forces. In June 1944, the Air Force obtained inspectors general direct from the States, thus relieving Theater of this work. Supervision and coordination was handled through the Inspector General on the staff of the United States Strategic Air Force. For the Ground Forces the supervision and coordination was conducted through Inspectors General of the 6th and 12th Army Groups.

6. Air Force Inspectors General. The Air Forces had Inspectors General on the staff of Headquarters United States Strategic Air Forces and within each major command under that headquarters down to and including the staff of Wing Commanders.

7. Ground Force Inspectors General. The 6th and 12th Army Groups each had Inspector General's Sections in the headquarters. These sections supervised and coordinated the work of the various Inspector General's Sections in the Armies under each respective headquarters. The Army Inspector General's section in turn supervised and coordinated the work of the Corps and Division Inspectors General within each Army.

CHAPTER 2

PERSONNEL

SECTION 1

PROCUREMENT AND INSTRUCTION

8. Procurement. The obtaining of commissioned officers to fill tables of organization and tables of allotments presented a constant problem. Some were sent from the United States but not as many as were requisitioned. The selection of officers in the Theater was given continuous attention and from this source came the majority of fillers and replacements after D-Day, 6 June 1944. The same difficulty was encountered in the European Theater that was said to have existed in the United States; that is, other agencies were reluctant to release

officers with the qualifications required for the Inspector General's Department. A number of officers were obtained individually by senior inspectors general, given training and their detail in the Department effected. Four orientation schools operated by the Theater Inspector General between October 1944 and March 1945 provided 38 officers of company grades, most of whom had had considerable combat service; 27 of these were assigned to Armies and 11 to Communication Zone commands. The basic policy was to replace senior captains in divisions with these new officers and, in turn, assign the senior captains, with longer experience in Inspector General's work, to Corps, Armies or Communication Zone commands.

9. Instruction. Inspectors General arriving from the United States were given an orientation course, prior to assignment, to familiarize them with policies and procedures of the Theater. Officers selected in the Theater were given basic instruction in orientation schools followed by on-the-job training under the supervision of Inspectors General prior to detail.

SECTION 2

ALLOCATION OF PERSONNEL

10. Allotments for Theater and Communication Zone Inspector General's Sections. Grades and numbers of personnel for the Headquarters European Theater of Operations, Headquarters Communication Zone and subordinate base sections were allotted by the War Department based on estimates or manning tables submitted by the Theater Commander. In the course of the growth of these headquarters from the beginning in early 1942 to D-Day, 6 June 1944, allotments were periodically increased based on successive phases of operation. The grades and numbers of personnel for the Inspector General's Sections of the headquarters were sub-allotted by the Theater Headquarters based on estimates prepared and submitted by the Theater Inspector General. While there were usually sufficient warrant officers and enlisted grades, at no time did the allotments of commissioned officer grades meet the estimated requirements. The deficiencies in officer allotments were most striking at base section level where the major portion of inspector general work in service forces was accomplished. Inclosure #1 shows the allotted and actual strength of officers and warrant officers on 1 April 1944 for the Inspector General's Sections of headquarters of the Theater and base sections. Column (8) shows the relationship of troop strength in base sections to inspector general commissioned officer strength. In the months following 6 June 1944 and ending with V-E Day, 8 May 1945, the allotted strength of Inspector General's sections was considered the actual strength. The Theater Inspector General secured additional grades and numbers of officers and enlisted men from the general allotment to the Theater for new base sections and for strenghening existing base sections. During this latter period, the average of commissioned officer strength to troop strength was one to 12,207.

11. Inspectors General for Communication Zone. It was the considered opinion of 15 Inspectors General in

Communication Zone commands that the actual number of Inspectors General available for service forces functions was from 10 percent to 15 percent below the desired figure, and that troop strength per officer should not exceed 10,000. The estimate was supported not only by examination of relative strength of command per Inspector General (Inclosure #1 and paragraph 10 above), but by facts covered in a separate study of "Functional Operations of Inspectors General in Communication Zone", the Theater General Board, United States Forces, European Theater. In the study referred to, it was found that limitations of officer personnel confined the work of Communication Zone Inspectors General to investigations and inspections of troop units to the exclusion of the broader field of inspections and inquiries envisioned in paragraph 36b, Field Manual 101-5.

