

THE GENERAL BOARD

United States Forces, European Theater

Antiaircraft Artillery Section

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THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERY GROUPS

AS COMPARED WITH ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERY REGIMENTS

Mission: Prepare Report and Recommendations on Effectiveness of Antiaircraft Artillery Groups as Compared with Antiaircraft Artillery Regiments

The General Board was established by General Orders Number 128, Headquarters European Theater of Operations, U. S. Army, dated 17 June 1945, as amended by General Orders 182, dated 7 August 1945 and General Orders 312, dated 20 November 1945, Headquarters United States Forces, European Theater, to prepare a factual analysis of the strategy, tactics, and administration employed by the United States forces in the European Theater.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
<u>Part One:</u> Introduction.....	1
1. Scope and Purpose.....	1
2. Current War Department Policies Affected.....	1
<u>Part Two:</u> Narrative Report of Committee Study.....	2
Chapter 1. Antiaircraft Artillery Group and Battalion Organization.....	2
Chapter 2. Antiaircraft Artillery Regimental Organization...	5
Chapter 3. Comparison Between Antiaircraft Artillery Group-Battalion and Regimental Organizations.....	6
Chapter 4. Conclusions and Recommendations.....	8
<u>Part Three:</u>	
Bibliography.....	9
Appendices:	
1. Extract of War Department Circular Number 439, 14 November 1944	
2. Six Charts Showing the Employment of the 16th, 18th, 71st, 103d, 113th, and 207th Antiaircraft Artillery Groups From D-Day to VE-Day	
3. Comments Made by Experienced Officers on the Group-Battalion Organization	
4. AGF Report No. 964, War Department Observers Board, 18 May 1945, "Reassignment Jurisdiction", Colonel M. G. Cary, CAC Observer	
5. AGF Report No. 1088, 4 July 1945, "Tactics and T/O, Infantry Division"	
6. Response to Question 28, Organization of AAA, ETOUSA Questionnaire, 11 June 1945, Headquarters Fifteenth U. S. Army	
7. Response to Fifteenth Army, General Board Question- naire, "Group versus Regiment"	
8. Extract, "Artillery With an American Army In Europe" by Brig Gen C. E. Hart, U. S. Army	
9. Officers Consulted in the Preparation of Appendix X	
10. Opinions of Officers Consulted on Fifteenth U. S. Army Group versus Regiment Questionnaire	

THE GENERAL BOARD
UNITED STATES FORCES, EUROPEAN THEATER
APO 408

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY GROUPS
AS COMPARED WITH ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY REGIMENTS

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THE GENERAL BOARD
UNITED STATES FORCES, EUROPEAN THEATER
APO 408

EFFECTIVENESS OF ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY GROUPS AS
COMPARED WITH ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY REGIMENTS

PART ONE

INTRODUCTION

1. Scope and Purpose. This study of the "Group versus Regiment" has been approached with the objective of recommending the best type of anti-aircraft artillery organization. It is the common opinion of experienced officers in the European Theater that neither the group type nor the traditional "old regimental" type is satisfactory and that another type, embodying the major characteristics desired by proponents of the group and the regiment, is indicated.

2. Current War Department Policies Affected.

War Department Circular Number 439, 14 November 1944;
Applicable tables of organization and tables of equipment.

EFFECTIVENESS OF ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY GROUPS AS
COMPARED WITH ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY REGIMENTS

PART TWO

NARRATIVE REPORT OF COMMITTEE STUDY

CHAPTER 1

ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY GROUP AND BATTALION ORGANIZATION

3. Origin of Group. Early in this war, a need was apparent for an antiaircraft artillery organization comparable to the old regiment in size and construction, but capable of greater flexibility. A new type organization was accordingly conceived and designated "_____ Anti Group". Existing regiments were broken up, the regimental headquarters were redesignated group headquarters and the battalions were made separate organizations. In the subsequent expansion program, group headquarters and separate battalions, only, were activated.

4. The Group-Battalion Relation. Under the new type organization, separate battalions, in such numbers and kinds as the tactical or training mission dictated, were attached to a group headquarters. The group headquarters, except in an advisory capacity, assumed no administrative or supply responsibility, as in these matters the battalions were constituted administratively self-sufficient. Although the battalion commander had complete command jurisdiction over his battalion, the authority of the group commander over his attached battalions was not clearly defined.

