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THE GENERAL BOARD

United States Forces, European Theater

PROCEDURES FOLLOWED BY CIVIL AFFAIRS AND MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RESTORATION, REORGANIZATION AND SUPERVISION OF INDIGENOUS CIVIL ADMINISTRATION

MISSION: Prepare Report and Recommendations in Connection with Procedures Followed by Civil Affairs and Military Government in the Restoration, Reorganization and Supervision of Indigenous Civil Administration.

The General Board was established by General Orders 128, Headquarters European Theater of Operations, US Army, dated 17 June 1945, as amended by General Orders 182, dated 7 August 1945 and General Orders 312, dated 20 November 1945, Headquarters United States Forces, European Theater, to prepare a factual analysis of the strategy, tactics and administration employed by the United States Forces in the European Theater.

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UNITED STATES FORCES, EUROPEAN THEATER
APO 408

PROCEDURES FOLLOWED BY CIVIL AFFAIRS AND MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RESTORATION, REORGANIZATION AND SUPERVISION OF INDIGENOUS CIVIL ADMINISTRATION

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

SUBJECT	PAGE
Preface	viii
Part One: Civil Administration Doctrines and Techniques Established in Planning	1
Chapter 1: Liberated Territories	1
Section 1 - FRANCE	1
Bibliography, Section 1	7
Section 2 - BELGIUM	7
Bibliography, Section 2	9
Section 3 - THE NETHERLANDS	10
Bibliography, Section 3	12
Section 4 - LUXEMBOURG	12
Bibliography, Section 4	13
Chapter 2: Occupied Territory	14
Section 1 - Appointment and Removal of Officials	14
Bibliography, Section 1	16
Section 2 - Suspension of Laws and Publication of Military Government Enactments	17
Bibliography, Section 2	18
Chapter 3: Public Works and Utilities	20
Section 1 - Liberated Territories	20
Bibliography, Section 1	21
Section 2 - Occupied Territory	21
Bibliography, Section 2	22
Chapter 4: Judicial Procedure in Occupied Territory	23
Section 1 - Military Government Courts	23
Bibliography, Section 1	23
Chapter 5: Postal Services	24
Section 1 - Liberated Territories	24
Bibliography, Section 1	25
Section 2 - Occupied Territory	25
Bibliography, Section 2	25
Chapter 6: Civilian Supply	27
Section 1 - Liberated Territories	27
Bibliography, Section 1	28
Section 2 - Occupied Territory	29
Bibliography, Section 2	30
Chapter 7: Trade and Industry	32
Section 1 - Liberated Territories	32
Bibliography, Section 1	33
Section 2 - Occupied Territory	34
Bibliography, Section 2	37

Part Two: Civil Administration Operations 38

Chapter 1: Liberated Territories 38
Section 1 - FRANCE 38
Bibliography, Section 1 55
Section 2 - BELGIUM 56
Bibliography, Section 2 61
Section 3 - THE NETHERLANDS 61
Bibliography, Section 3 64
Section 4 - LUXEMBOURG 64
Bibliography, Section 4 66

Chapter 2: Occupied Territory 68
Section 1 - Appointment and Removal of Officials 68
Bibliography, Section 1 90
Section 2 - Suspension of Laws and Publication of Military Government Enactments 91
Bibliography, Section 2 92

Chapter 3: Public Works and Utilities 93
Section 1 - Liberated Territories 93
Bibliography, Section 1 95
Section 2 - Occupied Territory 95
Bibliography, Section 2 97

Chapter 4: Judicial Procedure in Occupied Territory 99
Section 1 - Military Government and German Courts . . . 99
Bibliography, Section 1 99

Chapter 5: Postal Services 100
Section 1 - Liberated Territories 100
Bibliography, Section 1 104
Section 2 - Occupied Territory 106
Bibliography, Section 2 106

Chapter 6: Civilian Supply 107
Section 1 - General 107
Bibliography, Section 1 109
Section 2 - FRANCE 109
Bibliography, Section 2 118
Section 3 - BELGIUM 119
Bibliography, Section 3 122
Section 4 - THE NETHERLANDS 122
Bibliography, Section 4 125
Section 5 - LUXEMBOURG 125
Bibliography, Section 5 126
Section 6 - Occupied Territory 127
Bibliography, Section 6 134

Chapter 7: Trade and Industry 135
Section 1 - Liberated Territory 135
Bibliography, Section 1 135
Section 2 - FRANCE 135
Bibliography, Section 2 139
Section 3 - BELGIUM 139
Bibliography, Section 3 145
Section 4 - LUXEMBOURG 146
Bibliography, Section 4 147
Section 5 - THE NETHERLANDS 148
Bibliography, Section 5 150
Section 6 - Occupied Territory 150
Bibliography, Section 6 157

Part Three: Conclusions and Recommendations 159

Chapter 1: Conclusions 159

Chapter 2: Recommendations 161

Appendices:

1. "Removal of Nazi and German Military Personnel from Key Governmental and Important Civil Positions," G-5 Operational Instructions No. 11, Headquarters, 12 Army Group, 11 March 1945 1

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THE GENERAL BOARD
UNITED STATES FORCES EUROPEAN THEATER
APO 408

REPORT ON THE PROCEDURES FOLLOWED BY CIVIL AFFAIRS AND MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE RESTORATION, REORGANIZATION AND SUPERVISION OF INDIGENOUS CIVIL ADMINISTRATION.

PREFACE

SCOPE OF STUDY AND DEFINITIONS

1. Scope:

a. This study is an evaluation of civil administration doctrines and techniques employed by Civil Affairs/Military Government in liberated and occupied territories in Northwest Europe, excluding DENMARK and NORWAY.

b. Primary consideration has been given to the relationship of Civil Affairs/Military Government and indigenous governments, and to an evaluation of:

(1) Public Works and Utilities.
(2) Judicial Procedure in Occupied Territory.
(3) Postal Services.
(4) Civilian Supply.
(5) Trade and Industry.

2. Definitions:

a. "Civil Administration", the system by which laws and regulations controlling the conduct of the civilian population, the operation of its economy, and the provision of civilian services, are applied and executed.

b. "Administrative Doctrines", precepts or principles according to which military operations (except strategical and tactical), including Civil Affairs/Military Government, are to be carried out. For example, the elimination of Nazism and the use of indigenous administrative machinery are administrative doctrines.

c. "Techniques", methods of performance, especially the detailed methods used by military personnel in performing assigned tasks.

THE GENERAL BOARD
UNITED STATES FORCES EUROPEAN THEATER
APO 408

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PART ONE

CIVIL ADMINISTRATION DOCTRINES AND TECHNIQUES ESTABLISHED IN PLANNING

CHAPTER 1

LIBERATED TERRITORIES

SECTION 1

FRANCE

1. Proposals by the French Committee of National Liberation.[1(Note)]

a. On 7 September 1943 the French Committee of National Liberation (FCNL) submitted identical proposals regarding prospective civil administration in Metropolitan FRANCE to the UNITED STATES and British Ministers in ALGIERS. These proposals formed the first basis for negotiation between the French Committee of National Liberation and the Governments of the UNITED STATES and the UNITED KINGDOM regarding doctrines which were, in time, incorporated in the final directives for Civil Affairs in FRANCE.

b. The proposals contained provisions for:

(1) The establishment of three (3) Zones.

(a) Combat Zone.

(b) Military Zone.

(c) Interior Zone.

(2) The appointment of a Delegate of the FCNL to the Supreme Command.

(3) Furnishing liaison officers.

(4) Police powers.

c. The proposals included the following dual functions:

(1) To facilitate the task of the Supreme Allied Command and the troops placed under its orders.

1(Note)--Refers to the bibliography, which is located at the end of each section.

(2) To define the respective rights and powers of the competent French authorities.

2. Drafts of Directives for Civil Affairs in FRANCE.[2] Early planning for Civil Affairs in FRANCE, by Lieutenant General A. E. Grassett, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), listed the following objectives and principles:

a. The primary purpose of the Allied landing in FRANCE would be the defeat of GERMANY. Subject only to this, it would be the object of the Allied forces to bring about the earliest possible liberation of FRANCE and the creation of conditions in which a democratically constituted French authority might be able to assume the civil administration. Until this stage was reached, the largest measure of personal and political liberty compatible with the interests of military operations, freedom of speech, of opinion, of the press, and of correspondence, would be allowed.

b. In all liberated areas the Supreme Allied Commander must, so long as and in so far as military necessity required, have supreme authority in order that the prosecution of the war might continue unhampered.

c. The civil administration under the Supreme Allied Commander should, as far as possible, be conducted by French citizens. The Director of Civil Affairs must be a French Officer appointed by the Supreme Allied Commander from the French contingent or French Liaison Mission connected with the military operations in FRANCE.

d. Military control of Civil Affairs would be of as short duration as practicable. The time of termination of military control would be decided by the Combined Chiefs of Staffs (CCS) on the recommendation of the Supreme Allied Commander.

e. If circumstances permitted, the transfer of civil responsibility to French authority might be progressive.

f. In order to achieve the eventual aim of free and untrammelled choice by the French people of the form of government under which they might wish to live, the Supreme Allied Commander should do his best to hold the scales even between all French political groups sympathetic to the Allied cause.

g. One of the first tasks of Civil Affairs on entering French territory would be to establish relations with resistance groups within FRANCE, and to secure their cooperation in civil matters.

h. The Supreme Allied Commander should have no dealings or relations with the VICHY regime except for the purpose of liquidating it. He would not retain or employ in any office any person who had wilfully collaborated with the enemy or who had deliberately acted in a manner hostile to the Allied cause.

3. French Committee of National Liberation Ordinance of 14 March 1944.[3]

a. On 14 March 1944, the French Committee of National Liberation in ALGIERS, considering itself as the authoritative government of FRANCE, passed an ordinance providing for more detailed organization and supervision of the French civil administration after liberation.

b. The principal provisions of the ordinance provided for:

(1) Representation of the FCNL by a Delegate, assisted by a Military Delegate, representing the French High Command and the Military Commissariats, and by an Administrative Delegation representing the various Civil Commissariats.

(2) Division of liberated territory into an Operational or Forward Zone, and an Interior Zone in which local government would have started functioning.

(3) Establishment, by the Delegates, of a nucleus of their respective organization, and arrangement for liaison with the Allied Military authorities.

(4) Reestablishment and maintenance, by the Military Delegate, where possible, of local civil authorities, public utilities, and communications in Forward Zones, and establishment of liaison with resistance groups.

(5) Establishment and maintenance, by the Administrative Delegation, of all phases of civil administration in the Interior Zone, exercising governmental powers under Martial Law (etat de siege), and the supervision of civilian welfare measures.

4. Civil Affairs Plan, Operation "OVERLORD".[4]

a. In this plan, it was assumed that full control would pass to the French National Authority when recognized and as soon as the military situation permitted.

b. The plan provided that:

(1) Military control over civil administration would be exercised through appropriate indigenous officials. Civil Affairs operations would not necessarily require the establishment of a new civil administration, if an adequate civil administration sufficient to insure the military requirements were functioning at the time of occupation.

(2) The civil administration would be staffed by French nationals as far as possible, and control would be exercised through them.

(3) No person would be retained in office or employed, who had willingly collaborated with the enemy or who had deliberately acted in a manner hostile to the Allied cause.

(4) Prohibition of political activities might be imposed by ordinance in specified zones. Subject to such prohibition, freedom of speech, assembly, and religious worship would be permitted.

5. Employment of the French Forces of the Interior.[5]

a. In Operation "OVERLORD", the Supreme Commander directed that the basic consideration relating to the employment of the French Forces of the Interior (FFI) would be that their action must afford the maximum support to Allied operations on the Continent.

b. The FFI were to avoid open clashes with the enemy and large scale repressive operations which would lead to the destruction of resistance as an effective fighting instrument.

c. No specific provision for the actual participation of members of the FFI in Civil Affairs was made.

6. Establishment of Basic Doctrine for Civil Affairs in FRANCE.[6]

a. On 16 June 1944 the publication, by SHAEF, of the "Field Handbook of Civil Affairs in FRANCE", established the basic doctrines for the conduct of Civil Affairs in FRANCE which were to be pursued until the termination of the military period.

b. The Supreme Commander had, de facto, supreme responsibility and authority in accordance with the rules and customs of war. It was not intended, however, that Military Government should be established in FRANCE. Civil Administration in all areas was normally to be controlled by the French themselves. In order to secure uniform civil administration the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force (SCAEF), was to utilize the leadership of French authorities (other than VICHY) in national administration. Commanders were to make every effort to insure that any action required would be taken by the French Civil Authorities. If initial recourse to French authorities failed, such action as the security of the Allied Forces or the success of the military operations might require was authorized.

c. Under this de facto authority and responsibility of the Supreme Commander, the indigenous French authorities were charged with the duty of re-organizing or re-establishing French administrative and judicial services insofar as might be necessary to facilitate the discharge of Civil Affairs responsibilities. The suspension and appointment of French administrative and judicial services and officials was to be effected through the agency of attached French officers. If the French authorities were unable to carry out the requirements of Army Groups and Line of Communication/Communication Zone commanders having area responsibility, such commanders might effect, by their own direct action, suspensions and temporary appointments.

d. It was the policy of the Supreme Commander that no other burdens and restrictions than those which were involved in the defeat of the common enemy should be imposed,

and that the French authorities should assume responsibility for all actions involved in assistance to the Allied Forces and in the reconstruction of their country.

e. The intention of the Supreme Commander, and the French authorities designated by him, was that the termination of the VICHY regime should be complete. The political action necessary to secure such termination was not to be taken by United States/British forces, but by the French. The suspension and appointment of officials was a matter of French concern, for which no responsibility needed to be taken by the Allied Forces. The removal and appointment of officials was to be effected by military authority, should military necessity demand, only in the event of there being no French authority which could effect such removal or appointment. Such actions were to be through the agency of the French Liaison Officers except when military or administrative considerations (particularly the requirements of Counter-Intelligence) demanded more stringent action than the French Liaison officers were prepared to take.

7. Agreement between the French Committee of National Liberation and the Supreme Commander.7

a. An agreement between the FCNL and the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, was signed in London, 25 August 1944. Provisions of APPENDIX "A" in the 25 August 1944 agreement, relating to administrative and jurisdictional matters, incorporated substantially the previous stipulations made in the proposals by the FCNL, 7 September 1943, the Drafts of Allied Directives for Civil Affairs in FRANCE, the FCNL Ordinance of 14 March 1944, and the Civil Affairs Plan for Operation "OVERLORD", 19 April 1944, as outlined above.

b. In regard to Civil Administration proper, the provisions of the agreement of 25 August 1944 were as follows:

(1) In areas in which military operations were to take place the Supreme Commander would possess the necessary authority to effect all measures which in his judgment were necessary for the successful conduct of the operations.

(2) Liberated French Continental territory would be divided into a Forward Zone and an Interior Zone.

(3) In emergencies affecting military operations or where no French authority was in a position to put into effect the measures deemed necessary by the Supreme Commander, the latter might as a temporary and exceptional measure, take such measures as were required by military necessity.

(4) In the Interior Zone the conduct of the administration of the territory and responsibility therefor, including the powers under the state of siege, would be entirely a matter for the French authorities.

8. Revised Directive for Civil Affairs Operations in FRANCE.[8]

a. A revised Civil Affairs Directive for FRANCE was published 25 August 1944, the purpose of which was to bring Civil Affairs planning and operation in FRANCE into line with agreements concluded by the US and British Governments with the FCNL. The agreements were attached as Annex "A" to the Revised Directive.

b. Recourse was to be had to French authorities for necessary legislative enactments. Except as set forth below, no Civil Affairs enactments were to be issued except by or with specific authorization of the Supreme Commander.

c. In the Forward Zone in emergencies affecting military operations or where no French authority was in a position to put in effect the action required, or in a Military Zone where necessary to the conduct of operations or to assure the security and efficient operation of installations of military importance, commanders having area responsibility might, as a temporary and emergency measure, issue notices or orders to the civilian population or the specified persons or classes of persons with relation to matters directly affecting the success of military operations or the security and efficient operation of such areas, provided:

(1) The application of the enactment was limited to the Forward Zone or a Military Zone, as the case might be.