12. Table of Organization for Ground Forces. Armies, Corps and Divisions operated under approved War Department tables of organization. The Inspector General's Section for the Army Group had no table of organization but operated under an authorized allowance. The consensus of combat experienced officers in the European Theater indicates that the tables of organization for the Inspector General's Section in the various headquarters required revision, as indicated in Inclosure No. 2.

a. Army Group Headquarters. Four Inspectors General with combat experience in Army Group Headquarters or higher echelon were questioned with reference to table of organization for Inspector General's section for an Army Group Headquarters. The consensus was that the Inspector General's section should be divided into two sub-sections:

(1) "Army Group Headquarters section with one brigadier general and one colonel to establish policies, conduct investigations and supervise lower echelons. The grade of brigadier general was recommended in order to give the prestige and authority required as a personal representative of the Army Group Commander."

(2) "Special Troops section. This section to perform Inspector General duties for special troops of Army Group Headquarters, as these troops normally approximate a Division in number. Personnel for this section was made the same as for a division."

b. Army Headquarters section. The principal changes in Army Headquarters Inspector General's section from the old table of organization were the addition of one brigadier general and the deletion of one lieutenant colonel. The addition of an officer in the grade of brigadier general was recommended in order to provide one officer with the prestige and authority required as a personal representative of the Army Commander.

c. Corps Headquarters Section. The only change

in the proposed table over the old table of organization of the Inspector General section was with enlisted men. Experience during recent operations in the European Theater indicated that the old table of organization authorized fewer men than necessary for efficient operation.

d. Division Headquarters Section. It is generally recognized that officers of the Inspector General's Department should have the benefit of experience and maturity, and possess good judgment. To this end, it has been the policy of the War Department to detail in the Inspector General's Department officers in the grade of captain and higher, experienced in command of troops, and where possible, particularly in divisions, combat-seasoned. Serious difficulty was experienced in securing officers with these qualifications as assistant division inspectors general in consequence of the closed Table of Organization of a division inspector general's section; i.e., one lieutenant colonel, one captain, and one warrant officer. On numerous occasions officers suitable as assistant division inspectors general have indicated a desire to remain in their present assignment rather than accept the assistant inspector general's position with little prospect of promotion. The consensus of commanders and inspectors general of the Third and Seventh United States Armies was that the Table of Organization for a division inspector general's section should provide a position vacancy of major for the assistant inspector general, to encourage incentive and greater efficiency.

13. Tables of Organization for Air Forces. At the time this study was started there were insufficient Air Force Inspectors General within the European Theater from whom data for reasonable tables of organization could be obtained.

SECTION 3

DETAIL OR ASSIGNMENT OF OFFICERS

14. Inspector General's Department. Should officers be assigned to the Inspector General's Department or should they be "detailed in" the Department as at present? This question was asked four Commanding Generals and 20 Inspectors General. One Commanding General voted for assignment and the others were in favor of continuance of the detail policy. The Inspectors General were 50-50. An efficient Inspector General is one who can observe accurately, knows definitely when things are right, present his thoughts tactfully and clearly and is energetic. To know definitely when things are right or wrong and how to correct them, the Inspector General must have knowledge gained through experience with troops. The inspector will be more efficient inspecting troops and equipment of the branch of service with which he has served. Therefore, more efficient results will be obtained when the inspectors general are serving with their former arm or service.

a. Junior Inspectors General. Inspectors in grades of captain, major and lieutenant colonel can obtain their experience with line or service organizations

prior to their detail.

b. Senior Inspectors General. Officers in the grades of lieutenant colonel and higher can be assigned to the Inspector General's Department after completing a minimum of two years duty with troops, preference being given to those who had a four year detail in the Inspector General's Department. The senior inspectors general will provide continuing policies in the Department which, under the detail system, are not always present.

c. Reserve and National Guard Officers. The majority of inspectors general within the European Theater were formerly in the Reserve or National Guard. Any future emergency will again require their services in the Inspector General's Department and they must be trained. The policies enumerated in a and b above can be employed for peacetime training of Reserve and National Guard officers.