5. Recognition by War Department of loose Group-Battalion Relation.¹ As can be seen, the loose-knit group-battalion relation gave extreme tactical flexibility, but on the other hand, did not give command and administrative responsibility to the group commander. Command, training, discipline and morale suffered. The War Department, recognizing these deficiencies, published Circular Number 439, 19 November 1944, which made the group an administrative as well as a tactical unit, and encouraged "wherever practicable, continuity of command by retention of assignment of battalions to groups". It further authorized the assignment and reassignment of battalions to groups by Army Service Forces, Army Ground Forces, and Theater Commanders.

6. Misuse of Flexibility.² It is factual knowledge that battalions were never assigned to antiaircraft artillery groups and that continuity of command was not even approximated in the European Theater.

1 Ref. App. I

2 Ref. App. II

Six representative groups, for instance, in the period D-Day to VE-Day had 295 battalions attached to them for an average of 21 days each. The periods of attachment varied from one day to several months. Many battalions were repeatedly attached and detached within a few weeks' period of time. This misuse of flexibility was universal in all armies and commands.

7. Variation from War Department Policy. It is not known why those with authority to do so never assigned battalions to groups. But had it been done, more permanence of command would have resulted, thereby lessening much adverse criticism of the group-battalion organization. The War Department merely encouraged continuity of command and left discretion in this matter to lower echelons. Whether the deviation from the principle of continuity, as practiced in the European Theater, was in the interest of tactics is outside the scope of this study, but the fact remains that the constant shifting of battalions contributed towards:

- a. A lowered morale and esprit in the group and battalion relationship.
- b. The prevention, to a great extent, of experienced group commanders from impressing their leadership on their battalions.
- c. Insufficient time for indoctrination of battalions with the standards, policies, and operating procedures of the group.
- d. Negating, to a large extent, administrative supervision, help, and guidance.
- e. Preventing proper disciplinary control.

8. Extracts from Comments Made by Experienced Officers on the Group-Battalion Organization. The comments in their entirety are given in the appendices. Every effort was made to obtain criticisms of the subject matter from all readily available sources, to the end that a fair cross section of opinion would appear in the study.

"As a result of my own observations and of discussions with various group commanders who have served under me in the European Theater of Operations, I have come to the conclusion that the present organization of the AAA group is faulty and is affecting materially the efficiency of AAA units in combat. The principal deficiency is the omission of battalions from the T/O of the group.....On the other hand, it (old regiment) was entirely too inflexible to meet the varying tactical situations of combat. The adoption of the new AAA group, divorced of administrative functions and with no permanent hold on any battalions, has swung the pendulum to the other extreme. Now, there is complete flexibility but no permanence."¹

"The average period of attachment of battalions is too short to develop an esprit de corps which is the outstanding characteristic of all first class organizations. It does not permit the indoctrination of the battalions with the standards, policies and methods of procedure established by the commanding officer of the group.....Staff organization, training, and supervision would be more efficient on a regimental level."²

"Let me add my voice to the general recommendation that bat-

1 Ref. p. 1, App. III

2 Ref. p. 2, App. III

talions be given 'permanent' assignments to groups.....Yet how much real cooperation and interest is there going to be between me and the battalion CO while he is reasonably sure that he will leave my command during the coming week?"¹

"The present system (Group-Battalion) is excellent; it is believed, however, that the group, with its battalions should be a more permanent organization. The constant shift of battalions from one group to another works a hardship on both the groups and battalions."²

"I feel very strongly that the regiment should have a headquarters capable of exercising complete command and administrative control..... I am not satisfied with the present group and battalion set up.....The basic fundamental of a military organization is that it is a homogeneous entity,.....It is my opinion that the slight tactical advantage of the loose group organization is far out-weighed by the many command, administrative and personnel disadvantages."³

"The AAA Brigade and AAA Group should have reassignment jurisdiction. This is vital in placing the best qualified personnel in the proper jobs and thus build up the best team.....The battalion must feel that it is a part of the group. Also the Group must feel that the battalion is its responsibility and a part of the group team."⁴