(2) The character and application of the enactment was confined to the area of the commander's responsibility.

(3) The enactment conformed to policies laid down by the Supreme Commander.

d. Commanders of Army Groups or Line of Communications/Communications Zone having area responsibility might, in the circumstances and under the conditions stated in paragraph c above, issue ordinances within their respective areas of responsibility.

e. French authorities were given the responsibility for reorganizing and reestablishing French administrative and judicial services. If for military reasons commanders having area responsibility had any observations or requests to make concerning such matters, including the suspension or appointment of French officials, they were to communicate them to the French authorities. If the French authorities did not take the desired action, commanders, other than commanders of Army Groups and Lines of Communication/Communications Zones, were to report the facts to the next higher formation/headquarters with recommendations.

f. Commanders of Army Groups and Lines of Communication/Communication Zone having area responsibility

(1) Might in the Forward Zone in emergencies affecting military operations or where no French authority was in a position to insure the necessary action, take such action of a temporary character as military necessity might require, including the suspension of officials and the temporary appointment of officials on an acting basis.

(2) Might in a Military Zone take similar action where necessary for the conduct of operations or to assure the security and efficient operation of installations of military importance.

c. Other subordinate commanders might take the action provided in paragraph f above only when authorized by commanders of Army Groups and Lines of Communications/Communications Zone having area responsibility, who might delegate their powers to grant such authorization when and as required.

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SECTION 2

BELGIUM

9. Position of the Belgian Government. The policies laid down for the Supreme Commander regarding the conduct of Civil Affairs in BELGIUM were not complicated by the existence of an unrecognized central national authority, as in FRANCE. The Belgian Government, save for the absence of the King, had remained substantially intact and was invested with powers to act *in absentia* without royal sanction. The Belgian Government in LONDON was the legal and constitutional government of BELGIUM and the only authority recognized by the Governments of the UNITED STATES and the UNITED KINGDOM as qualified to speak and act in the name of BELGIUM.

10. Relations with the Belgian Government.[1]

a. The Supreme Commander was directed to prepare civil affairs plans in conjunction with a military mission appointed by the Belgian Government.

b. During the military phase, the Supreme Commander was to cooperate with the Belgian Government with regard to:

(1) The dissolution of all Nazi-inspired organizations;

(2) The impounding or sequestering of property belonging to GERMANY and her associated powers or their nationals which was not required for military purposes;

(3) The dissolution of political parties and organizations which had collaborated with the enemy;

(4) The taking of necessary measures to permit religious worship and such freedom of speech and assembly as was consistent with military necessity.

11. De Facto Authority of the Supreme Commander.[2] The agreement entered into between the Belgian Government and the Supreme Commander provided for a first or military phase in which the Supreme Commander must, de facto, exercise supreme responsibility to the full extent necessitated by the military situation. The powers of the Supreme Commander were analagous to those recognized in THE HAGUE Convention as arising out of military necessity in accordance with the usages and customs of war.

12. Belgian Sovereignty.[3] No action was to be taken, or plans made, which would affect the sovereignty of the Belgian state or commit that state to a particular course of action in the future.

13. Administration of Liberated Territory Through the Belgian Government.[4]

a. The Belgian agreement provided for the administration of liberated territory by the Belgian Government during the first phase to include the reorganization or re-establishment of Belgian administrative and judicial services. For this purpose the instructions of the Belgian Government were to be communicated through appropriate members of the Belgian Military Mission, or the Auditeur General, Haut Commissaire a la Securite de l'Etat. Appropriate members of the Belgian Military Mission were authorized to act on the spot in the event that normal procedure previously described was impracticable or impossible.

b. The re-establishment of Belgian Administrative and judicial services was to be effected by the competent Belgian authorities in accordance with Belgian Law. In the first phase, if conditions necessitated such appointments, they were to be made after consultation with the Supreme Commander, who also might request the Belgian authorities to make appointments when he considered it necessary.

14. Operation of the Belgian Civil Administration.[5]

a. It was planned that the civil administration would

normally be operated by the Belgian Government.

b. If the Belgian authorities were unable at any time or in any locality to render the assistance necessary to enable the Supreme Commander to accomplish his mission, then such executive action as the military situation might require was authorized. No executive action of a civil administrative nature, which was national in character, such as the enactment of legislation national in scope, or the suspension or appointment of national officials, was to be undertaken except as expressly authorized by the Surpeme Commander.

15. Responsibilities of the Belgian Civil Administration.[6] Belgian provincial and communal authorities were responsible for re-establishing and maintaining law and order and good government. The Belgian Government in LONDON was responsible, as soon as it was able to return to BELGIUM, for re-establishing and reorganizing the machinery of the central government, and for controlling, subject to essential military requirements, the provincial and communal government organization throughout the country. The Belgian government was also responsible for such changes of personnel in government service at all levels as they might deem necessary.

16. Liaison.[7] During the first phase the Supreme Commander was to make the fullest possible use of the advice and assistance tendered to him through Belgian liaison officers. These liaison officers were to be employed as intermediaries between the Allied Military Authorities and the Belgian local authorities.

17. Arrest of Collaborationists.[8] The Supreme Commander was directed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to arrange for the arrest and internment of the leaders of Nazi-inspired organizations and political parties which had collaborated with the enemy, and any other persons whose detention might be considered necessary in the interest of the Allied cause or the maintenance of order. All such persons who were Belgian citizens were to be turned over as soon as possible to the competent Belgian authorities to be dealt with in accordance with Belgian law.

18. Political and Industrial Activity.[9] Subject to overriding military necessity, lawful and orderly political and industrial activity was to be allowed.

19. Release of Political Prisoners.[10] In consultation with the Belgian representatives on the Supreme Commander's staff, the immediate release of persons imprisoned or detained in BELGIUM for political reasons was to be arranged.

20. Censorship.[11] During the military period, censorship and control of press, printing, publications, cinema, mail and telecommunications and the dissemination of news and information, was to be instituted in collaboration with Belgian representatives.

21. Resistance Groups.[12] No use of resistance groups after liberation was contemplated.

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SECTION 3

THE NETHERLANDS

22. General. Civil Affairs planning for THE NETHERLANDS followed the same lines as for BELGIUM. THE NETHERLANDS Government had remained intact and universally recognized among the Allies ever since its establishment in LONDON in 1939. There were, in consequence, no internationally or internally delicate conditions which called for special consideration.

23. Basis for Civil Affairs Planning for THE NETHERLANDS. The directive for Civil Affairs planning for THE NETHERLANDS, forwarded to the Supreme Commander by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, provided for:

a. The de facto responsibility of the Supreme Commander during the military period.

b. The establishment of a NETHERLANDS Government Military Mission.

c. Administration of liberated territory through THE NETHERLANDS Government.

d. Operation and responsibilities of THE NETHERLANDS civil administration.

e. Liaison.

f. Arrest and internment of collaborators and leaders of Nazi-inspired organizations.

g. Political and industrial activity.

h. Release of political prisoners.

24. Civil Affairs Directive for THE NETHERLANDS.[2] This directive authorized the Commanding General, 21 Army Group, to exercise supreme authority on behalf of the Supreme Commander and to redelegate such authority in such manner and to such extent as considered advisable. The First US Army was under the direction and control of 21 Army Group in the planning and early operational stages of the "OVERLORD" plan. If circumstances required legislation national in scope, the Supreme Commander was to be consulted beforehand. Final authority as to the formal notification to THE NETHERLANDS Government of the time and extent of the termination of the First Phase, and the making of agreements with respect thereto, was reserved to the Supreme Commander.

25. THE NETHERLANDS Military Mission.[3] For purposes of planning for the conduct of Civil Affairs and for operations in the field THE NETHERLANDS Government appointed a Military Mission, the Civil Affairs element of which was to maintain liaison with the Civil Affairs staffs at 21 Army Group Headquarters and lower echelons, and with the SHAEF Mission (NETHERLANDS). Appropriate consideration was to be given to the policies recommended by the Civil Affairs element of THE NETHERLANDS Military Mission. All NETHERLANDS Civil Affairs Officers belonged to THE NETHERLANDS organization known as THE NETHERLANDS Military Administration (MILITAIR GEZAG), and possessed extraordinary legal powers under the Royal Decree imposing a Special State of Siege.

26. Resistance Groups.

a. As the area of active operations approached the frontiers of THE NETHERLANDS, the Supreme Commander recognized the members of the resistance movement as "THE NETHERLANDS Forces of the Interior".[4] Lieutenant General His Royal Highness Prince Bernhard was nominated by THE NETHERLANDS Government to command THE NETHERLANDS Forces of the Interior, under the authority of the Supreme Commander.

b. The Supreme Commander's directives were to be issued to Prince Bernhard, who was to operate through the agency of the Commander, Special Forces, 21 Army Group.

c. Because of the underground communication facilities with occupied HOLLAND which were available to Prince Bernhard, he was able to exercise more direct control, however, than was originally anticipated.

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SECTION 4

LUXEMBOURG

27. Basis for Civil Affairs Planning for LUXEMBOURG.[1]

a. The directive for Civil Affairs planning for LUXEMBOURG was forwarded to the Supreme Commander by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. It was anticipated that the restoration of LUXEMBOURG national law and administration was likely to be a longer and more complicated process than in other Allied countries, due to the fact that LUXEMBOURG had been forcibly annexed to and absorbed in the German Reich, loyal LUXEMBOURG officials having been removed from office by the Germans. The Supreme Commander was therefore directed to consider the necessity of having to exercise a large measure of direct administrative responsibility in LUXEMBOURG during the first phase. LUXEMBOURG was formally annexed to the German Reich in August 1942, on the ground that the population was Germanic. The German occupation had been so oppressive, and the measures taken to absorb the country into the fabric of the Reich so complete, that the restoration of the status quo ante was expected to be a more complicated and lengthy process than elsewhere.

b. The directive provided for:

(1) The de facto responsibility of the Supreme Commander during a military period.

(2) The establishment of a LUXEMBOURG Government Military Mission, with functions similar to those of the Belgian and Netherlands Government Military Missions.

(3) Administration of liberated territory through the LUXEMBOURG Government.

(4) Operation and responsibilities of the LUXEMBOURG civil administration.

(5) Liaison.

(6) Arrest and internment of collaborators and leaders of Nazi-inspired organizations.

(7) Political and industrial activity.

(8) Release of political prisoners.

(9) Censorship.

c. The Supreme Commander was authorized to take any necessary action to carry out the terms of the directive utilizing as far as possible the advice and assistance of the LUXEMBOURG Government given through the LUXEMBOURG Military Mission.

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CHAPTER 2

OCCUPIED TERRITORY

SECTION 1

APPOINTMENT AND REMOVAL OF OFFICIALS

28. Directive of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.[1] The Combined Chiefs of Staff authorized the appointment and replacement of local German governmental officials by the Supreme Commander. Officers of the occupation forces could be used to replace German officials if necessary. Military Government was normally to be effected through indirect rule. The principal level for this indirect rule was to be the Regierungsbezirk or Kreis. Controls at higher levels were to be ordered at the discretion of the Supreme Commander. Subject to any necessary dismissals, local officials were to be instructed to continue to carry out their normal duties. No actual appointment of Germans to important positions was to be made until approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. It was to be made clear to all German governmental officials and employees that their continued employment would be solely on the basis of satisfactory performance and behavior.

29. Directive of the Supreme Commander.

a. Powers relative to the appointment and removal of officials were delegated by the Supreme Commander to the Commanding Generals of the Sixth and 12 Army Groups who in turn delegated them to the Commanding Generals of Armies.

b. The policies upon which these appointments and removals were to be made are as follows:[2]

(1) The removal and replacement of government officials in the area occupied by an Army would be a matter for the Army Commander's discretion. The guiding principle was to be the removal of Nazi officials and active Nazi collaborators and their replacement by non-Nazis. No permanent appointment of Germans to posts involving the exercise of authority at Regional levels or above, and no permanent appointments of Germans to the position of Regierungspräsident should be made until approved by the Supreme Commander. Confirmation of permanent appointment to lower posts was to be made only on approval of Headquarters Sixth and 12 Army Groups.

(2) The entire Nazi leadership was to be removed from posts of authority and no member of the German General Staff or of the Nazi Hierarchy was to occupy any important governmental or civil position. Army Commanders were not to permit the employment of active Nazis or ardent Nazi sympathisers and no exception was to be made to this policy on the grounds of administrative convenience or expediency. Army Commanders were to remove and exclude from office any person who acted, or whom they deemed likely to act, contrary to Allied interests or principles.

(3) The administrative machinery of certain dissolved Nazi organizations might be used with non-Nazi personnel and facilities when necessary to provide certain essential functions, such as welfare, health and sanitation.

(4) To minimize the risk of an administrative breakdown, Army Commanders were to take prompt action in connection with the appointment of acceptable substitutes to important administrative posts vacated by the Nazis.

(5) If acceptable German officials could not be found in time to prevent an administrative breakdown which would imperil the attainment of the objectives of Military Government, Army Commanders were authorized to permit direct administration by their Military Government personnel as a temporary expedient.

30. The Combined Chiefs of Staff Directed Dissolution of the Nazi Organization.[3]

a. It was the intention of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to dissolve the Nazi Party throughout GERMANY as soon as possible. In furtherance of this objective, the Supreme Commander was directed to:

(1) Take possession of offices and records of all Party organizations and list them.

(2) Suspend activities of all Party organizations except those which he might require to continue to function for administrative convenience.

(3) Arrest and imprison high Party officials.

(4) Take Party property into custody, except for those organizations specially exempted by the Supreme Commander.

b. In general the entire Nazi leadership was to be removed from posts of authority and no permanent member of the German General Staff or of the Nazi Party was to occupy any important Governmental or Civil position. The German Supreme Command and General Staff were to be disbanded in such a way that their possible restoration later would be made as difficult as possible.

31. Purpose of Law No. 5.[4]

a. To the full extent of their operation in the occupied territory, the National Socialist German Labor Party, and its 52 subsidiary offices, organizations, and institutions were dissolved and declared illegal. All Party activities, and the activities of the 52 subsidiary offices, organizations and institutions were prohibited.

b. Eight para-military organizations, all recruiting offices, training establishments, and depots connected therewith were to be dissolved. Orders regarding the disposition of the personnel and equipment thereof were to be issued by the Allied

Military authorities. Until receipt of such orders, all officers and personnel were to remain at their posts in the organizations. No further recruiting was to be permitted.

c. All offices of the NS-Volksvohlfehrt were to be closed. Its welfare activities were, subject to further direction by Military Government, to be carried on by the Burgermeister.

d. All activities by any organization, dissolved or suspended by the Military Government, its officers or members, and any acts tending to continue or renew such activities, under any form, were prohibited.

32. Directives of the Supreme Commander and The Commanding General, 12 Army Group on Dissolution of Nazi Organization.5

a. Commanders were directed to dissolve the Nazi Party.

b. In furtherance of this objective, Army Commanders were directed to:

(1) Take possession of offices and records of all Party organizations and list them.

(2) Prevent activities of all Party organizations.

(3) Arrest and imprison high Party officials.

(4) Seize and preserve all records and plans of the Nazi Party and of the Security, Criminal and ordinary police, and records of Nazi economic organizations and industrial establishments.

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SECTION 2

SUSPENSION OF LAWS AND PUBLICATION OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT ENACTMENTS

33. General Proclamation. On the commencement of occupation, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, in his capacity as SCAEF, immediately suspended every German activity which might conflict with the policies to be effected by the occupying forces. One of the first moves made by the Allied troops toward notifying the German population of any city or town of their new duties and responsibility was the posting of Proclamation Number 1 quoted below.[1]

I

"The Allied Forces serving under my Command have now entered Germany. We come as conquerors, but not as oppressors. In the area of Germany occupied by the forces under my command, we shall obliterate Nazi-ism and German Militarism. We shall overthrow the Nazi rule, dissolve the Nazi Party and abolish the cruel, oppressive and discriminatory laws and institutions which the Party has created. We shall eradicate the German Militarism which has so often disrupted the peace of the world. Military and Party leaders, the Gestapo and others suspected of crimes and atrocities, will be tried, and, if guilty, punished as they deserve.