CHAPTER 3

ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES

SECTION 1

GENERAL

15. Inspections.

a. Inspections made prior to combat either in the United States or in the European Theater were very thorough. After troops entered combat, it was very difficult to conduct anything resembling an inspection except for checking records. In lieu of inspections during combat, visits of observation or surveys were made. These will be discussed later. The Air Force troops were in more permanent establishments and inspections were made about every four months. Troops in the Communication Zone were inspected at irregular intervals without interfering with their normal duties. Rest periods for all troops in any one organization were few and far between, especially with the combat troops. Therefore, few inspections were made other than checking property and equipment during rest periods. These record inspections resulted in a general policy of constructive fault-finding of minor details. Few Inspectors General followed the broad policy of determining that the records were incorrect, notifying the staff section concerned for supervision and instruction and rechecking the unit to determine whether or not the necessary corrections were made.

b. Visits of Observation and Surveys. Visits of observation and surveys were made frequently by the majority of inspectors general. This resulted in obtaining facts with the least possible interference with the troops, whether they were in combat or in the rear areas. This policy accounted for the feeling, largely of combat battalion commanders, that they had no assistance from the inspector general while in combat. Of the army inspectors general contacted, one devoted the bulk of his time to work of this type. He observed the broad policies, such as supply, messing, evacuation, etc., and rendered

valuable assistance in this way to his commanding general. Few inspectors general with combat units gave their troops an opportunity to register complaints; thus the commander was deprived of this valuable source of information.

16. Investigations:

a. Formal. Paragraph 9, Army Regulations 20-30, provided an excellent form for use in reporting investigations. This form was in the minds of commanding generals and was required on all investigations in about 15 to 20 percent of the units. When asked why they desired formal reports, the answer was, "I want a permanent record". This policy resulted in excessive time being spent on investigations by the inspector general with the attending apparent shortage of clerical help and typewriters. The remaining 80 to 85 percent of the commanding generals varied from the above extreme to about ten percent of the commanders who wanted almost no formal investigations and reports.

b. Informal. Most inspectors general conducted their informal investigations by recording all evidence by stenographers, but the report contained only a summary of the testimony given, followed by a brief discussion, conclusions and recommendations. This procedure has the advantage of saving time and clerical work. The commanders who favored this type of investigation and report felt that most investigations by inspectors general consumed too much time. The commanders wanted a short statement of facts within a brief period rather than a long report much delayed.

17. Duties. The duties of an Inspector General are stated in the 20 Series Army Regulations, paragraph 36, Field Manual 101-5 and paragraph 26, Field Manual 100-10. The directives clearly indicate that the inspectors general were required to perform such duties as the commanding general may direct. The commanding generals within the European Theater assigned duties to their inspectors general. One Army and two Corps Commanders were contacted and asked "May I have your recommendations for the improvement of the Inspector General's Department?" One commander answered, "Give me more and better Inspectors General. A top notch Inspector General was my ground eyes. Over 50 percent of the commanders under me did not know how to use their Inspectors General efficiently". Another commander expressed the same opinion - that commanders failed to use properly their Inspectors General. A few of many illustrations are given: One corps inspector general stated that over 90 percent of his duties were rear echelon commander and president of two boards. In another corps, one officer was on duty in the G-1 office, one officer in the G-4 office, the warrant officer in the war room and one sergeant in the Historical Section. One division had an inspector general in charge of a rest center. Fortunately, these examples represented only a small percentage of the commanders and were the result of one or more of the following:

a. Inspectors General were inefficient due to inexperience.

b. Inspectors General did not gain the confidence of the commanding general.

c. Commanding generals did not realize the information they could have obtained through their inspectors general.

The first two were partially eliminated by more thorough training of the inspectors general. The third was not corrected.

18. Regulations. The 20-series of Army Regulations was written during peacetime and promulgated policies applicable to the Inspector General's work in the United States. Examples are: annual general inspections, Action-Letters IGD, formal investigations and monthly reports of inspectors general. Copies of these documents were required in The Inspector General's office in Washington, D.C. It was not practicable to send the reports to Washington, D.C. In May 1942 the Inspector General, European Theater obtained authority to discontinue the annual general inspection and the four reports mentioned above. There were no policies established by The Inspector General prior to the departure of the initial task force for the European Theater.