"The regimental organization is strong because its members know each other's capabilities and so build up mutual confidence and esprit. It takes time to assimilate a new member."⁵

1 Ref. p. 2, App. III

2 Ref. App. VI

3 Ref. App. VII

4 Ref. App. IV

5 Ref. App. V

ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERY REGIMENTAL ORGANIZATION

9. Regiment-Battalion Relation. As has been stated in paragraph 5, Chapter 1, the regimental type organization was discarded for the group-battalion type because of the former's limited degree of flexibility for tactical deployment. The battalions, as constituted, were not capable of executing independent missions for any prolonged period away from the parent headquarters with the staff they then had. They were integral sub-units in the regiment and had to be administered and supplied by it.

10. Organizational Characteristics of Regiment. In addition to the supply and administrative ties which bound battalions so closely to the regimental headquarters, the regiment possessed a wealth of other highly desirable organization characteristics: (1) direct command, (2) adequate staff, (3) close training supervision, (4) disciplinary control, (5) organizational esprit, and (6) economy of personnel.

11. Name and Prestige. The Antiaircraft Artillery Section wholeheartedly agrees with the majority of those consulted on the subject, that the term "Regiment" has no counterpart. Behind it are 150 years of history and tradition. Both civilians and professional soldiers look upon the regiment as the basic (or time-honored) unit of prestige, loyalty, and esprit-de-corps.

COMPARISON BETWEEN ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY GROUP-BATTALION

AND REGIMENTAL ORGANIZATION

12. Basis for Comparison. Since no anti-aircraft artillery regiments were employed in the European Theater, a direct comparison in effectiveness between them and the groups obviously cannot be made. The Anti-aircraft Section has, therefore, made an indirect approach to the argument by the study of letters and questionnaires containing comments on the subject and by consultation with senior officers who have had experience with both type organizations. It can be accepted that brigade and group commanders are overwhelmingly against the regiment type as it was constructed. On the other hand, these same officers are not satisfied with the present group-battalion type. Advantages and disadvantages of both type organizations are given in the following paragraphs.

13. Advantages of the Group-Battalion Organization.

- a. Greater flexibility in the tactical employment of battalions.
- b. A group may have readily attached to it different types of anti-aircraft artillery battalions and a variable number of them to meet a tactical situation.
- c. The group-battalion combine meets the requirement of economy in force.
- d. Different types of battalions require different types of training; i.e., guns need a gun range; automatic weapons another type of range; searchlights still another type. Battalions, being self-sufficient, are capable of training at separate places suited to their individual needs.

14. Disadvantages of Group-Battalion Organization.

- a. Tendency of all higher echelons to misuse its flexibility by excessive shifting of battalions among groups.
- b. Less esprit de corps because of short-term affiliations.
- c. Little or no training as a team.
- d. Group commanders have no personnel assignment or reassignment jurisdiction; therefore, they cannot correct mal-assignments within the group battalions without great delay occasioned by processing through command channels.
- e. Group commander and his staff and battalion commanders and their staffs have little opportunity to know each other's capabilities and limitations.
- f. Group commander cannot indoctrinate battalions, when they change so rapidly, with the standards, policies, and methods of the group.

g. Groups, because of the usual short attachment period of their battalions, very often cannot carry to completion necessary aid for the battalions, especially supply and administrative matters requiring action by higher echelons.

h. No continuity of command.

i. Poor battalion commanders are not readily discernible in short-term battalion attachments.

15. Advantages of the Traditional Type Regiment.

a. All officers and men learn each other's capabilities and limitations.

b. Assignment jurisdiction permits the regimental commander great latitude in fitting officers and men in positions where they are best suited.

c. High esprit de corps due to mutual confidence and respect.

d. Team training resulting in teamwork.

e. The standards, policies and methods of the regimental commander are known and understood by all.

f. Regimental commander had authority to shift officers and men promptly to duties best suited to them.

g. Continuity of command assured.

h. Proper supervision and aid in supply and administration.