II

"Supreme legislative, judicial and executive authority and powers within the occupied territory are vested in me as Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces and as Military Governor, and the Military Government is established to exercise these powers under my direction. All persons in the occupied territory will obey immediately and without question all the enactments and orders of the Military Government. Military Government Courts will be established for the punishment of offenders. Resistance to the Allied Forces will be ruthlessly stamped out. Other serious offenses will be dealt with severely.

III

"All German courts and educational institutions within the occupied territory are suspended. The Volksgerichtshof, the Sondergerichte, the SS Police Courts and other special courts are deprived of authority throughout the occupied territory. Re-opening of the criminal and civil courts and educational institutions will be authorized when conditions permit.

IV

"All officials are charged with the duty of remaining at their posts until further orders, and obeying and enforcing all orders or directions of Military Government or the Allied Authorities addressed to the German Government or the German people. This applies also to officials, employees and workers of all public undertakings and utilities and to all other persons engaged in essential work."

34. Nazi Laws Replaced.

a. In order to eliminate from German law and

administration within the occupied territory the policies and doctrines of the National Socialist Party, and to restore to the German people the rule of justice and equality before the law, it was ordered that all fundamental Nazi laws enacted since 30 January 1933, together with all supplemental or subsidiary laws, decrees or regulations whatsoever should be deprived of effect within the occupied territory. The abrogations and enactments implementing this policy are listed below:

(1) Abrogation of Nazi Law.[2]

(2) Character of Military Government.[3]

(3) Crimes and Offenses.[4]

(4) German Courts.[5]

(5) Military Government Gazette.[6]

(6) Dispensation by Act of Military Government With Necessity of Compliance With German Law.[7]

(7) Legislation to be Enacted.[8]

(8) Administrative Structure: Removal and Appointment of Officials.[9]

b. For further details, consult Chapter 1, of Part Two of "Legal Phases of Civil Affairs and Military Government", which is a complete study of this subject made by Judge Advocate Section of the Theater General Board. (Study No 85)

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CHAPTER 3

PUBLIC WORKS AND UTILITIES

SECTION 1

LIBERATED TERRITORIES

35. FRANCE.

a. It was the policy of the Supreme Commander to provide for the restoration of public works and utility services (such as water supply, gas supply, sewage disposal, roads and bridges) to the extent necessary to attain military objectives, including the prevention of disease and unrest that might interfere with these objectives. The implementation of this policy was primarily the responsibility of the Engineers. Civil Affairs, acting in an advisory capacity, provided liaison between the civilian officials and the Engineers.[1]

b. The restoration and maintenance of these services for civilian purposes was the responsibility of the French authorities, utilizing French technical personnel to the extent possible.

c. In areas where the Engineers were not functioning, Civil Affairs officers were responsible for advising and assisting local authorities in the restoration of public works and utilities services, in accordance with the policy of the Supreme Commander.

d. In areas of operations and in the Communications Zone, the Engineers were charged with responsibility for the procurement and control of engineering materials of either military or civilian origin.

e. In the forward areas, in emergencies affecting military operations or where no French authority was in a position to put into effect the measures deemed necessary, commanders were authorized "as a temporary and exceptional measure" to take such direct action as military necessity might require. They were directed to use local resources wherever possible, but Engineer supplies could be used for repair and construction necessary to assure the security and efficient operation of essential public utility installations.

36. BELGIUM, THE NETHERLANDS and LUXEMBOURG. Policies for the restoration and maintenance of public works and utilities in BELGIUM, THE NETHERLANDS and LUXEMBOURG were substantially the same as for FRANCE, i.e., to restore them to the extent necessary to attain military objectives, with the restoration and maintenance of such services for civilian purposes being primarily the responsibility of the particular government involved. Detailed consideration of these policies and the accompanying instructions may be found in the SHAEF "Handbook for Civil Affairs - BELGIUM," Chapter 27;[2] the 12 Army Group "Civil Affairs Directives and Instructions - THE NETHERLANDS," Annex 7,[3] and the SHAEF "Field Handbook for Civil Affairs - LUXEMBOURG," Chapter 26.[4]

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4. "Field Handbook for Civil Affairs - LUXEMBOURG," SHAEF, undated.

SECTION 2

OCCUPIED TERRITORY

37. Over-all Policy. In occupied territory it was the policy of the Supreme Commander to provide for the restoration of public works and utility services (such as water supply, electric power supply, sewage disposal, roads and bridges) to the extent necessary to attain military objectives and to prevent such disease and disorder as might endanger or impede military operations.[1]

38. Non-military Purposes. The restoration and maintenance of such services for other purposes was to be carried out by German civilians only, at the direction of the Army Commanders. Such direct action as the Army Commanders considered necessary was authorized.

39. Use of Local Resources. Public works and utilities were to be restored to the extent possible by utilizing only local resources not needed for military use, but Army Commanders might at their discretion use Engineer supplies for repair and construction where such material was essential to the implementation of the policy stated in paragraph 37 above.

40. Denazification. The commanders were to remove active Nazis and ardent Nazi sympathizers holding positions in public works and utilities and in the German administrative agencies exercising control over them.

41. Engineer Responsibilities. The Engineers had primary responsibility in areas where they were functioning.

42. Military Government Responsibilities. Military Government officers were to be responsible for the direction of German authorities in the restoration of public works and utilities services, in accordance with the policy of the Supreme Commander, in areas where the Engineers were not functioning. In areas where the Engineers were functioning, Military Government officers were to advise and assist them in every possible way.

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CHAPTER 4

JUDICIAL PROCEDURE IN OCCUPIED TERRITORY

SECTION 1

MILITARY GOVERNMENT COURTS

43. General Policies. Commanding Generals of Armies were authorized to establish Military Government courts.[1] They were empowered to redelegate the authority to establish General, Intermediate and Summary Military Courts to Corps and Division commanders and to general officers commanding areas equivalent to provinz, land (state), regierungsbezirk and landeskommisserbezirk (district). In addition, Army commanders were authorized to redelegate the power to establish Summary Military Courts to Military Government detachment commanders at corresponding governmental levels.

44. Jurisdiction. Military Government courts were given jurisdiction over all persons in the occupied territory except persons, other than civilians, subject to military, naval or air force law who were serving under the command of SCAEF or any other commander of any forces of the United Nations. These courts had jurisdiction over:

a. All offenses against the laws and usages of war.

b. All offenses under any proclamation, law, ordinance, notice or order issued by or under the authority of the Military Government of the Allied Forces.

c. All offenses under the laws of the occupied territory or of any part thereof, which had not been superseded by Military Government laws.

45. Powers of Sentence, Composition of Courts, Review, Records, Fines and Rules of Procedure. A complete statement of the policy of the Supreme Commander on these matters may be found in Ordinance No. 2, "Military Government Courts".[1] A discussion of these policies may be found in a contemporary study by Judge Advocate Section, this Headquarters, "Legal Phases of Civil Affairs and Military Government", Part Two, Chapter 1, "Jurisprudence of the Military Government", Study number 85.[2]

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CHAPTER 5

POSTAL SERVICES

SECTION 1

LIBERATED TERRITORIES

46. FRANCE.

a. It was the policy of the Supreme Commander to authorize and assist the restoration of French postal services, including financial and other services connected therewith, to the extent necessary to attain military objectives. This policy recognized the prompt restoration of postal service for civilian use as essential to the maintenance of local administration and economy.[1]

b. The operation, maintenance and administration of this service was to be accomplished by French authorities utilizing local resources and civilian technicians. Where necessary to attain military objectives, Army Group Commanders were authorized to augment local equipment and supplies from military stocks.

c. No postal service was to be restored, however, without obtaining the concurrence of the appropriate security authorities (G-2), and all communications were subject to such censorship as the Supreme Commander prescribed.

d. In the Forward Zone in emergencies affecting military operations or where no French authority was in a position to put into effect the measures deemed necessary, Army Group Commanders were authorized "as a temporary and exceptional measure" to take such direct action as military necessity might require. Such direct action might include the suspension of postal services for civilian use "but only to the extent and for the time requisite to insure security and to provide for military needs." In military zones, moreover, commanders might take, or cause the services in charge of installations of military importance to take, such measures in regard to civilian postal activities as were necessary for the conduct of operations and, in particular, those necessary to assure the security and efficient operation of such installations.

e. Financial policies related to the postal service were laid down in Civil Affairs directives. Control was to pass to the French as soon as possible.

47. BELGIUM, THE NETHERLANDS and LUXEMBOURG. Policies for the restoration and maintenance of postal services in BELGIUM, THE NETHERLANDS and LUXEMBOURG were substantially the same as for FRANCE, i.e., to restore them to the extent necessary to attain military objectives, with the restoration and maintenance of such services for civilian purposes being primarily the responsibility of the particular government involved. Detailed consideration of these policies and the accompanying instructions may be found in the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, "Handbook for Civil Affairs - BELGIUM", Chapter 28;[2] the 12 Army Group "Civil Affairs Directives and Instructions - THE NETHERLANDS", Annex 7,[3] and the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, "Field Handbook for Civil Affairs - LUXEMBOURG", Chapter 27.[4]

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SECTION 2

OCCUPIED TERRITORY

48. Restoration Planned Only to Accomplish Military Mission. The Commanding Generals of the First, Third, Ninth and Fifteenth US Armies were directed by Headquarters 12 Army Group to insure that civilian postal services, including financial services performed by the Reichspost, should be continued or restored to the extent necessary to fulfill their missions.[1]

49. Responsibilities. Commanding Generals were charged with insuring that the Reichspost was fully controlled and that it discharged in full its responsibility of providing any and all facilities required for the military occupation and government of GERMANY. These facilities included approved postal technical and administrative personnel. The Reichspost was made responsible for compliance by civilian users with the censorship regulations governing the use of its services when opened. To clarify all regulations, Headquarters 12 Army Group furnished each of the armies with complete instructions to be issued to the Reichspost.[2]

50. Financial Policy. Other than the customary financial services rendered by German post offices, such as the Postal Saving Service and the payment of salaries, pensions and allowance, general civilian use of the postal services was directed to be temporarily suspended at the beginning of occupation. Policies for these customary financial operations were laid down in Military Government financial directives.

51. Local Resources To Be Used. Repairs and maintenance authorized were to be carried out only to the extent that utilization of local resources not required for military purposes would permit.

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CHAPTER 6

CIVILIAN SUPPLY

SECTION 1

LIBERATED TERRITORIES

52. Definition. Civilian supplies include the following items necessary for the health and welfare of the civil population:

a. Food.

b. Emergency equipment for feeding people.

c. Medical and sanitary supplies.

d. Clothing.

e. Blankets.

f. Footwear.

g. Industrial machinery, spare parts and repair equipment.

h. Automotive spare parts and repair equipment.

i. Farm implements and seeds.

j. Postal equipment.

k. Newsprint.

53. Captured Enemy Equipment. Captured enemy equipment and supplies not required for the Allied Armies were considered potential civilian supply, to be used when needed. Everything from bridging materials to livestock was named in this category.[1]

54. Responsibilities in FRANCE. The Commanding Generals of 21 Army Group and 12 Army Group were made responsible for calling forward civilian supplies to meet such relief and rehabilitation requirements as were necessary to further the military mission.[2] The use of military transport as necessary was authorized. The storage and issue of the supplies was entrusted to the supply branches of Ordnance, Quartermaster, Engineer, Medical and Signal Sections, with each such Service handling the supplies peculiar to its own functions. Supervision of accounting for the supplies was made the responsibility of Civil Affairs Finance Branch.

55. Credits for Supplies. Credits for civilian supplies were made available to the Supreme Commander by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Commanding Generals of Army Groups were made responsible for delivering the supplies to points where civil agencies could receive them within the Zone of Operation and Communications Zone. Other agencies were responsible for areas outside of these zones (Hiatus Areas). SHAEF reserved control of credits for civilian stocks allocated to the Army Group Commanders and reserved the right to transfer such stocks without regard to previous allocations. To implement this policy, SHAEF required periodic reports indicating the status of such credits.

56. Distribution and Payment. At the earliest possible date consistent with military operations, arrangements were to be completed by Army Group Commanders for the delivery of Civil Affairs supplies at points of initial entry to French authorities, for equitable distribution to civilian populations. Only a quantitative receipt was to be demanded. Payment was to be arranged at a later date between the French authorities and the British and US Governments.

57. Direct Issue Only in Emergency. Except when circumstances were clearly such that no other course of action was possible, it was the policy of the Supreme Commander to avoid direct relief activities wherein issue of Civil Affairs relief supplies would be made to actual consumers. The civilians needing such help were to receive it only (as a general rule) through the medium of agencies designated by the French authorities. An exception to this rule was made in cases of camps or other installations operated by elements of the Allied Forces for Displaced Persons; but here also it was still required that proper quantitative receipts be obtained from the authorized French authorities for Civil Affairs relief supplies so issued.

58. Use of Local Resources. Before issuing imported Civil Affairs supplies, every effort was to be made to insure that the French authorities made maximum use of existing local resources, including manufacturing and production facilities.

59. Civilian Labor. French authorities were required to hire, pay and furnish civilian labor necessary for the handling of Civil Affairs supplies. However, if the French authorities were unable to provide the requisite labor, Civil Affairs detachments were authorized to hire civilian labor through appropriate military channels. The cost of this labor was to be borne by the French authorities concerned.

60. Emergency Transportation. Civil Affairs detachments were authorized to apply to the appropriate military commanders for the use of military transport whenever the French civil authorities were unable to provide it.

61. Food Calorie Standard. In planning the import of foodstuffs for civil populations, the Supreme Commander prescribed a minimum standard of 2,000 calories per person per day.

62. BELGIUM, THE NETHERLANDS, and LUXEMBOURG. Policies for civilian supply in these countries were substantially the same as for FRANCE, i.e., to provide what was necessary to attain military objectives, with the restoration and the maintenance of supply services for civilians being primarily the responsibility of the particular government concerned. Detailed considerations of these policies and the accompanying instructions may be found in the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, "Handbook for Civil Affairs - BELGIUM", Chapter 21;[3] the 12 Army Group "Civil Affairs Directives and Instructions - THE NETHERLANDS", Annex 6,[4] and the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, "Field Handbook for Civil Affairs - LUXEMBOURG", Chapter 21.[5]

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SECTION 2

OCCUPIED TERRITORY

63. Policy.

a. It was the policy of the Supreme Commander not to import any relief supplies into GERMANY. This policy was only to be modified in extreme emergencies to the extent necessary to prevent disease and such disorder as might endanger or impede military operations.[1]

b. The German authorities were to be required to make necessary provision from German resources for the food and other essential living requirements of Displaced Persons, and to meet the minimum basic requirements of the German population. Provision for the German population was in no case to be higher than that in liberated countries.

c. The German authorities were to be required to maintain or develop production to meet the needs indicated above, and for the production of such exportable surpluses as might be required by Allied authorities.

64. Responsibility for Displaced Persons.

a. Army Commanders were to require the German authorities to make necessary provision from German resources for the essential living requirements of Displaced Persons and refugees.

b. To the extent that it was feasible, food supplies were to be furnished to Displaced Persons at approved camps or other centers, at a scale of approximately 2,000 calories a day. Where available supplies were inadequate to meet the minimum needs both of Displaced Persons and the German population, Displaced Persons were to be given priority.

65. Responsibility for German Population. Army Commanders were empowered, in extreme emergencies dictated by strict military necessity, to furnish relief items for the German population, including Displaced Persons other than United Nations nationals. This, however, was to be done only in extreme circumstances where indigenous essential supplies were not available for the German population in sufficient quantities to prevent disease and such disorder as might endanger or impede military operations.