SECTION 2

TECHNICAL SUPERVISION

19. Theater and Communication Zone. The Theater Inspector General was charged theoretically with technical supervision of all work of the inspectors general in the European Theater of Operations. As a matter of policy and in actual practice, aside from reviewing reports submitted to the Theater Headquarters by inspectors general of Air and Ground Forces, advising on technical matters and providing replacements for the Ground Forces, technical supervision of inspectors general in the United States Strategic and Tactical Air Force and the 6th and 12th Army Groups was left to the senior inspectors general of these major commands. The Theater Inspector General more closely supervised technical policies of inspectors general of Communication Zone commands. This was inherent in the fact that after 17 January 1944, the Theater Inspector General acted as the Inspector General of Headquarters Communication Zone. The extent of technical supervision, however, was limited to the procurement, assignment and transfer of personnel, reviewing of reports of investigations and certain inspections forwarded from base section headquarters and furnishing advice and assistance relating to subjects requiring special emphasis.

20. Technical Supervision in Ground Forces. The 6th and 12th Army Groups Inspectors General supervised the work of the inspectors general in the lower echelons of their respective commands. Their contacts were mainly with the army sections although on a few occasions they went to corps and divisions. The army inspectors general supervised the work and policies of corps and divisions. The question of who should inspect army units attached to a lower unit was always under debate. Some division

commanders wanted their inspectors general to inspect and contact all attached units. The corps commanders wanted to know how the units attached to divisions were being handled, so directed their inspectors general to inspect these units. The general policy was that the attached units were the responsibility of the unit to which they were attached.

21. Technical Supervision in Air Forces. The Inspector General with the United States Strategic Air Force, operating on a policy level, was responsible for the supervision of the inspectors general in the three major commands in the European Theater, Eighth Air Force, Ninth Air Force and First Tactical Air Force. The Inspectors General in these major commands supervised the work in the lower echelons within each command. This was accomplished largely through the policy of inspecting the procedures of inspectors general in the lower echelons. This policy produced excellent results.

SECTION 3

RELATIONSHIP WITH STAFF

22. Theater. The Theater Inspector General's Section was an independent administrative staff section and reported directly to the Deputy Chief of Staff of Theater Headquarters, who was also Chief of Staff of Communication Zone Headquarters. General and special staff sections of both headquarters referred matters for comment or assistance directly to the Inspector General in a routine manner; however, all directives for action came from the office of the Chief of Staff.

23. Communication Zone. Inspectors General of Communication Zone base sections functioned directly under their chiefs of staff or commanding generals. Without exception worthy of mention, there was excellent relationship and cooperation in these commands between the Inspector General's Section and other staff sections.

24. Ground Forces. A majority of the Inspectors General with the Ground Forces operated directly under the commanding general or chief of staff and cooperated with the other sections of their staff. The few instances where the spirit of cooperation did not prevail were usually the result of conflicting personalities. Initially the inspectors general of a few units operated under G-1. This procedure did not produce the best results and in most instances was changed to conform with the generally accepted policy as stated above.

25. Air Force. The Air Force originally had an Air Inspector, normally a rated pilot, operating under the commanding general or chief of staff. In only two cases was the Air Inspector an Inspector General. The Inspector General, with two exceptions, operated under the Air Inspector. The Air Inspector coordinated and supervised the work and policies of the Inspector General's section with the Technical and Tactical sections and with the other staff sections.

SECTION 4

COMPILATION OF DATA

26. Theater and Communication Zone. Reference data were compiled in the office of the Inspector General, Headquarters Services of Supply and later in the office of the Theater Inspector General, largely for use of officers of those sections. Copies of useful data were routed informally to all Inspectors General of base sections. In one instance a model service record was prepared, printed in a requisite number of copies and given comparable distribution throughout the Theater. In base sections data in check lists provided each officer and enlisted man concerned was kept current. In two of these commands check lists on administrative and personnel records were prepared and distributed to all units.

27. Ground Forces. In about 50 percent of the headquarters the inspectors general kept sufficient data to the end that his successor could carry on the policies he had established. Check lists were on hand in all Inspector General's sections but such essential information as units inspected, journals and standing operating procedures were missing in about half the sections contacted.

PART TWO

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CHAPTER 1

SECTION 1

CONCLUSIONS

28. That many policies and procedures laid down for the work of inspectors general in the United States are not applicable in an active theater of operations.

29. That in general the Tables of Organization for inspector general's sections authorized insufficient personnel.

30. That the Inspector General's Department was not properly organized to meet the situation encountered in overseas operation.

31. That some commanding generals did not realize the full possibilities to be derived from the inspector general on their staffs.