16. Disadvantages of the Traditional Type Regiment.

a. Limited Flexibility. Battalions were dependent upon their regiment for administration and supply. They were incapable of operating alone, except either for short periods of time or when they were relatively close to regimental headquarters.

b. Uneconomical for Most Missions. Being composed of three different types of battalions (one each of guns, automatic weapons, and searchlights), the regiment was presented with few missions where all three battalions could be used simultaneously or most effectively at one locality. Therefore, when the regiment remained intact, one or more of the battalions would either be in excess of the mission requirements, or be used on tasks for which ill-suited.

CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

17. Conclusions: a. Neither the traditional type regiment nor the group type as now constituted was entirely satisfactory. The former was too inflexible, but had many desirable organization characteristics--particularly, definite command responsibility. The latter, as employed in the European Theater, was flexible but lacked clearly-defined command authority.

b. Continuity of command will not be realized when battalions are attached to a parent headquarters.

c. Battalions should be able to operate independently for extended periods by drawing the necessary administrative and service personnel from the parent headquarters.

d. The term "regiment" should replace the term "group".¹

18. Recommendations. It is recommended that:

a. The parent organization of battalions be called a regiment.

✓ b. Battalions be assigned to a regiment.

c. The regiment be given clearly-defined command and administrative authority, to include the assignment and transfer of officers and enlisted personnel.

✓ d. Battalions be able to operate independently for extended periods by drawing the necessary administrative and service personnel from the regiment.

1 Ref. App. X, par. 4

THE GENERAL BOARD
UNITED STATES FORCES, EUROPEAN THEATER
APO 408

EFFECTIVENESS OF ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY GROUPS AS
COMPARED WITH ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY REGIMENTS

PART THREE

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3. Army Ground Forces Report Number 228, 13 September 1944, subject: "Assignment of Battalions to Groups," filed in Secretariat Files, Hq Fifteenth U.S. Army, APO 408.
4. Army Ground Forces Report Number 964, 18 May 1945, subject: "Reassignment Jurisdiction," filed in Secretariat Files, Hq Fifteenth U.S. Army, APO 408.
5. Army Ground Forces Report Number 1088, 4 July 1945, subject: "Tactics and Table of Organization, Infantry Division", filed in Secretariat Files, Hq Fifteenth U.S. Army, APO 408.
6. Group versus Regiment Questionnaire, Headquarters Fifteenth U.S. Army, Antiaircraft Section, October 1945, filed in Antiaircraft Section Files, Hq Fifteenth U.S. Army, APO 408.
7. Military Review, Volume XXV, Number 6, September 1945, article, "Artillery with an American Army in Europe", filed: Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; Artillery Section Files, Hq Fifteenth U.S. Army, APO 408.

APPENDIX I

EXTRACT OF WAR DEPARTMENT CIRCULAR NUMBER 439, 14 NOVEMBER 1944

1. FLEXIBILITY OF ORGANIZATION.-Paragraph 7, Circular No. 256, War Department, 1943, is rescinded and the following substituted therefor:

* * * * *

7. a. The principle followed in the revised group organization emphasizes tactical flexibility of units while retaining continuity of command where practicable. Separate battalions (administratively self-sufficient) may be included under a general headquarters pool or assigned or attached to a group.

b. The group is an administrative and tactical unit composed of a headquarters and a varying number of separate battalions (squadrons) and companies. Normally, three or four battalions and/or companies with total equivalent strength of a battalion will be assigned to a group. Additional battalions may be attached to a group where required by the situation or where required by the limited number of available group headquarters. The total number of battalions assigned and attached to a group should not exceed six.

c. Assignment and reassignment of battalions to groups may be directed by theater commanders and Headquarters, Army Ground Forces and Army Service Forces, for units under their control or by the War Department. Assignment and reassignment of battalions and companies to groups will be reported to the War Department through appropriate channels.

d. Administration within the group is the responsibility of the group headquarters. Administrative personnel from battalions assigned to a group may be utilized to augment organic administrative elements of group headquarters, as required. Further, instructions on administration within groups will be included in changes or revisions of pertinent publications in the near future.

e. The brigade is provided in certain cases as an administrative and tactical unit for command of three to four troupes. Groups will not be assigned organically to brigades.

f. The flexibility of this organization makes it readily possible to form task forces by reassignment of units without any reorganization thus permitting a massing of means as required by the situation. Wherever practicable, continuity of command, by retention of assignment of battalions to groups will be encouraged.

g. Present policies regarding operational control of a number of battalions by a group headquarters are not changed by this circular. (AG 322 (31 Oct 44))

16TH AAA GROUP

FIRST ARMY

THIRD ARMY

49TH AAA BRIGADE

III CORPS
49TH BRIG.