66. Provision of Military Government Supplies.

a. Army Commanders were directed to secure approval and call forward supplies to create a stockpile of relief items to meet critical emergencies that might arise under the conditions indicated above. Estimates of items, quantities and the date when the stockpile would be available were to be submitted to 12 Army Group Headquarters as early as possible.

b. When it was found necessary from a strictly military viewpoint to provide military supplies for Displaced Persons or the German population, Army Commanders were directed to notify 12 Army Group Headquarters immediately of such action, the reasons therefor, the quantity of each item supplied and the probable period of issue.

c. Immediately upon occupation of an area, Army Commanders were to conduct a survey of available indigenous supplies in relation to requirements of Displaced Persons and German population in the area, in order to determine the existence of surpluses which might be needed elsewhere or to determine the extent of critical deficits. In the case of deficits, estimates were to be made of additional supplies that might be required to prevent disease and such disorder as might endanger or impede military operations. These estimates were to be submitted to 12 Army Group Headquarters covering a period for at least three months ahead.

67. Distribution. Imported supplies provided for Displaced Persons and the German population were to be distributed through whatever medium was operationally practicable. From the earliest moment, German authorities would be required to distribute equitably available supplies among the civil population.

68. Receipts for Supplies.

a. Supplies furnished for Displaced Persons who were being provided for at camps or other centers which the Army Commanders had approved were to be issued against quantitative receipts only. Where it had been possible to segregate such Displaced Persons by nationalities the record would show the nationality.

b. Pending further instructions, any imported supplies furnished the German population were to be issued against quantitative receipts. Instructions were to be issued at a later date as to the procedure for settlement by the German authorities.

69. Stock Control. Supreme Headquarters was to exercise control of such credits as might be allocated, and reserved the right to transfer stocks regardless of allocations. Periodic reports indicating the status of credits reallocated to Army Commanders were to be submitted to 12 Army Group Headquarters.[2]

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CHAPTER 7

TRADE AND INDUSTRY

SECTION 1

LIBERATED TERRITORIES

70. FRANCE - General Policy.

a. The general policy of the Supreme Commander provided for the restoration of French industry and production to the extent necessary to insure the maximum contribution to military requirements and essential needs of the civilian population.[1]

b. Restoration was made the responsibility of the French authorities.

c. Army Group Commanders were authorized to take any emergency action required by military necessity in the Forward Zone.

71. Civil Affairs Specialists and Emergency Industrial Supplies. Army Group Commanders were directed by SHAEF to facilitate the effort of French authorities to re-establish stable trade and industrial conditions in FRANCE whenever the tactical situation permitted. They were authorized to assign Civil Affairs specialists to French authorities in an advisory capacity and to allocate emergency industrial supplies for trades and industries whose continued productive activity was of material importance to military or other public interests.

72. Objectives. The over-all objectives of the Supreme Commander in regard to labor were to:

a. Secure for the Allied Forces whatever labor might be required.

b. Make remaining labor available for urgent civilian needs.

c. Prevent work stoppages involving employees of the Allied Forces engaged on projects essential to the successful prosecution of military operations.

d. Re-establish labor exchanges, employment offices and other government labor agencies required to accomplish this objective.

e. Army Group Commanders were authorized to effect such measures as they found necessary to the success of their mission. This was to be accomplished by reliance on the French authorities to the fullest extent possible.

73. Direct Action Permissible in the Forward Zone.

a. Army Group Commanders were authorized by the Supreme Commander to exercise emergency control over wage scales and labor in the forward zone by "temporary and exceptional" actions.

b. Moreover, in military zones, similar measures were authorized in order to assure the security and efficient operation

of essential installations. Direct action so taken was to be in accordance with the following principles:

(1) Wage rates in the public services were not to be changed except under the most unusual conditions. Local public service employees were not to be placed on the payroll of the military force concerned but were to be retained on the payroll of the civilian agency.

(2) Civilian labor exchanges or offices were to be continued in operation unless proved inadequate.

(3) Collective bargaining between public and private employers and employees was to be authorized.

(4) Social security and social insurance institutions, programs and systems might be continued, except that those inimical to the Allied Forces were to be reorganized or discontinued. The collection of premiums and payment of benefits was to be authorized under existing systems, and advances from Civil Affairs funds to enable such benefits to be paid might be made under appropriate safeguards.

(5) Under normal circumstances Civil Affairs staffs and detachments were directed not to engage or use labor directly. In those places where General Purchasing Agents or Engineers operated, Civil Affairs labor needs were to be filled through these agencies. Where these agencies were not operating, Civil Affairs staffs and detachments were given authority to hire labor directly.

74. BELGIUM, THE NETHERLANDS and LUXEMBOURG. Policies for the restoration and maintenance of trade and industry in BELGIUM, THE NETHERLANDS and LUXEMBOURG were substantially the same as for FRANCE, i.e., to restore them to the extent necessary to attain military objectives, with the restoration of such trade and industry for civilian purposes being primarily the responsibility of the government involved. Detailed consideration of these policies and accompanying instructions may be found in the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, "Handbook for Civil Affairs - BELGIUM," Chapter 19;[2] the 12 Army Group "Civil Affairs Directives and Instructions - THE NETHERLANDS," Annex 7,[3] and the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, "Field Handbook for Civil Affairs - LUXEMBOURG," Chapter 18.[4]

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SECTION 2

OCCUPIED TERRITORY

75. Objectives.

a. It was the intention of SHAEF to assure that production, acquisition or development of implements of war would be stopped except as needed to meet the requirements of the Allied Forces and to assure, to the extent that it was feasible, the production and maintenance of goods and services essential:

(1) To meet the needs of the Allied Forces.

(2) For the prevention or alleviation of epidemics, civil unrest and disorder which would endanger occupying forces and interfere with the accomplishment of the occupational objectives.

(3) For the procurement of such goods and materials for export as might be directed for the use of the United Nations.

b. A further objective was to prevent the dissipation or sabotage of German resources which might be required for relief, restitution or reparation to any of the Allied countries.

76. Import and Export Trade. In accordance with Military Government Law No. 161, import and export trade was to cease and was not to be resumed except as authorized by Army Group Commanders to meet the immediate needs of the US Forces involved. The shipment of supplies, equipment and other property to meet the responsibilities of the Supreme Commander in areas outside of GERMANY was to be made only upon approval of Army Group Commanders. Subsequent instructions were issued with regard to utilization of German resources for export from GERMANY.

77. Protection of Plants, Etc. Army Commanders were directed to prevent sabotage and damage of plants, property, materials, patents, equipment, books and records of large German industrial companies and trade and research associations which had been essential to the German war effort and the German economy.

78. Economic Controls. Army Group Commanders ordered German authorities to:

a. Eliminate all features of control or allocation systems which discriminated against or in favor of groups or individuals on the grounds of race, creed, color or political opinion.

b. Maintain in force and effect all other laws and regulations pertaining to the control of industry and to the allocation of fuels, raw materials, semi-finished goods and items for maintenance and repair.

c. Maintain or re-establish the agencies responsible for the administration and enforcement of such laws and regulations as were continued in force, and to require the officials and employees

of the agencies, except those removed in accordance with par. 81 below, to continue with or return to their function.

79. Responsibility of German Authorities. Such steps were to be taken as might be necessary to hold the German authorities strictly responsible for the protection of all funds, property, equipment, accounts and records of such agencies.

80. German Officials Required to Remain At Posts. When any agency, or branch or section thereof was abolished, officers and administrative officials were to be required to remain at their posts until otherwise directed and were to be held strictly responsible for the protection of all funds, property, equipment, accounts and records.

81. Removal of Personnel. All active Nazis and ardent Nazi sympathizers were to be removed immediately from all positions in the Ministry for Armaments and War Production, the Ministry of Economics, and organizations performing governmental or semi-governmental functions such as cartels, groups and other trade and industrial associations.

82. Production of War Material. Production of all war material was to be stopped. Research and experimental work were to be resumed only pursuant to orders issued by or under the authority of the Army Group Commander. Commanders were not to authorize the production, acquisition or development of implements of war for use of their forces except by direction of the Army Group Commander or in cases of military necessity. Any action taken in such emergency cases was to be reported to Army Group.

83. Other Materials.

a. In order to fill requirements of the Allied forces, to assist in meeting the responsibilities of the Supreme Commander in areas outside of GERMANY, and to provide for essential civilian needs in GERMANY to the extent necessary for the attainment of the objectives of Supreme Headquarters, German authorities were to continue production at the highest level feasible with existing plant and mine capacity of:

(1) Food products.

(2) Medical supplies.

(3) Sanitation supplies.

(4) Soap.

(5) Liquid fuels.

(6) Solid fuels.

(7) Fertilizers.

(8) Raw materials, semi-finished goods, repair parts and equipment required for production of the above items, and for current maintenance of plants and mines.

b. German authorities were to maintain gas, electric, water and other public services at the level necessary to meet

military requirements, minimum civilian needs, and the requirements of hospitals and essential industries.

84. Emergency Production. In an emergency, in order to obtain the objectives of the Army Group Commander, the German authorities could be authorized or required to produce items for the civilian population in addition to those listed in par. 83 above.

85. Changes. The Army Group Commander might from time to time change or add to the list of items set forth in par. 83 above.

86. Allocations. In order to attain the objectives of the Army Group Commander, Army Commanders were to order the German authorities to allocate fuels, raw materials, semi-finished goods, and items for maintenance and repair, on the following priority basis:

a. First priority - Requirements of the Allied Forces.

b. Second priority - Transportation for essential civilian needs; production of food products, medical supplies, sanitation supplies, soap and fertilizers.

c. Third priority - Production of clothing, textiles and footwear; farm implements and equipment.

87. Priorities. Priorities for production of fuels, raw materials, semi-finished goods, and items for maintenance and repair were to be determined by the contemplated use of the products. German authorities were to be prohibited from allocating fuels, materials and maintenance items to other industries until the needs of industries listed in par. 83 and 86 above, had been satisfied. In emergency, in order to attain the objectives of the Army Group Commander, German authorities were to be authorized temporarily to change priorities or to add items to the priority list set forth in par. 83 above. Permanent changes and additions were not to be made without authorization from the Army Group Commander.[1]

88. Distribution. Distribution of products for civilian use was to be made in accordance with SHAEF directives on Distribution, Rationing and Price Control,[2] Agriculture and Food Processing, Fisheries, Forestry,[3] and Supply.[4]

89. Surpluses. Surpluses were to be held in stock until instructions for their disposition were issued.

90. Reports. Further instructions were to be issued with respect to:

a. Stocks on hand.

b. Plant and mine capacities.

c. Feasibility of converting plants to other production.

d. Patents and processes.

e. State of repair of plants, mines and equipment.

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PART TWO

CIVIL ADMINISTRATION OPERATIONS

CHAPTER 1

LIBERATED TERRITORIES

SECTION 1

FRANCE

91. Army Civil Affairs Responsibilities.[1]

a. The conduct of Civil Affairs operations was a command responsibility. Each commander was responsible for Civil Affairs operations within the area under his jurisdiction. The duty of the Civil Affairs staffs at the headquarters of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), 12 Army Group, 6 Army Group, or Armies, Corps and Divisions was to advise the respective commanders on Civil Affairs problems, and to coordinate Civil Affairs plans and operations with tactical plans and operations.

b. Civil Affairs detachments were provided to relieve the arms and services of civil commitments and to make available to them such civilian resources as were required to further the military effort. Civil Affairs detachments were assigned to the principal cities and towns in the combat zone and normally operated through acceptable heads of the local civil government, except where military necessity required more direct methods. Their area of jurisdiction was so defined that the entire territory in the military zone was covered. Civil Affairs detachments normally remained in the area to which originally assigned, and reverted to Corps, Army and Communications Zone control as the rear boundaries moved forward.

92. Techniques of Civil Affairs Administration.

a. Initial contact with civil administration on the continent was made on the evening of D-Day.[2] Three officers of the Civil Affairs Section of the First US Army accompanied the 82 Airborne Division and landed in NORMANDY in a glider on 6 June 1944, marking the first instance of Civil Affairs participation in an airborne invasion. By the morning of 8 June 1944 the three officers were able to begin Civil Affairs activities. The mayors of several communes in NORMANDY were contacted and arrangements were made for the procurement of labor and burial of the dead. Two officers of the Civil Affairs Section, First US Army, accompanied the 101 Airborne Division, landing with other headquarters personnel on the beach. These officers held the first two group meetings of local officials in liberated territory, the first consisting of six mayors on D plus eight and the second of 25 mayors on D plus 10.

b. Until 1 August 1944, the First US Army was under the operational control of 21 Army Group. On that date 12 Army Group became operational on the Continent and the First US Army was placed under its command.

c. When 12 Army Group became operational, arrangements for the administration of French Departments were completed by the Government Affairs Branch, G-5 Section, and coordinated with the Armies through the individual Prefets.[3] During the next stage, and as a basis for operations to follow, conferences were held with the Regional Commissioner at BRETAGNE and other French officials at RENNES (Y-05). The French officials assembled for the occasion were informed that it was the desire and purpose of the Army Group Commander to have the French carry on all governmental operations and they were urged to do so with minimum assistance from Armies and Army Group. The French agreed to the plan. As the Armies advanced, regional authorities were contacted in like manner as their areas were uncovered, particularly in the regions of ANJOU and ORLEANS. Following the liberation of PARIS, the French had so well organized themselves that thereafter it was usually unnecessary for Army Group Headquarters or the Armies to contact the regional or departmental governments because the activities of concern to the military, for the most part, were conducted by the French Provisional Government.

93. Political Relationships with French Civil Administration.

a. From 9-12 June 1944 a survey was made on the political situation by Lt Col D. R. Ellias of 21 Army Group. Col Ellias reported that:[4]

(1) The only deduction to be drawn from his many conversations in FRANCE was that the average man in the territory so far liberated looked to General de Gaulle as the natural and inevitable leader of Free FRANCE. Asked whether the General was regarded as the head of the Provisional government, most were vague in their replies. More than anything else Frenchmen were looking for a government, even if it were to be a temporary one, in which they could repose trust during the period of transition from war to peace. Further they were waiting for General de Gaulle to take the initiative. Were he to land in FRANCE as the recognized head of the Provisional government, there would be no possible doubt that all would rally to him.

(2) The uncertainty of the political situation, in which the general terms of Proclamation No. 1 must have been considered a factor, had had one important result. In BAYEUX (T-78), the Maire and Commissaire de Police stated that they could not bring persons to trial until they knew in whose name they were to act. They wanted guidance as to the identity of the legitimate government of FRANCE.

(3) Lt Col Ellias, in summation, believed that the elation of D-Day was being succeeded by reflection which showed the thinking man that the regime was rudderless:

"A lead had to be given. No leader other than General de Gaulle was mentioned at any time. Without doubt a lead by General de Gaulle

would be loyally and universally followed," predicted Lt Col Ellias.

b. A report was made by Major E. J. Boulton of 21 Army Group on the initial visit to the First US Army zone of operations on 10-11 June 1944. Major Boulton reported that:5

(1) Most officials and authorities were present. Administration was functioning, but assistance and advice were generally required.

(2) No members of resistance movements had been encountered. The people were undemonstrative, but were very cooperative and generally friendly towards our troops. The attitude towards General de Gaulle was friendly and the impression gained was that a Provisional government under his leadership would be popular. When his name was mentioned on the army news van broadcast it was cheered. No French liaison officers had yet landed, and it was felt that they were urgently required.

c. Up to 14 June 1944, M. Rochat, the Sous Prefet of BAYEUX (T-78), whose activities during the occupation were the subject of unfavorable representations by the local resistance group leaders, was outwardly cooperative, and law and order throughout the Second British Army beach-head functioned smoothly from the outset.6 On this date General de Gaulle landed in FRANCE. He brought with him Colonel de Chevigne as Commandant Militaire and M. Coulet as Commissaire Regional who, under Etat de Siege powers and the ordinance of the Committee of National Liberation of 14 March 1944, assumed civil control of the area. M. Rochat was replaced as Sous Prefet by M. Triboulet. The reactions of the local population, according to the Second British Army report, were to accept the situation as the only possible solution and to accept the General as the head of the only available French government. All shades of political opinion in BAYEUX (T-78) were in varying degrees enthusiastic and emphatic that General de Gaulle and no one else could solve the existing deadlock.