32. That pre-combat inspections were in general satisfactory, but during combat the inspections were insufficient to produce the best results.

33. That a majority of the inspections conducted checked details rather than following the policy of determining when a unit needed help and obtaining the necessary help from one of the staff sections. This resulted in a fault-finding policy rather than a fact-finding policy.

34. That a majority of the inspectors general did not use visits of observation and surveys sufficiently to obtain general trends within the unit.

35. That too many formal investigations, as against informal investigations, were conducted and reported, thus consuming time of personnel and increasing the time required for submitting the report.

36. That some of the inspectors general were inefficient as a result of lack of experience gained through duty with troops.

37. That inspectors general obtain better results when assigned to units of a branch of service with which they have formerly served.

38. That the independent character of much of the inspector general's activities calls for a direct relationship with the chief of staff or commanding general rather than operating through a general staff section.

SECTION 2

RECOMMENDATIONS

39. That policies applicable to an inspector general's work in an overseas theater be prepared.

40. That the Tables of Organization for inspector general's sections in Ground, Communication Zone and Air Forces be revised to provide rank more commensurate with their duties and personnel adequate in number to perform their function.

41. That consideration be given to the permanent assignment of senior inspectors general to the Inspector General's Department.

42. That no annual general inspections be required in active theaters but that fact-finding inspections with reports made direct to the commander concerned, be substituted therefor.

TABLES OF ALLOWANCES AND ACTUAL STRENGTH
INSPECTOR GENERAL'S SECTIONS
HEADQUARTERS EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS AND COMMUNICATION ZONE COMMANDS

1 April 1944

(1)	(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)		(6)		(7)		(8)	
	Colonels		Lt Cols		Majors		Captains		WOs		Total Officers		Aver Troop Strength per IG Officer	
Headquarters	*T/A	**Actual	T/A	A	T/A	A	T/A	A	T/A	A	T/A	A	T/A	A
Central Base Section			1	1	1	0	1	1	1	2	3	2		
Southern Base Section	1	0	2	2	2	2	0	1	3	1	5	5		
Western Base Section	1	1	1	0	3	3	[illegible]	[illegible]	2	2	5	4		
Eastern Base Section	1	0	1	1	3	3	[illegible]	[illegible]	2	2	5	4		
Northern Ireland Base Section			1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	3	3		
Advance Section	1	0	1	3	3	0	2	2	1	1	7	5		
Total Com Z	4	1	7	8	13	9	4	5	10	9	28	23	13,456	16,381
European Theater of Operations	5	*** 5	4	3	1	1	[illegible]	1	4	5	10	10		

*Tables of Allowances
**Actual Strength
***1 Brig General

Inclosure #1

PRESENT* AND PROPOSED TABLES OF ORGANIZATION
INSPECTOR GENERAL SECTIONS, ARMY GROUND FORCES

	ARMY GROUP				ARMY				CORPS				DIVISION			
Headquarters Sec.																
Officers	MOS	Pres.T/O	MOS	Prop.T/O	MOS	Pres.T/O	MOS	Prop.T/O	MOS	Pres.T/O	MOS	Prop.T/O	MOS	Pres.T/O	MOS	Prop.T/O
Brig Gen		None		1				1								
Colonel		"		1		1		1		1		1				
Lt Col		"				4		3		1		1		1		1
Major		"				1		1		1		1				1
Captain		"				1		1						1		
WO		"		1		1		1		1		1		1		1
Enlisted Men																
M/Sgt		"	502	1	502	1	502	1			502	1	502	1	502	1
T/Sgt		"					502	1			502	1				
S/Sgt		"	213	1	055	1	502	1	502	1	213	1			213	1
Tec 3		"			213	1	213	1								
Tec 4		"	405	1	213	1	213	2	213	1	405	1	213	1	405	1
Tec 4		"			247	1	405	1	405	1						
Tec 4		"			405	1										
Tec 5		"			055	1	213	2			213	1	213	1	213	1
Tec 5		"			213	1	055	1								
Tec 5		"			247	1										
Special Troops Sec.																
Officers																
Lt Col		"		1												
Major		"		1												
WO		"		1												
Enlisted Men																
M/Sgt		"	502	1												
S/Sgt		"	213	1												
Tec 4		"	405	1												
Tec 5		"	213	1												

*October, 1945.

Inclosure #2

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Inclosure #3