XIX CORPS


49TH AAA BRIGADE

THIRD ARMY

49TH BRIG.

III CORPS

JUNE JULY AUGUST SEPTEMBER OCTOBER NOVEMBER DECEMBER JANUARY FEBRUARY MARCH APRIL MAY JUNE




ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERY QUESTIONNAIRE
ETO 11 JUNE 1945

FIRST ARMY

ATTACHMENT & DETACHMENT
OF BATTALIONS TO GROUP
"D"DAY TO "VE"DAY

18TH AAA GROUP




103RD AAA GROUP

FIRST ARMY ATT. 49TH AAA BRIGADE

JUNE JULY AUGUST SEPTEMBER OCTOBER NOVEMBER DECEMBER JANUARY FEBRUARY MARCH APRIL MAY JUNE

110 GN
552 AW
563 AW
136 GN
789 AW
788 AW
197 SP
639 AW
602 GN
413 GN
142 GN
316 GN
467 SP
444 AW
542 AW
58D AW
109 GN
134 GN
581 AW




ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERY QUESTIONNAIRE
S TO III JUNE 1945

FIRST ARMY

ATTACHMENT & DETACHMENT
OF BATTALIONS TO GROUP
"D" DAY TO "VE" DAY

113TH AAA GROUP

FIRST ARMY VIII CORPS



ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERY QUESTIONNAIRE
E-T-D 11 JUNE 1945

FIRST ARMY

ATTACHMENT & DETACHMENT
OF BATTALIONS TO GROUP
"D" DAY TO "VE" DAY

207TH AAA GROUP

ASST THIRD ARMY

ATT FIRST ARMY

ATT 49TH AAA BRIG


THIRD ARMY

ATT 36TH AAA BRIG

AAA SEC

THIRD ARMY

JUNE JULY AUGUST SEPTEMBER OCTOBER NOVEMBER DECEMBER JANUARY FEBRUARY MARCH APRIL MAY JUNE



ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY
QUESTIONNAIRE
ETO 11 JUNE 1945

THIRD ARMY

ATTACHMENT & DETACHMENT
OF BATTALIONS TO GROUP

"D" DAY TO "VE" DAY

COMMENTS MADE BY EXPERIENCED OFFICERS ON THE GROUP-BATTALION ORGANIZATION

(From Army Ground Forces Report Number 228, 12th Army Group, dated 13 September 1944, subject: "Assignment of Battalions to Groups".)

* * * * *

Brigadier General N. A. BURNELL, II, Commanding 52d AAA Brigade

"As a result of my own observations and of discussions with various group commanders who have served under me in EPO, I have come to the conclusion that the present organization of the AAA group is faulty and is affecting materially the efficiency of AAA units in combat. The principal deficiency is the omission of battalions from the T/O of the group.

"The old regimental organization was quite advantageous to peace time training because it provided for continuity of command supervision. On the other hand, it was entirely too inflexible to meet the varying tactical situations of combat. The adoption of the new AAA group, divorced of administrative functions and with no permanent hold on any battalions, has swung the pendulum to the other extreme. Now, there is complete flexibility but no permanence. As a result of the frequent changes in attachments, group commanders are continually struggling with the problem of learning the capabilities and limitations of new commanders and their staffs and of determining the ability of battalions to perform their missions. Before the group commander has had time to impress his leadership on a battalion, it is frequently reassigned. At the same time, battalion commanders rarely stay under a group commander long enough to find out the way he wants things done. Consequently they are likely to pay as little attention to the current group commander as possible on the theory that next week there will be a new commander and a new way of doing things. This adds immeasurably to the burden of both.