94. Civil Affairs Relationships with Indigenous Administration continued to improve after M. Coulet became the Regional Commissioner. A survey of the contacts established by the G-5 Staffs of the First, Third and Seventh US Armies in FRANCE and the detachments operating under their direction gives a comprehensive picture of the type of problems that were met and settled. The Ninth US Army had similar problems and contacts, but of a comparatively limited scope, in BRITTANY, and its reports are not considered here. Following are some of the highlights of the operations of the Armies in civil administration:

a. First US Army.

(1) The AC of S, G-5, on 11 June 1944 reported from NORMANDY that Civil Affairs detachments had been established at ST. LAURENT-SUR-MER (T-68), ISIGNY (T-58), TREVIERES (T-68), STE. MERE EGLISE (T-39), and HIESVILLE (T-39) He stated:

"Local administration functioning with

assistance...No resistance movement met. De Gaulle popular."[7]

(2) On 25 and 26 June 1944 the First US Army reported:

"Effectiveness of Civil Affairs remains satisfactory and Civil Administration improving and taking more aggressive action."[8]

(3) On 1 July 1944 Civil Administration was becoming more effective in that it was devoting its attention to administrative problems rather than to questions of sovereignty:

"Minor officials were taking more pride in their offices."[9]

(4) The SHAEF Civil Affairs Summary (CASUM) reported on 8 July 1944, concerning First US Army activity in CHERBOURG (C-12), the first major Civil Affairs experiment on the Continent:

"The efficiency of civil administration throughout the area continued to improve during the past week. The situation seems to be typically represented by Cherbourg where officials are turning their attention more to administrative problems than to questions of sovereignty, and minor officials are taking more pride in their duties. Some uncertainty exists, both among certain elements of the population and in some allied staffs, concerning the manner in which representatives of General de Gaulle will exercise their authority.

"French Liaison Officers are now attached to the Civil Authorities instead of to the Civil Affairs Detachments. This change in procedure does not alter the real functions they will perform.

"Advance planning of First US Army for Cherbourg seems to be bearing fruit in the administration of that city by Colonel Howley, CO of the CA Detachment operating there. He has been given a coordinating position covering billeting, police, and security, by the Port Commander."[10]

(5) It was reported on 3 July 1944 that the Mayor of CHERBOURG (C-12) was competent:

"He is much interested in seeing that all matters which will facilitate the Allied military effort are carried out."[11]

(6) The first report indicating any appreciable difficulty in the United States zone was from LA HAYE DU PUITS (T-18) on 12 July 1944. The new German policy of evacuating all civilians was felt for the first time. The Civil Affairs detachment could not find the mayor or other

officials and was forced to post its notices and proclamations by its own authority.[12]

(7) At the end of July the situation in the First US Army area seemed to be much clearer and hopeful generally:

"The cardinal principle of successful CA operation is supervision of local government to the end that it becomes an agency contributing to the military effort. It became increasingly clear during July that the local governments of France were eager to accept that role; that they only wanted the chance."[13]

(8) More evidence of the difficulty experienced because of the withdrawal of officials by the retreating enemy was reported on 1 August 1944:

"Difficulty was experienced in finding any government officials in towns recently occupied by the First US Army. While this occasioned no other ill effects except to delay signing of Army orders by the mayors and the speedy functioning of local government, it brought about a situation where Civil Affairs, for a matter of hours, or in some cases, days, operated without local officials present."[14]

(9) On 2 August 1944 an appraisal of the situation stated:

"The state of Civil Administration is satisfactory in the lower echelons and doubtful in the higher."[15]

(10) The liberation of PARIS, 25 August 1944, by the V Corps of the First US Army found Civil Administration functioning smoothly enough to maintain the essential services of law and order.[16]

Third US Army.

(1) During the month of July 1944, before the Third US Army became operational, members of the G-5 Staff visited public officials in towns liberated by the First US Army upon the invitation of the AC of S, G-5, of that Army. According to the Third US Army After Action report:

"These officers saw at first hand the ability of the French, with the encouragement of Civil Affairs specialists, to reorganize and set in motion the machinery of public administration."[17]

The Third US Army AC of S, G-5, concluded that:

"The service in which Civil Affairs could be most valuable was to perform liaison with the French, to convey to them the wishes of the Army Commander, and to lend prestige to local governments by giving open evidence of the Army's

support."[18]

(2) August 1944 operations.[19]

(a) The breakthrough of the German lines at AVRANCHES (T-21) late in July, and the swift advances of the Third US Army troops in BRITTANY that followed during August, changed the Civil Affairs operational picture completely.

(b) The degree of damage to towns decreased almost in exact ratio to the increase in the pace of the advance. The problem now became one of spreading the available detachments thinly, of a single detachment taking over an area comparable to that previously allotted to a company of detachments. Liaison and communications became major problems; toward the month's end, VIII Corps G-5 headquarters was more than 350 miles from Army G-5.

(c) More and more reliance had to be placed on the French. Whereas proclamations and other notices had been posted in towns by hundreds, they now had to be provided by thousands. In a single printing at GRANVILLE (T-13), 50,000 copies of such notices were turned out to meet the demands of corps and division staffs.

(d) The early forecast of French cooperation made by the Army Commander, and on which all G-5 policy had been based, soon was abundantly justified. On 4 August 1944, AC of S, G-5, was able to report to the Chief of Staff that everywhere in the Army's Zone of Operations the authorities were restoring their authority and assuming their functions.

(e) French nationals were allowed to keep arms they had seized from the Germans or which had been dropped to them by parachute by Allied air forces. This demonstration of confidence in the loyalty of the population, and in the ability of the French authorities to police their own communities, proved invaluable to French morale.

(f) As rapidly as conditions permitted, the French assumed responsibility at all levels of government. On 6 August, the French Military Commander of the 10th Military Region issued a proclamation, ordering that no arrests be made in the Department of ILLE-ET-VILAINE except for flagrant offences, without the mandate of the Military Authority for the 10th Military Region. Thus the Provisional Government quickly asserted its authority over the area involved. The practical value of the action

to Civil Affairs and the Army lay in the prompt exercise of jurisdiction by the French over offenses which concerned the security of the Allied forces. The action also clarified the position of Les Forces Francaises Interieures (French Forces of the Interior) (FFI), already recognized as a component part of the Allied forces, and increased their activity and aid to Civil Affairs detachments. Soon, throughout the Army Zone, FFI members were assisting in traffic control and public safety functions. They gave information of enemy stragglers and concentration, enemy supplies and native collaborationists, which was forwarded by Civil Affairs to proper army authorities.

(g) A confused political situation initially existed at VANNES (H-10), resulting in street shooting by the populace. However, appointment on 15 August 1944 of Colonel de Civrie of the FFI as Military Commandant for the Department of MORBIHAN, and his creation of a military court reestablished law and order in 24 hours.

(h) On the civil side, Regional Commissioners exercised the powers given under the Laws of the State of Siege, and the power to appoint and remove officials, an end desired by Supreme Headquarters policy. The Prefet, Sous-Prefet, and Mayor at RENNES (Y-05), and the mayors at DINAN (X-79) and FOUGERES (Y-37) were removed.

(i) French officials at all levels with whom Civil Affairs detachments were required to deal, quickly resumed ordinary functions, and demonstrated initiative in meeting extraordinary problems. Public safety, relief, money and banking required a minimum of aid and supervision by Civil Affairs personnel. The movement and care of refugees, anticipated as a difficult problem, was in the main satisfactorily handled by local officials and agencies.

(j) The early announcement of Civil Affairs objectives and the tact and judgment displayed by Civil Affairs personnel played an important part in reassuring the French as to Allied aims and in encouraging the resurgence of French authority in Civil Administration. The presence of Civil Affairs officers gave prestige and strength to established French officials. It also provided a means of liaison, through which Allied policies could be conveyed to French authorities and local needs made known to the Army. When needs were made known appropriate action was taken. For example, an Army order was issued on 16 August

permitting the movement of civilians, under Civil Affairs control, to harvest crops. Further examples are found in the release of captured medical and other supplies for civilian uses.

(3) In September 1944, G-5 Section stated that after the establishment of the French Provisional Government in PARIS, control of French Civil Administration was again coming from the capital of FRANCE. The government was very active in appointing new officials and disposing of those who served the Germans.[20]

(4) October 1944 Operations.[21]

(a) The area over which the Army exercised Civil Affairs responsibility during October was essentially industrial. The disruption of industry and transportation facilities had been accompanied by shortages of food, fuel, and basic supplies. Resources were further taxed by Army needs. The impact of these factors upon an industrial society, geographically adjacent to GERMANY, provided a new test for gauging the capabilities of French Civil Administration. However, in the region of NANCY (U-81) it demonstrated the same stability, resourcefulness and capacity for cooperation observed in other areas traversed by the Third US Army.

(b) Recognition of the French Provisional Government on 20 August 1944 by the UNITED STATES and GREAT BRITAIN undoubtedly increased the desire of the French authorities for further participation and cooperation in the war effort. The agreements concluded between the French Provisional Government and the Allies with respect to zones of authority, supplies, enemy property and related subjects removed points of local conflict and established a basis for mutual aid and effort.

(c) At local levels, several meetings were held with French officials, including the Regional Commissioner, the Prefet of the Department MEURTHE-ET-MOSELLE, Sous-Prefets, and police officials, at which military and Civil Affairs objectives were emphasized and French problems considered. At these conferences it was firmly established that all liaison between French officials and the Army would be effected through Civil Affairs. Largely as a result of these meetings, French authorities throughout the Region took effective steps toward assisting military operations by the establishment of

security patrols, enforcement of curfew, blackout, traffic and circulation restrictions and by the organization of their own resources.

(d) The NANCY Region presented new and complex problems but they were met by close liaison between French Civil Administration and Civil Affairs and by the experience gained in prior operations. French authorities gave active assistance in the apprehension of civilians charged with the commission of offenses against the Army. French Courts, after being notified of their position under French-American agreements, assumed proper jurisdiction over displaced persons charged with the commission of offenses against French civilians. The report of AC of S, G-5, to the Chief of Staff on 17 October on the NANCY (U-81) situation gives a typical story of the general difficulties and problems all over liberated FRANCE at that time. Part of his report follows:[22]

"Two distinguished French educators were appointed to the chief political posts in Nancy. M. Paul Chailley-Bert, Professor of Medicine at the University of Nancy, is the Regional Commissioner. M. Jules Blanche, another professor of the same university, a former soldier and hero of Verdun, is the Prefet. Both speak English. M. Blanche was an exchange professor at Harvard in 1935.

"These men are giving all assistance in their power to the American Army. The problems they face are not easy ones. With only the most limited official telephone communications and no postal service, they are forced to rely chiefly on bicycle couriers to carry on civilian travel, especially to Paris and other large centers in the rear, and again the lack of communications makes it extremely difficult to restore Regional industries and insure the employment of large numbers dependent on them. The authorities are frankly worried about the possible economic consequences of a long stabilization of the front and the continued isolation of the Region for military reasons.

"They expect the food and black market situation to be adjusted rapidly, largely because the American Army is feeding itself, thus freeing great quantities of produce formerly requisitioned by the Germans. Ways of overcoming the transport shortage and of getting in supplies from farms are being worked out in cooperation with civil affairs."

(5) November 1944 Operations.[23]

(a) Political events which followed the liberation of the Department of MOSELLE and its capital, METZ (U-85), were interesting and significant. In 1940, the Department of MOSELLE was annexed by Hitler as a part of the Reich, and incorporated in the Reichsgau of WESTMARK. Strong measures were taken to bring the population and institutions into the greater Reich. The chief offices were filled by Germans, immigration from Germany into the area was promoted and military conscription ordered. The German language was designated as the official language, and schools and other institutions were brought into the German regime. The liberation of the area provided an unusual opportunity for testing the effect and influence of German measures, the ability of the French government to reassert its authority, and Civil Affairs operations under new conditions.

(b) The French government quickly reestablished its authority, by naming General Dody as Military Governor of METZ (U-85). For the purpose of civil administration the Department of MOSELLE was provisionally designated as a part of the Region of NANCY under M. Chailley-Bert, Commissaire de la Republique, and M. Rebourset, Prefet of the Department. Subordinate officials assumed the exercise of their various administrative functions, and at the close of November 1944, it could be assumed that French government was successfully established. Relations with the Army and coordination with G-5 Section were immediately effected.

(c) In the Department of MEURTHE-ET-MOSELLE, VOSGES and MEUSE, French authority broadened its scope. Its central organization was strengthened by changes of officials at several places. At NANCY (U-81) the Commissaire de la Republique announced the removal of the President, Vice President and Secretary-Treasurer of the NANCY (U-81) Chamber of Commerce and at BRIEY (U-67) the Sous-Prefet was removed.

(d) Active steps were taken to implement the provisions of the agreements between the French Provisional Government and the governments of the UNITED STATES and GREAT BRITAIN. On 1 November 1944, it was announced that the French Government had assumed the payment of wages of civilian labor employed by the Army within the Region of NANCY (U-81). Upon the recommendation of the AC of S, G-5, two Civil

Affairs officers were designated to meet with representatives of the French government to adjust conflicting claims with respect to the ownership and disposition of fuel stocks held by the Army as German war material. This committee functioned throughout the month. An increase in the formulation and expression of political opinion was reported by various Civil Affairs detachments, which was indicative of an awakened interest in government and the resurgence of traditional French individualism.

c. Seventh US Army.

(1) When the Seventh US Army went ashore on 15 August 1944, under the operation "DRAGOON", the influence of the de Gaulle government and the resistance groups was growing stronger in Civil Administration in the area of Southern and Eastern FRANCE. The resistance groups had themselves liberated large areas before D-Day, 6 June 1944, and had taken a major part in settling the problems of the removal and appointment of public officials either ahead of or in the wake of the rapid advance of the Seventh US Army and the First French Army. The activities of resistance groups are treated separately in the following paragraph of this Section.

(2) The dangerous tactical situation in January 1945, caused by the German counter-offensive, created many difficult problems, including the partial evacuation of STRASBOURG (W-09) and the evacuation of loyal, reliable officials as a priority, lest they fall into the hands of the enemy for punishment and also to insure their being available when the territory would again be liberated.

(3) On 4 January 1945, AC of S, G-5, of the Sixth Army Group reported to SHAEF that:[24]

"Due to the tactical situation, G-5 officers have had to ask Alsace officials to tighten certain civilian controls. Some lack of centralized civil administration is now evident.

"Throughout the VI Corps area, G-5 has had to deal with each mayor separately and treat each commune as an individual problem. This has made the task more complex and difficult--forcing G-5 officers to assume certain supervisory functions not practiced in other areas of France.

"In the XV Corps area, towns and villages are operating as well as can be expected under new mayors appointed by French liaison officers and G-5 officers attached to tactical units."

However, with the clearing up of the COLMAR pocket and the resumption of the Seventh US Army

offensive, no major difficulties thereafter appeared in this zone.

95. Resistance Relationships. (Attention is invited also to question (2) of Questionnaire in the following paragraph).

a. Third US Army appraisal of resistance assistance.