"It is believed that the loss of continuity of command outweighs the gain in flexibility in the new organization and that there must be a return to a more or less permanent group (or regimental) organization before the efficiency of AAA units can be raised materially. It is probably impracticable to return to a regimental organization at this time but it is believed to be practicable to do the following:

- a. Assign or attach to each group a minimum of three battalions all of one kind.
- b. Make no change in the attachments unless necessary to meet an existing situation and then return detached units to their parent organizations upon termination of the necessity.
- c. Assign to groups the responsibility for administration of all attached battalions giving them additional personnel and equipment to perform this function. As a temporary measure, each battalion could contribute parts of its administrative section to the group staff."

Colonel J. H. MADISON, CAG, Commanding 16th AAA Group

"Based upon my experience as a group commander I should like to

recommend that consideration be given to the return to the regimental organization for AAA units for the following reasons:

a. The average period of attachment of battalions is too short to develop an esprit de corps which is the outstanding characteristic of all first class organizations. It does not permit the indoctrination of the battalions with the standards, policies and methods of procedure established by the commanding officer of the group.

b. General administrative supervision at regimental level rather than by battalions is preferred in the interests of efficiency, economy, and uniformity.

c. Tactical flexibility can be retained in a regimental organization if such organization is based upon the functional characteristics of the weapons assigned. I favor the organization of gun, automatic weapons, searchlight, and barrage balloon regiments, command, staff, and administrative provisions being made for the detachment of battalions to form task forces as required.

d. Staff organization, training, and supervision would be more efficient on a regimental basis."

Colonel J. T. CAMPBELL, CAC, Commanding 118th AAA Group.

"Let me add my voice to the general recommendation that battalions be given 'permanent' assignments to groups and groups similar long term assignments to brigades.

"I assure you I have controlled enough battalions by this time to learn that unless a group commander has control of a battalion over a rather long period he cannot rightfully be held to account for their actions. He is placed in a position, controlling independent units, which is really a spot suitable for a general officer with a large staff. The only way a colonel can get a reasonable control of his units is in training, and, especially with these units which have been in existence over a year or more, training requires continued pressure for quite a time.

"I have had battalions that have passed through the hands of many groups and still are not good enough to meet the requirements of any one of the group commanders. I have been able to raise the standards of certain battalions as long as they were under my control and have then seen them fall flat immediately upon being released from that control. I would hate to be judged by such outfits after they have passed from me, and I surely would not like to be the group commander who gets them next and will have to answer for their sins while he is taking their measure.

"I have in my command right now a battalion which I believe I can make into something useful. Surely I would like to take a whirl at it. Yet how much real cooperation and interest is there going to be between me and the battalion commander while he is reasonably sure he will leave my command during the coming week? Each of us might be human enough to do as little as possible for the other and get out as easily as possible.

"Please add my voice to those who are clamoring for long term assignments."

APPENDIX III

APPENDIX IV

AGF Report No. 964, War Department Observers Board, dated 18 May 1945

Subject: "Reassignment Jurisdiction"

Colonel MILO G. CARY, CAC Observer

"1. The following information was obtained from Commanding Generals of several AAA Brigades and Commanding Officers of many AAA Groups.

a. The AAA Brigade and AAA Group should have reassignment jurisdiction. This is vital in placing the best qualified personnel in the proper jobs and thus build up the best team. Basically, there must be perfect teamwork at all times and such teamwork naturally builds up esprit. These two things are vital, yet very difficult to obtain, unless the Brigade and the Group retain the same units as their team, and have reassignment jurisdiction throughout their team. The battalions must feel that it is a part of the Group. Also the Group must feel that the battalion is its responsibility and a part of the group team. The same is true of the Brigade.

b. Divisions, regiments, and battalions have such jurisdiction."

APPENDIX IV

APPENDIX V

AGF Report No. 1088, dated 4 July 1945, Subject: "Tactics and T/O,
Infantry Division."

EXTRACT

* * * * *

"Two Corps and six divisions were questioned on this point (Gp vs Regt) and they were unanimous in preferring the regimental organization. Without exception, they stated that any slight advantage that might be gained by shifting to a group organization would be more than offset by the loss in teamwork.

"The regimental organization is strong because its members know each other's capabilities and so build mutual confidence and esprit. It takes 'time to assimilate a new member'.

VIII Corps, G-3"

* * * * *

APPENDIX V

APPENDIX VI

Response to Question 28, Organization of AAA, ETOUSA Questionnaire,

11 June 1945

Brig Gen G. W. Badger, Commanding 56th AAA Brigade

"The present system (Group - Battalion) is excellent. It is believed, however, that the group, with its battalions should be a more permanent organization. The constant shift of battalions from one group to another works a hardship on both the groups and battalions. Group and brigade commanders should have reassignment jurisdiction within their commands."

APPENDIX VI

APPENDIX VII

Response to Fifteenth Army, General Board Questionnaire--

Subject: "Group vs Regiment"

I feel very strongly that the regiment should have a headquarters capable of exercising complete command and administrative control. It should, however, be of such flexibility that normal sections can operate with a detached battalion. It is believed that this arrangement will result in a considerable saving of overhead administrative personnel over that now necessary in the separate battalion set-up

"I am not satisfied with the present group and battalion set up. Napoleon gave his reason for his defeat at Waterloo: 'My men had not eaten soup long enough together.' The basic fundamental of a military organization is that it is a homogeneous entity. It takes time to build this. It means that the organization works together, trains together, plays together and lives together. Under the present group and separate battalion set-up, the group commander has little or no 'command' under the full meaning of the word. He is called upon to render reports on and make decisions concerning officers and men whom he does not know. It is unfair to the individual officer or man, to the commander and to the Government. It is my opinion that the slight tactical advantage of the loose group organization is far outweighed by the many command, administrative, and personal disadvantages. To quote Napoleon again: 'The moral is to the physical as three is to one.'

Colonel P. L. LEWIS, CAC,
Commanding 31st AAA Brigade."

APPENDIX VIII

Extract: "Artillery With an American Army in Europe" by

Brig General Charles E. Hart, Artillery Officer, First US Army.

".As a result of the experience at First Army, one constructive criticism is made with regard to WD Circular 439. It is considered most regrettable that the fine old military term 'regiment' was not substituted for 'group' throughout the circular."

APPENDIX VIII

APPENDIX IX

OFFICERS CONSULTED IN THE PREPARATION OF APPENDIX X

Brig Gen N. A. Burnell, Commanding 52d AAA Brigade
Brig Gen D. W. Hickey, Jr., Commanding 38th AAA Brigade
Brig Gen H. R. Jackson, Formerly AA Officer, ETOUSA
Brig Gen W. L. Richardson, Commanding IX Air Defense Command
Brig Gen E. V. Timberlake, Commanding 49th AAA Brigade
Colonel W. I. Brady, Commanding 56th AAA Brigade
Colonel O. T. Forman, Commanding 44th AAA Group
Colonel C. W. Gettys, Formerly CO, 207th AAA Group
Colonel W. Q. Jeffords, Formerly Executive Officer to AAO, ETOUSA
Colonel P. W. Lewis, Commanding 31st AAA Brigade
Colonel W. C. Mahoney, Jr., Formerly Executive Officer, 49th AAA Brigade
Colonel W. B. Merritt, Formerly AA Officer, Eighth Air Force
Colonel S. C. Russell, Formerly Executive Officer, 38th AAA Brigade
Lt Col K. F. Cordrey, Formerly Assistant AA Officer, Fifteenth U.S. Army
Lt Col V. M. Kimm, Formerly CO, 550th AAA Battalion
Lt Col E. L. Mickelson, Formerly CO, 119th AAA Battalion
Lt Col C. S. Vance, Formerly CO, 431st AAA AW Battalion

APPENDIX IX

APPENDIX X

Opinions of Officers Consulted

Questionnaire, Group vs Regiment, submitted by Headquarters Fifteenth U.S. Army, AA Section, in October 1945, to available senior Coast Artillery Corps Officers (see Appendix IX). The questions applicable to this study with the corresponding results tabulated for each are given below.

	<u>Replies</u>	
	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>
1. Should the battalion in a Group (Regiment) be capable of independent planning, supervision, and administrative functions, or, in short, be capable of independent mission?	17	0
2. Do you feel that the commanding officer of a group should be given all authority normal to a regimental commander?	15	2
3. Do you agree that the Group (Regiment) should consist of a headquarters capable of exercising complete command and administrative control?	15	2
4. Should the Group (Regiment) organization be called Group or Regiment. ¹	<u>Group</u> 5	<u>Regiment</u> 12

1 Ref. App. VIII