(1) To coordinate the support of the Third US Army by resistance personnel, a Special Force Detachment operated the FFI forces from BRITTANY to the German border. Over 60,000 armed effectives participated. Lines of communications were guarded and cleared, enemy pockets were mopped up, protection of the Army south flank was afforded and a large volume of valuable information for G-3, G-2 Counter Intelligence and Civil Affairs was provided. Many towns and cities were occupied and held, and in numerous encounters FFI units fought side by side with Army troops and provided guides. Many commanders regularly called for FFI assistance in support in the various activities mentioned above.[25]

(2) In forward areas the FFI was of great assistance in removing collaborationists and replacing them with trustworthy officials. Many collaborationists were incarcerated by the FFI but in general their disposal was expedited by the Provisional Government and presented no problem.[26]

b. Seventh US Army appraisal of resistance groups.[27]

(1) In September 1944 the Sixth Army Group reported incidents in the Seventh US Army area and in the First French Army area. The Civil Affairs detachments in both zones consisted of UNITED STATES officers with French liaison officers and their reports are interesting inasmuch as they show the virile, sometimes virulent form "La Resistance" took in Southern and Southeastern FRANCE. The 23 September report stated:

"All political parties throughout the area are active. It has been reported in several instances that Resistance Groups attempting to take over the political administration of the communes are proving a nuisance. They are not accepting the prefet's nominees but are insisting upon using men of their own choice."

The 30 September report stated:

"In Southern France the political parties have shown intermittent action and the situation remains in a state of reorganization. In fact the only major political parties to date are the Parti Communiste and the Parti Socialiste with the former Radical Socialists showing little signs of activity except in the LYONS area.

"Despite the isolated cases of difficulty with the FFI reports indicate that the FFI continues to do excellent work both as a military organization and as political administrators. Under the FFI the morale of the people is reported to be very high."

96. Questionnaires. Selected answers to questionnaires returned by Military Government Officers are given below in order to present field experiences and opinions formed in the course of their Civil Affairs duties in FRANCE. Each Military Government Officer (MGO) was the Commanding Officer of a detachment in GERMANY on the date given below, which is also the date of the writing of the answers.

a. Questions:

(1) Of how much assistance to Civil Affairs in the restoration of Civil Administration were the Allied National authorities?

(2) To what extent were you able to utilize resistance groups in collecting information regarding the political partiality and activities of individuals?

b. Answers: (The sub-paragraphs correspond to the sub-paragraphs under "Questions" above).

Major Elton W. Manning, Jr., O-360439
Detachment H-302 - 24 October 1945

(1) "Was in France in British Canadian Section for two months. The French in Dieppe cooperated in restoring and reorganizing Civil Administration. German suppression for four years reflected their inability to grasp and operate without advice and authorization. Initiative lax in the beginning but before we left they began to adjust themselves to liberated conditions."

(2) "Field Security Branch (BR) dealt with matters pertaining to security. With both Army and Navy Intelligence Branches operating in the same city, the resistance groups channeled through those two organizations."

Major George F. Vieault, AC, O-94078
Detachment G-22 2 MGR - 22 October 1945

(1) "Mayors appeared out of nowhere as soon as we captured villages. Prefets came in quickly, there was a short time vacancy for Sous-Prefets, but it did not appear a problem to me. I believe the French were able to set their administrative machinery going very quickly. I was not able to see where the Americans were of any help or hindrance in the restoration or reorganization of the French government in the areas I served in. Once liberated, they went ahead and there were always officials to do business with."

(2) "Resistance groups frequently came of their own volition to give information on someone that had

managed to get an American tactical group to protect him or her. Actually I did not need this type of information."

Major Raymond L. Patten, 0-418389
Detachment G-36 2 MGR - 22 October 1945

(1) "Their assistance was only fair, this was due in part to fact that the French Government itself did not clear house thoroughly."

(2) "Everywhere I went in France I found the Resistance groups busy collecting information, arresting suspects and continually coming in with information as to individuals, security, enemy movements, locations of U X B and much other useful information, such as location of warehouses and supplies."

Major Francis B. Douglass, 0-535541
Detachment G-243 3 MGR - 20 October 1945

(1) "In Domfront-Department of the Armes, France and Charlesville, Department of the Ardennes (in the combat phase) the new officials from Prefet down were most cooperative, enthusiastic and hard working."

(2) "In the early stages the Resistance Groups were most valuable, but before long friction within the group began. They began fighting among themselves (in France and Belgium) for power and their information became unreliable."

1st Lt Benjamin M. Zeigler, 0-1043548
Detachment G-242 Kempten/Allgaii
18 October 1945

(1) "In combat zones French Allied National authorities were of particular help in establishing liaison between administrative and resistance officials."

(2) "French resistance groups worked well in collecting information regarding political partiality of individuals. However, the major part of this information was for use of French officials, Civil Affairs serving in an advisory capacity."

Major Joseph H. Mattox, Jr., 0-1305620
Detachment G-244, Amberg, Germany
22 October 1945

(1) "In combat phase French, Belgian and Luxembourgers were quick to assist in any way possible."

(2) "Until the breakthrough in Normandy I saw no resistance groups. They became increasingly valuable until France was liberated, then deteriorated into nuisance groups who looted, terrorized and generally made life miserable for Civil Affairs detachments."

Capt Samuel L. Haber, O-533206
Detachment H-54 2 MGR - 17 October 1945

(1) "In Alsace Lorraine all orders and directives issued to locally constituted French authorities, such as Mayor, sous prefet and prefet were respected, these officials were found to be 100% cooperative."

(2) "We did not receive assistance from resistance groups, but did receive some valuable assistance from individuals in these groups."

Capt Neil J. Van Steenberg, O-519178
Detachment G-31 2 MGR - 22 October 1945

(1) "In France and Luxembourg assistance varied with locations. In most places it was a matter of supporting organizations already existing openly or underground."

(2) "The detachment made wide use of information given by individuals generally and leaders of resistance groups. Everyone in France was denouncing everyone else. Only when everyone agreed could reliance be placed on denunciations. Very little contact with CIC in liberated countries."

Capt Vincent J. Manno, O-1037165
Detachment H-50 Co A, 2 MGR - 20 October 1945

(1) "Most of the communes liberated elected their own Mayors who generally were good. Allied national authorities were of much assistance and cooperated freely. They were ready and willing to grasp the machinery of indigenous government."

(2) "Resistance groups were extremely effective, more effective than CIC teams."

Major Ernest C. Wills, O-243417
Detachment H-290 3 MGR - 19 October 1945

(1) "French appointed the Department and Arrondissement heads in the Vosges and the Haut-Rhin, Alsace. Special Military Missions were also appointed by the First French Army in Department of Haut-Rhin. When they had previous army experience, the French authorities had efficient organizations. Very few others seemed to have much executive or organizational ability. Too much politics and favoritism were used in appointing French department heads, men who were interested in personal gain."

(2) "Resistance used to a great extent, but with this reservation: all denunciations were closely checked to eliminate personal spites. In cases where the denunciations were baseless, the FFI in France proved that they were a detriment instead of a help after liberation."

Lt Col Richard J. Jackson, O-525570
G-5 Section, Third US Army (Lt Col Jackson was attached to XX Corps and was with Civil Affairs detachments at Chartres, Fontainebleu, Nancy and Luxemburg City).

(1) "I would estimate that from 90 to 100 percent assistance was given in France and Luxemburg. Everything was moving so fast that if we had not had all of the splendid cooperation we did from Allied National Authorities (and Allied Nationals) our job would have been much more difficult. It was my experience that cooperation was always forthcoming and that in fact they were many times over anxious to do things to help. Everything requested was always done, in my experience."

Capt Arden L. Yakoubian, O-354484
Detachment H-86 2 MGR - 22 October 1945

(1) "In my opinion Civil Affairs in France succeeded in giving confidence to local officials in re-organizing and building up initiative and was of material aid in getting essential supplies of critical items to civilians during the period of near chaos following combat."

(2) "Resistance groups, after the combat phase, proved of very little aid in any category. In fact, within a short time, they created a feeling of strain among their own people. I found the French officials very anxious to cooperate and on the whole they were successful."

Lt Col Robert L. Rogers, O-165346
Detachment G-22 2 MGR - 17 October 1945

(1) "Representatives of Provisional National Government accompanied combat troops and Civil Affairs Detachments. In the first phases of liberation they were invaluable in screening officials. By the time I came under Com Z the original Civil Administrations had been restored. In the Department of Eure-et-Loire the local officials frequently appeared to be employing obstructionary tactics against Civil Affairs. Departmental governments were capable of functioning with surprising efficiency considering the great shortage of almost all facilities. Standards of efficiency and cooperation with Civil Affairs varied widely from Department to Department. Reporting officer recalls one Prefet whose cheerful compliance with Civil Affairs requests was seriously affected by his not being given permission to travel on the Red Ball Highway."

(2) "During operations in France reporting officer did not employ the services of resistance groups. The Civil Administration did and Civil Affairs Detachments dealt only with the Civil Administration."

Major Merritt Y. Hughes, 0-531053
Detachment E-201 3 MGR (Field Historian
with Third US Army) - 12 October 1945

(1) "From Normandy to Metz French villages, town, city and department authorities were usually competent and always cooperative when combat conditions permitted them to assist Civil Administration Officers. In Brittany they were conspicuously zealous and competent in finding accommodation for refugees, 20,000 of whom poured out of Brest in one day. In Luxembourg and Belgium, though there was some panic among the public during the Battle of the Bulge, civil authorities generally were eagerly and intelligently cooperative. In Nancy from October 1944 to January 1945 relations were good. If anything French Prefets erred in excess of zeal in removing mayors with even a remote official or business connection with the Germans."

(2) "In Brittany the AC of S, G-5, VIII Corps, placed slight value on the services of the FFI, but the prevailing opinion of their service there and later at the liberation of Metz was favorable to them. In the campaign of August 1944 they undoubtedly played a highly valuable part. In the organization of civilian police forces, many of their members proved most useful and loyal to their superiors in the French Gendarmerie and to US Civil Affairs Officers."

Major Lloyd S. Laprade, 0-530246
Detachment G-32 2 MGR - 29 October 1945

(1) "Civil Affairs detachments did not undertake the reorganization of the Civil Administration, the local authorities and people did it themselves for the most part. In Com Z particularly the burden of reestablishing civil administration was placed upon and accepted by the Allied National authorities. Civil Administration detachments assisted in such matters as transport, procuring of essential materials and in providing fuel in many cases. I should say that in most cases Allied National authorities sought to meet every responsibility assigned to them. In some instances execution of responsibilities involved direction from and action at a level of government which did not exist at the time."

(2) "My experience with so-called resistance groups was mixed. In the first place, real exponents of Resistance did not linger behind advancing troops but went forward with them. Secondly, with liberation a great number of "overnight" resistance folk swarmed out to claim credit and seek personal advantage. In some cases the equivalent of paramilitary outfits, they paraded under the name of resistance groups and gave more trouble than assistance."

Capt John G. Cox, 0-228807
Detachment H-58 2 MGR - 25 October 1945

(1) "Was in Arrondissement of Luneville, Sous Prefet a capable and efficient administrator. Gave every assistance and cooperation to Civil Affairs. Relations were excellent during the entire four months we operated in this Arrondissement. Without his aid and that of the Mayor's office the work of Civil Affairs would have been much more difficult."

(2) "Members of the resistance groups and the FFI were used to uncover collaborators and saboteurs. Found to be valuable because of specific knowledge of area of persons involved."

Major Charles E. Vickerman, 0-251042
Detachment H-282 3 MGR - 23 October 1945

(1) "In combat zone the Allied National authorities were of no assistance, and very little in Com Z. The Regional and Departmental governments established themselves according to their old system prior to occupation by the Germans."

(2) "The resistance movement aided in the apprehension of collaborators, Gestapo members in hiding and the location of deserted Wehrmacht soldiers."

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SECTION 2

BELGIUM

97. Techniques. Substantially the same procedure of liaison with local civil administration was pursued by Civil Affairs staffs and detachments as was described in Par 1, Section 1 of this Chapter in the case of FRANCE. The larger part of the Civil Affairs work in BELGIUM was under the supervision of 21 Army Group.

98. Political Relationships with Civil Administration.[1]

a. Civil Affairs operations were conducted against a background of political reshuffling in the Belgian Government. The liberation of the greater part of the country was effected with

great speed by the Allied Forces, assisted by the Belgian resistance movements. The liberation was faster than anticipated and the interval which elapsed before the opening of the SCHELDT estuary entailed a delay in opening the Belgian ports, a factor which retarded economic recovery and caused considerable hardship.

b. The constitutional Belgian Government returned to BRUSSELS immediately after the liberation and at once resumed its functions. The SHAEF Mission to BELGIUM went into operation and in the US Zone, LIEGE and other cities and towns were handled by detachments from the European Civil Affairs Division. Parliamentary activity was resumed without delay, and a new coalition government representing all the main parties was formed by M. Pierlot.

c. The "growing pains" of liberation were present in abundance and much political friction resulted. Party differences of opinion as to the methods of solving reconstruction problems, and especially as to the future of the resistance groups culminated in November 1944 in the resignation of three ministers representing the extreme left wing and the resistance groups. There were demonstrations involving minor incidents, but the intervention of SHAEF prevented serious disorders and brought about an easing of the tension.

d. On 1 February 1945, the Belgian Socialist Party requested that M. Pierlot, the Prime Minister, remodel his Cabinet. The request was refused and the executives of the Socialist Party then resolved that the five Socialist ministers should resign. The Prime Minister persuaded the Socialists to postpone their departure until after a debate of confidence for the Government, which it was agreed, would take place in the Parliament on 6 February 1945. On 7 February 1945, at the end of a two-day debate, in which it had been accused of slackness and inefficiency, the Pierlot Government resigned. Charges against the government had included failure to purge and prosecute collaborators with the enemy; failure to make proper use of the resistance movement; and inability to organize adequately the distribution and supply of food and coal.

e. The Regent promptly asked M. van Acker, a Socialist who had been Minister of Labor in the Pierlot Cabinet, to form a new government. The new formation was announced on 11 February 1945 and contained six Catholics, five Socialists, four Liberals, two Communists and one member who belonged to no party. M. Spaak retained his portfolio as Foreign Minister and became Deputy Prime Minister as well. M. van Acker personally assumed responsibility for the production and distribution of coal. A Communist member, editor of that party's newspaper, accepted the Ministry of Food, which had proved a thorn in the side of the Pierlot administration

f. There was a continuation of effort toward restoring government and normal civil functions in the devastated areas of the "Bulge" district. In many cases the heavier tasks proved too much for the acting mayors, and assistants were appointed, or, in some cases, an advisory or administrative committee was called into being either for an arrondissement, as at MARCHE, or for cities, as at VERVIERS (K-62) and VIELSALM (F-68). In addition to these advances, the newly-appointed Special Commissioner for the district, M. Hoen, established his office in MALMEDY (K-80) on 10 February 1945.

g. Herein is presented a part of a BBC broadcast delivered 21 December 1944, which summarized the SHAEF official attitude toward the civil administration of Belgium:[2]

"The Allied agreement on civil administration and jurisdiction in liberated Belgium signed in London on 16 May 1944, by the UK-US and Belgian Governments paved the way for the resumption of a democratic political life in Belgium with the minimum of Allied intervention necessitated by military operations. It has laid down in the agreement that during the first or military phase of the liberation of the country the Allied Supreme Commander must enjoy such measure of supreme responsibility and authority over the civil administration as might be required by the military situation, but that as soon as this situation permitted the Belgian Government should resume their full constitutional responsibility for the civil administration on the understanding that such special facilities as the Allied forces might continue to require on Belgian territory would be made available for the prosecution of the war to its final conclusion. This agreement has been fully carried out and the Supreme Commander's representative in Belgium (Maj General Erskine) has intervened in Belgian affairs only to act as mediator and to declare Allied support for the Government in maintaining the law and order necessary for the furtherance of military operations."

99. Belgian Resistance.[3]

a. As the Civil Affairs detachments moved forward into BELGIUM they were confronted with a problem much more complex than they had met in FRANCE, that of dealing with several resistance groups in the same area. Most of the worth-while French resistance groups had united under the FFI, thereby presenting a single source of authority. The Belgian resistance was active, but its effectiveness was thwarted by the very fact that there was no central authority to guide it; and one group frequently came into conflict with the other, while both were trying to accomplish the same object.

b. The Armee Secrete, also known as the Armee Blanche, was the chief resistance organization, composed of members of all classes and led by officers who had formerly been members of the Belgian Army. The Allies had been in contact with this group long before D-Day and had dropped arms to them in order to further their sabotage activity. Two other resistance groups that played an effective part were Front de l'Independence (FI), whose members came largely from the laboring groups and the Mouvement National Belge (MNB), which represented the extreme right and was composed of jurists, statesmen and others who did not belong to the FI or Armee Secrete. While the Armee Secrete was purely a military organization, the FI and MNB tended to revert to purely political organizations once the actual fighting was over.

c. From the viewpoint of the Allied Armies, in the combat stage the resistance groups were decidedly helpful, with difficulties arising only after the liberation. Many Belgian towns were liberated solely by the resistance, thus facilitating the advance of the Allied troops. They took many prisoners and were of great value in cleaning out pockets of Germans left in the wake of Allied combat units. They were used as guards by Civil Affairs detachments and assisted in the direction of civilian traffic.

d. Although Civil Affairs detachments were able to control the unorthodox resistance activities in towns where detachments were placed, they had their difficulties in the surrounding rural areas. Complaints began to come in from the outlying districts that resistance forces were stopping farmers from bringing their produce to market, that they were making illegal arrests, breaking into enemy

supply installations and seizing what they wanted. Reports of such incidents were investigated by the Civil Affairs detachments and sent to the SHAEF Mission (BELGIUM). The Mission, after some months, and after dealing with the van Acker government, was able to report that law and order had at last prevailed.

100. Reports of G-5 Staff Sections of the United States Armies on the relationships of Civil Affairs staffs and detachments and the National and local Belgian civil administration were uniformly favorable.

a. On 22 October 1944 the Ninth US Army AC of S, G-5, stated:[4]

"Civil administration in St. Vith and vicinity is satisfactory with progress and improvement noted daily."

b. A report of 24 October from the same source stated:[5]

"The St. Vith detachment reported that as the local officials became more accustomed to their jobs their effectiveness increased. Fine cooperation has been evidenced in the entire area."

c. On 31 January the First US Army reported:[6]

"Conditions are improving after the serious dislocation in Eastern Belgium caused by the Battle of the Bulge. In re-liberated towns, where no Burgomeisters were present, well known citizens, including many priests, were administering the needs of the population, especially in the field of public welfare."

d. The AC of S, G-5, of the Third US Army reported on 17 February 1945:[7]

"Full cooperation of all local governments is being accorded the Third US Army throughout its Zone which includes portions of France, Belgium, Luxembourg and Germany."

e. The 12 Army Group on 26 February stated:[8]

"Practically all of the former Belgian officials have returned to their positions and full staffs of experienced officials have resumed duty."

f. On 7 February 1945 an order was distributed to Corps, Divisions and Civil Affairs Detachments of the First US Army to prepare immediately for turning over full responsibility for governmental affairs to the civil authorities, in order that civil affairs personnel might be made available for a quick entrance into GERMANY and the assumption of Military Government functions. This preparation entailed the closing of civil affairs projects under way, but it was suggested that civilian plans be drawn up promptly so that the local authorities might have the benefit of advice from Civil Affairs officers.[9] When the First US Army's offensive rolled into GERMANY in March, civil administration in BELGIUM was stable and working efficiently.

101. Questionnaires. Selected answers to questionnaires returned by Military Government Officers are given below in order to present field experiences and opinions formed in the course of

their Civil Affairs duties in BELGIUM.

a. Questions:

(1) Of how much assistance to Civil Affairs in the restoration of Civil Administration were the Allied National authorities?

(2) To what extent were you able to utilize resistance groups in collecting information regarding the political partiality and activities of individuals?

b. Answers: (The sub-paragraphs correspond to the sub-paragraphs under "Questions" above.)

Lt Col Richard A. Norton 0346562
Detachment F-214 3 MGR (Formerly AC of S, G-5 of 17 Airborne Division 1 January 1945 to 15 June 1945) 20 October 1945

(1) "During combat phase near Bastogne, the civil authorities were willing to assist but as in so many cases of small communities the administrative officers had either fled from their homes or were too concerned with their own plight to worry too much about their community so that they were not of much assistance."

Capt Shale L. Tulin 01037756
Detachment I-332 3 MGR 17 October 1945

(1) "For the little time my detachment was operative in both France and Belgium every possible assistance was given us by the local authorities in the restoration of civil government."

(2) "Members of the FBI (Forces Belgique Interiere) were valuable to us in giving information about collaborators in and around Thuin, Belgium. We encountered no members of the FFI in France where we were operative."

Maj Ralph G. Hill 0413081
Detachment I-364 3 MGR 17 October 1945

(1) "The officials appointed by the Belgium authorities in the forward areas of the Canton of Malmedy were of great assistance in controlling the civilians and meeting of the manifold needs of the forward tactical commander. Civil Administration was limited to the bare day by day needs. When the town of Malmedy (population 5,000) was called on to billet and feed 12,000 people the civilian officials did a superior job. At All times they recognized the Supreme authority of the tactical commander and worked day and night on his and their people's behalf. They insisted on choosing their own personnel and those chosen proved, when the Germans returned to the area, to be reliable in every instance. I had an excellent opportunity to observe this as I was present both before and after the Ardennes campaign."

(2) "During the early days of the resistance, new officials were installed in the Canton of Malmedy. These were accepted by the Military Government, later approved by the Allied National authorities, and proved, under the most difficult conditions, to be the best available."

Maj Micheal E. Dipietro 0453851
Detachment H-311 3 MGR 18 October 1945

(1) "Civil Administration was fully operative, no difficult problems existed for us in the area."

(2) "Belgian resistance personnel cooperated fully with this detachment and with CIC in uncovering politically unreliable people."

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8. Casum, 12 Army Group, 26 February 1945.
9. Casum, 12 Army Group, 2 February 1945.

SECTION 3

THE NETHERLANDS

102. General.

a. Since THE NETHERLANDS were only in part liberated in the fall of 1944, there was no central government for the entire country, with the result that SHAEF Mission (THE NETHERLANDS), with one echelon in BELGIUM and the forward echelon at EINDHOVEN (E-41) dealt with THE NETHERLANDS military administration and such provincial authorities as the military administration authorized it to deal with.[1] Civil Affairs detachments were phased in under 21 Army Group and 12 Army Group with the larger part of the territory finally coming under the jurisdiction of 21 Army Group.

b. With the establishment of the central government and the return of the Queen, Civil Affairs responsibilities dwindled except in the very important fields of Civilian Supply and Trade and Industry, dealt with elsewhere in this study.

103. Resistance.

a. There appeared to be less political dynamite in THE NETHERLANDS than in BELGIUM. Civil Affairs detachments encountered no appreciable difficulties with those groups that were busily engaged aiding the tactical units in clearing the rest of their country after the early fall of 1944.

b. There were two main resistance groups, the Orde Dienst (O.D.) and the Koninkluke Patrouille (K.P.). The former, a large group which was fairly passive during the German occupation came to the surface after the liberation. It was composed of conservative, substantial middleclass elements. The K.P. was a smaller but well-organized group which conducted active sabotage and other subversive operations against the Germans. It had vigorous leadership that cooperated with Civil Affairs detachments in tracking down Quislings and deserting German soldiers and in giving all kinds of intelligence data on local government matters.[2]

104. Ninth US Army Reports on Civil Administration.

a. On 4 November 1944.[3]

"As civilians in the Civil Administration become more accustomed to their jobs, their effectiveness increases and they become more willing to point out flaws and defects of their own previous administration."

b. On 24 November 1944.[4]

"Civil Administration continues satisfactory."

c. On 2 December 1944.[5]

"The Civil Administration continues most satisfactory. There is excellent cooperation among the Dutch authorities and Civil Affairs."

105. Questionnaires. Selected answers to questionnaires returned by Military Government Officers are given below in order to present field experiences and opinions formed in the course of their Civil Affairs duties in THE NETHERLANDS.

a. Questions:

(1) Of how much assistance to Civil Affairs in the restoration of Civil Administration were the Allied National authorities?

(2) To what extent were you able to utilize resistance groups in collecting information regarding the political partiality and activities of individuals?

b. Answers: (The sub-paragraphs correspond to the sub-paragraphs under "Questions" above).

Major James R. Case FA 0110145
Detachment G-247 3 MGR

(1) "In Heerlen (South Limbourg Province) Holland and vicinity all officials and agencies were 100%

cooperative. During Feb-Mar 1945 practically 100% of the Dutch food requirements came in under Civil Affairs arrangements."

Major Theodore T. Turnbull 0353691
Detachment H-70 2 MGR 19 October 1945

(1) "All officials were cooperative and energetic, but during the initial combat phase when the shock of combat was still present, were ineffective."

Major Charles F. Russo 0184268
Detachment G-40 2 MGR 19 October 1945

(1) "The greatest assistance was given by the Dutch and excellent cooperation experienced."

(2) "The resistance groups were very well organized and rendered great assistance."

Capt LeRoy C. Smallenberger 0319077
Detachment H-301 3 MGR 18 October 1945

(1) "The civil administration at Hoensbroek was working well in the early stages when my detachment took over, only minor assistance had to be given and that had mostly to do with distribution of Allied food."

(2) "The resistance groups were a great deal of help in ascertaining the political feeling of the people in general. They assisted CIC in rounding up Nazis."

Capt Wymn Wickersham 0275346
Detachment I-380 3 MGR 18 October 1945

(1) "Operated in Limbourg Province and found our detachment and others were able to solve supply and problems pertaining to law and order, health and welfare very effectively. There was some weakness in the civil administration and civil affairs acted as an expediter, advisor and supervisor of supply and public safety matters."

(2) "We used resistance groups to a limited extent only."

1st Lt William M. Blanton Jr 01043280
Detachment I-357 3 MGR 16 October 1945

(1) "In South Limbourg Province the city officials generally were of great assistance, and particularly in Vebach-over-Worms. The Dutch Military Government was in general of little assistance because of internecine quarrels and lack of positive direction from the London Cabinet of the Dutch Government."

(2) "The Resistance groups in our area were of mixed value. Generally only those persons closely allied with CIC rendered effective aid. The

Commanding General XIII Corps made very effective use of CIC detachments in this connection."

1st Lt Joseph T. Langland 01310852
Headquarters 3MGR (No date)

(1) "In Holland the Allied National authorities were very cooperative in assisting detachments in the field. Without them the establishment of a civilian economy after the passing of the combat phase would have been difficult."

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SECTION 4

LUXEMBOURG

106. General.

a. In September 1944 a small portion of the Duchy of LUXEMBOURG came under the control of the Third US Army. Officials were quickly installed by the local authorities to replace those with Nazi tendencies. The SHAEF Mission (LUXEMBOURG) entered the territory soon after its liberation and assumed responsibility for Civil Affairs.[1]

b. At the time the Mission arrived nothing had been done in regard to economic or administrative rehabilitation, or reorganization. The enemy had, during the period of the occupation, eliminated every vestige of the former LUXEMBOURG government. When the enemy withdrew, most of the officials, civil and economic, left with them taking all records possible and attempting to destroy the balance.[1]

c. In addition to the elimination of the LUXEMBOURG government, the enemy had installed its own government. The Duchy was redistricted or rezoned and a complete change made in the functions of the administrative officials. New offices and bureaux were created with a complete change in the keeping of public or quasi-public records. When a former burgermeister or public official, either national or local, was appointed he obtained no aid from the files when such files were located. The heads of many offices had been out of touch with their respective functions or duties at least four years, having been replaced by the enemy shortly after the occupation began. Resistance groups were negligible and ineffective.

d. The enemy had deported or removed from the Grand-Duchy approximately 50,000 persons. Over 30,000 were in GERMANY, some 5,000 in POLAND, and others were forced into the German Army or Todt Organization. The majority of those removed were civil servants, both national and local in character. In a country of approximately 250,000 nationals this was a great loss. Without the civil servants and officials to assist, the problem of restoring the Government initially presented many difficulties that were however quickly solved.[1]

e. On October 21, 1944, in accordance with SHAEF letter and verbal orders of the Commanding General, 12 Army Group, the G-5 Division (Civil Affairs Component) of the SHAEF Mission (LUXEMBOURG) assumed responsibility for coordination between the government of LUXEMBOURG and the military forces within the Grand Duchy. The Commanding General and Chief of Staff, 12 Army Group, indicated verbally that they desired that all contacts be made with the government through the G-5 Section of the Mission, and that the Mission be responsible for the coordination of all Civil Affairs within the country. The A10l Civil Affairs detachment, working under the Mission, was held responsible for the implementation of this coordination by the First US Army through the VIII US Corps.[2]

f. The Minister of Justice cooperated heartily in carrying out 12 Army Group plans. He had laws enacted and promulgated which were desired by the US Forces and re-established the minor courts for offenses against the army. Actually, despite the willingness to cooperate, sentences of the courts were so light that they were of no practical value.[3]

g. The procedure that was followed in BELGIUM in withdrawal of civil administrators during the ARDENNES campaign was pursued by 12 Army Group in LUXEMBOURG. The same officials who were in office prior to the GERMAN counter-attack eventually returned to their communities and reorganized the local governments much more effectively than they had been organized before the re-liberation.[3]

107. Army Reports on Civil Administration.[4]

a. Ninth US Army on 5 October 1944:

"Civil Administration continued effective in all areas. Civil Administration was established at the Duchy level in the Grand Duchy of LUXEMBOURG."

b. The Third US Army on 20 January 1945:[5]

"Civil Administration in nearly all the communes of Diskirch Canton, Luxembourg was fairly efficient and in most cases a high degree of cooperation existed between burgermeisters and troops. Further, the Luxembourg State Government was taking strong measure to meet critical conditions caused by the German Ardennes offensive, with the result that self-confidence was returning to lower echelons of government."

c. The Third US Army on 29 January 1945:[6]

"Civil Administration of towns in our area is returning steadily to normal with a corresponding decrease in requests for aid from Civil Affairs. Lack of transportation is the greatest handicap in the resumption of efficient Civil Administration."

d. The Third US Army's final report on Luxembourg in March 1945:[7]

> "Contact between Civil Affairs and local government was reduced as active military operations passed to Germany. Enforcement of security measures against civilians continued but emphasis moved to the internal needs of the nation. Brigadier H. R. H. Prince Felix returned, the Consultative Assembly met, and the people awaited the return of the Grand Duchess Charlotte."

108. Questionnaires. Selected answers to questionnaires returned by Military Government Officers are given below in order to present field experiences and opinions formed in the course of their Civil Affairs duties in Luxembourg.

a. Questions:

(1) Of how much assistance to Civil Affairs in the restoration of Civil Administration were the Allied National authorities?

(2) To what extent were you able to utilize resistance groups in collecting information regarding the political partiality and activities of individuals?

b. Answers: (The sub-paragraphs correspond to the sub-paragraphs under "Questions" above).

Lt Col Richard J. Jackson 0525570
G-5 Section, Third US Army - 12 October 1945

(1) "I would estimate that from 90 to 100 percent assistance was given in France and Luxembourg. Everything was moving so fast that if we had not had all of the splendid cooperation we did from Allied National authorities (and Allied Nationals) our job would have been much more difficult."

Lt Col Richard Norton 0346562
Detachment 214 3 MGR (Formerly AC of S, G-5, of 17th Airborne Division - 19 January to 15 June 1945) 20 October 1945

(1) "In Luxembourg I found more willingness and much more assistance (than in Belgium) given by civil authorities all the way from national level down to local level. Cooperation and interest in Luxembourg were excellent."

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CHAPTER 2

OCCUPIED TERRITORY

SECTION 1

APPOINTMENT AND REMOVAL OF OFFICIALS

109. Army Military Government Responsibilities.

a. The Supreme Commander was responsible for Military Government of areas of GERMANY occupied by forces under his command. The 12 Army Group and the 6 Army Group Commanders were responsible for their respective areas within the Supreme Commander's zone and they further delegated responsibility to their respective Army Commanders.

b. Military Government was planned to be based ultimately on the German Regional system. As rapidly as practicable during the course of the occupation, recognition was given to this ultimate organizational plan by conforming tactical boundaries with administrative boundaries and fixing military government responsibility accordingly.

c. Until it was possible to establish Military Districts after V-E Day, Military Government was carried out on a temporary basis in accordance with the tactical areas of command, and Military Government operations were the r sponsibility of each Military Commander in the areas occupied by his forces.

d. Army Commanders were responsible for providing lateral liaison between the areas occupied by their corps and between all subordinate echelons as required in order to maintain consistency of policy in local regulations and facilitate administration.

e. The Military Government resources of the Commanders consisted of G-5 Staffs and Military Government detachments at regional and subordinate centers of civil administration. The Military Government staffs were largely concerned with liaison duties and normal staff work incident to the chain of command, and the Military Government detachments controlled directly the civil administration.

110. Responsibilities for Eradication of Nazism.

a. The dissolution of the National Socialist Party and its subsidiary organizations was delegated to Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) personnel assisted by Military Government Officers.

b. Demobilization and disbandment of Nazi military and para-military formations was the responsibility of Military Commanders.

c. The purge of the police and the removal of Nazis from the Civil Administration of GERMANY was the responsibility of Military Government Officers in which they were assisted by CIC personnel.

d. Military Government officers, assisted by CIC personnel, had to ensure that those placed in Civil Administration posts and other positions of influence and authority were not Nazi or Nazi

sympathizers. The Military Government Officers were also charged with the reorganization of all types of administrative agencies necessary for government.

e. Counter Intelligence Corps personnel were charged with ensuring that Nazis who might, at liberty, be a danger to military security were interned or kept under surveillance.[1]

III. Coordination Between the Counter Intelligence Corps and Military Government.[2]

a. CIC detachments were assigned to tactical units and had definite responsibilities on the matter of security. Their mission was to seek out and eliminate all elements hostile to the Allied occupation. They were charged with eliminating officials in Automatic Arrest categories and apprehending those on the SHAEF Black List. Under their mission they screened personnel for Military Government as far as such personnel were not a threat to the security of the Allied occupation.

b. In September 1944 at AACHEN, following much difficulty in screening prospective appointees for the office of burgermeister, Military Government established, under the Public Safety Officer of the detachment, a Special Branch section for the purpose of working with the CIC in evaluating properly the type of person needed for the municipal administration. German personnel approved by CIC and appointed by the Public Safety Officer were employed to work with the new Special Branch, and later in occupied territory a school was set up by Military Government to train such German personnel for Special Branch work. Gradually Special Branch sections or divisions were added to Military Government detachments, but in the fast moving situation before V-E Day Military Government had to depend almost entirely on the effectiveness of CIC screening. The mission of Special Branch was to ensure the security of Civil Administration. Fragebogens (questionnaires) were filled out under the supervision of the Special Branch personnel and then checked with CIC. Before appointment was made CIC had to certify that the individual was one not hostile or dangerous to the security of the Allied occupation. The professional qualifications of the appointees were the concern of Military Government, in addition to the general standing of the applicant in the community.

c. The screening process employed by CIC in dealing with prospective appointees consisted of:

(1) Verification of the facts of the fragebogens by reference to available civil records.

(2) Check against Nazi Party records.

(3) Check against SHAEF "Wanted Persons" records.

(4) Interview with reliable local informants.

(5) Check of local police records.

(6) Limited surveillance where indicated by previous investigation.

d. The G-2 Section of the Armies itself maintained no "Black List" of political figures. However, SHAEF maintained a list of "Wanted Persons" which contained a great many officials and others within the purview of "Automatic Arrest" for Nazi

Party activities. The ACofS, G-2 of the Theater General Board reports:

> "The SHAEF cards were not distributed to G-5 agencies as their highly classified nature required their retention in G-2 Section of Army, where they were available for checking by CIC of subordinate units. When check of Military Government appointees revealed that they were 'carded' personalities, Military Government was given that information."

e. The following actions were taken jointly by CIC and Military Government:

(1) Arrest of "Wanted Persons" and "Automatic Arrest" personnel.

(2) Seizure of all Nazi Party records.

(3) Screening of prospective employees and appointees.

f. CIC obtained political intelligence and information from informants as to the popular feeling of natives of occupied areas to assist Military Government in supervising and controlling civil administration.

112. Techniques of Operations in Civil Administration.[3]

a. In initial operations in GERMANY, it was necessary to appoint civil officials, (i.e. burgermeisters) at the lowest level. As larger areas were uncovered, the next highest supervisory officials at the Landkreis, i.e., the Landrat or Oberburgermeister of a Stadt, were appointed, and as still larger areas were uncovered Regierungsbezirk officials and Regional (provinz-Land) officials were appointed. Among the first Gemeinde or smaller towns for which Burgermeisters were appointed were KORNELI-MUNSTER (K 83), and MONSCHAU (K 91). AACHEN (K 84) was the first Stadt or large city to be occupied. Because of the ARDENNES counter attack, and delay in uncovering any substantial areas in GERMANY, Regierungsbezirk organization was delayed so that the Oberpraesident for the AACHEN Regierungsbezirk was not appointed until February 1945. Similar procedure was followed throughout the Army Group areas. The Governments at Landkreis and Kreis levels were re-established early in the operation. Twelfth Army Group After Action Report:

> "The Regierungsbezirk, Stadtkreis and Landkreis governments have been set up throughout the area and are functioning satisfactorily. This does not mean that the governmental organization has been established in all details, but it has been established to a considerably greater extent than as a mere framework, and performs sufficiently well to be called an operating organism. Changes in personnel occur daily and, it is admitted, to a greater degree than they would occur in an organization that was functioning without any outside disturbances; this, however, must be considered the natural result of building up, virtually from the ground, a governmental organization which for at least three years prior to occupation by our troops operated on an emergency basis, and under the complete

control of the NSDAP (Nazi Party). Staffs had been reduced, normal office and administrative routines had been discarded and makeshift procedures had taken effect. In addition, the German system of communications had been disrupted by Allied air attacks, and a great many of the central offices of the Reich had been relocated.

"One of the principal difficulties encountered throughout the Army Group area was the lack of qualified and acceptable German personnel. It was found that a fairly large percentage of the qualified personnel was not acceptable due to previous associations and activities, and many of them fell in the mandatory arrest categories. Of the remainder, practically all claim to have been forced into the Nazi Party or its affiliated organizations, and proclaim their anti-Nazi feelings. To select those who are trustworthy is an undertaking requiring the utmost effort from those charged with that responsibility. Inspections in the field indicate that de-nazification will remain one of the foremost tasks of Military Government for months to come.

"Under the supervision of Military Government in general, and in the field of coordination of civil administration in particular, many agencies which are not strictly governmental have been established and are functioning in cooperation with civil government officials, such as food offices, agricultural departments, price control agencies, and rationing and distribution offices. In related fields, Public Health and sanitation agencies, Public Utilities and transportation services for civilians have been organized and placed in operation; first locally, then on an integrated basis for larger districts, and finally for the entire area under US control. It should be noted that thus far no central Reich agencies exist, and that it therefore has been necessary to subordinate various functions formerly controlled by such agencies to other government offices. This has been accomplished generally by 'attaching' these functions to the supervision of the principal government representative in the area served, e.g. the Regierungspresident of the Regierungsbezirk concerned."

b. As a rule the Military Government staffs of corps and divisions took the first steps toward setting up Military Government, posting the initial proclamations and the primary regulations, and, if the tactical situation allowed them to stay in the area long enough, made at least a start toward clearing the local administration of Nazis and replacing them with acceptable individuals. In a great many cases, however, the tactical units moved on so soon after uncovering a town that most of the work was left for the pinpointed detachment to do when it came on the scene.[4]

c. In general, Military Government detachments had three main objectives in the early phases of their work, incidental to their chief objective which was to facilitate the successful prosecution of the war. These objectives were:

(1) Maintenance of law and order.

(2) Removal from office of Nazis and others likely to act contrary to Allied interests or principles.

(3) Locating and safeguarding supply stocks and other resources of value to Allied forces.

d. In some places the Burgermeister and other important civil servants, including the police, had decamped with the retreating troops. In others, some or all of the administrative members remained. Very few of them were acceptable, however, to Military Government.

e. The first step in bringing order out of chaos was for the detachment commander to appoint someone to act as Burgermeister, if this had not been done already by the tactical unit G-5 staff. If one had been appointed, it was the function of the detachment Military Government officer to make sure that he was ideologically acceptable, and if not, to replace him. Once the Burgermeister had been chosen and placed in office, the rest of the civil administration stemmed from him, under the guidance and supervision of the Military Government officer.

113. Clarification of Denazification. The policy of denazification, which was pronounced in the Handbook for Military Government in GERMANY, and reiterated in the SHAEF and Army Groups directives, needed some clarification and tightening up during combat. All Nazis, even so-called nominal Nazis and those persons belonging to affiliated and attached organizations, were excluded from governmental posts. Twelfth Army Group issued Operational Instructions Number 11 (Appendix 1) in March 1945 to cover these requirements. Later, 14 April 1945, as operations progressed further into GERMANY, this policy was modified by Operational Instructions Number 12 (Appendix 2) to permit the use of persons who belonged only to certain affiliated or attached organizations.[5] Sixth Army Group issued similar instructions.

114. Army Experience in Civil Administration. By 1 January 1945 Military Government had been firmly established in a small part of GERMANY west of the RHINE. AACHEN (K 84) was still the largest German city in which Military Government had been established. Denazification was put to the test because, as in other instances at the beginning of operations, the Military Government detachment was compelled to secure personnel who would produce immediate results, without giving full consideration to political status. As AACHEN (K 84) was a laboratory for early Military Government in GERMANY and was under constant scrutiny, it was visited by representatives of SHAEF, Army Groups, civilian organizations and Congressional Committees. Below are given selected experiences of Army Groups and Armies with the problems concerning them in the removal and appointment of officials and with its corrollary problem of denazification in the period up to V-E Day.

(1) First US Army, 6 October 1944.[6]

"While nothing has occurrred in Germany which would seem to be serious in itself, evidence indicates that probably 25% of the police already appointed are active Nazis. A recheck is being conducted and those found to be Nazis will be removed."

(2) First US Army, 10 October 1944.[7]

"Difficulty is being experienced in locating trained personnel who have not been active Nazis."

(3) First US Army, 15 October 1944.[8]

"In the towns of UBACH-BOSCHELN and BARDENBERG, GERMANY, the local priests have been appointed as the civil administrative heads. It is reported that there are no other civil officials in those towns."

(4) First US Army, 17 October 1944.[9]

"Cooperative but inexperienced officials are reported to be making steady progress."

(5) First US Army, 25 October 1944.[10]

"The Nazi Chief of Police and all police fled upon the arrival of American troops. Military Government Officer, 16th Inf. 1st Inf Div., has appointed some twelve auxiliary police. Three of these have had previous reserve experience. These men have been screened by CIC. On 15 October 1944, the Public Safety Officer picked the new Chief of Police, William Otten, 10 Neustrasse, BUSBACH, and placed him in charge under the burgermeister.

"The Nazi Party's records and private papers of Wilhelm Rong, former Burgermeister of BRAND, have been secured and are in the possession of the Military Government Officer of this detachment (I5H2). The Public Records, except the Financial Records, which had been confiscated by the former burgermeister, are in the hands of the present burgermeister.

"The burgermeister, L. Hanbusken, and a staff of thirty-four (34) civil servants have been cleared by CIC."

(6) First US Army, 26 October 1944.[11]

"Continues satisfactory. Reports indicate that all civil officials in that part of Germany occupied by First United States Army troops continue to cooperate with Military Government officials. Difficulty in obtaining sufficiently trained personnel for administering civil government in AACHEN is the big problem."

(7) First US Army, 31 October 1944.[12]

"VII Corps reports on 30 October that, after being reported on favorably by CIC, Herr Franz Oppenhoff was installed by the 1st Inf Division as temporary burgermeister of the Stadtkreis of AACHEN at 1500 hours, 30 October. VII Corps reports further that civil administration is generally effective throughout its area."

(8) First US Army, 1 November 1944.[13]

"The Bishop of AACHEN has requested that clergymen should not be brought directly into civil administration. However, he gave assurances that they would give full cooperation indirectly."

(9) Ninth US Army, 19 December 1944.[14]

"G-5 Staffs and CA detachments report excellent cooperation from civil officials, clergy and others."

(10) First US Army, 21 December 1944.[15]

"Military Government detachments in Landkreis AACHEN have been instructed to begin to relinquish direct control of civil administration in every instance where it is possible to do so. In particular, they have been requested to turn over matters of food collection and distribution to German civilian authorities."

(11) First US Army, 27 February 1945.[16]

"The importance of the functions of the Special Branch section of Public Safety is emphasized. A German civilian who had been discharged from a governmental position after the evaluation of his questionnaire by a Special Branch Investigator was subsequently employed by a newly-arrived tactical unit. The local Military Government Officer was not notified. Upon investigation, the man was ordered dischargod, and the proper procedure for hiring civilians was explained to the unit. A representative of this section is visiting detachments and tactical units in the field to assist them in establishing Special Branch activities and in the correct evaluation of Fragebogen."

(12) Third US Army, March 1945.[17]

"Reports received from corps, divisions and detachments operating west of the RHINE, described a docile people, amenable to law and regulation. Exceptions were noted at KOBLENZ (L-99) and COCHEM (L-5972), where the people were described as 'sullen and uncooperative' and detachments moving east of the RHINE observed a similar attitude.

"In the establishment of local German Government difficulty arose in finding eligible and competent officers. Many of those who had not fled were ineligible because of Nazi connections. In many of the Kreis (City and Land counties), non-Nazis who had been removed from office by the German Government in 1933 were reinstated. In some of the smaller communities within the Kreis (Gemeinde) non-Nazi officials were found, who had not been removed because of their long service to the community and a part of these were retained.

"At the next higher level of government, the Regierungsbezirk, and at the higher level of Provinz, it was more difficult to secure proper officials and only in the Regierungsbezirk TRIER was Military Government able to install officers. There Dr. Wilhelm Steinlen, native lawyer and non-Nazi, was made Regierungspresident, and a small staff selected.

"At all levels where Chief Administrative Officers were appointed they were able to organize police and other essential services upon a limited scale. All appointments were on a temporary basis, and some appointees were dismissed after screening by Counter Intelligence Corps."

(13) First US Army, 8 March 1945.[18]

"The reaction to Military Government notices, proclamations and laws is excellent. Military Courts have made a great impression in the population and civilians are aware of the fact that violations of Military Government orders result in swift and strict punishment of all offenders, with no discrimination shown to the influential classes as was the case under the Nazi regime. The opinion of those who have knowledge of the operations of German Military Government in France and Belgium is that Allied Government is more humane. An attempt to discriminate against non-Nazis in favor of former members of the Party has been discovered and effectively counteracted in AACHEN."

(14) Third US Army, 11 March 1945.[19]

"The XII Corps reports that former officials who have been imprisoned by the Nazis have been found to be a good source of temporary appointees to civil government. Johann Neipes appointed Burgermeister of MACKEL was imprisoned several times since 1939 for anti-Nazi activities."

(15) First US Army, 14 March 1945.[20]

"The former Burgermeister of NA Bolheim (F2348) is remaining in office. Full investigation of the records of two AACHEN (K-8443) department heads (Industry and Personnel) have resulted in the removal of both. Although neither was a Party member, both were considered to have been too closely associated with the Nazi policy and militarism to be suitable public officials."

(16) First US Army, 22 March 1945.[21]

"One hundred thousand of the normal 780,000 inhabitants of KOELN (F-4560) remained when the city was occupied by American troops. No head of the civil administration has been appointed as yet. Progress is being made in the screening of candidates for the position of Burgermeister of FRECHEN (F-3558), Landkreis KOELN. The entire civil

government and police force of LUSKIRCHEN (F-3330) fled with the German Army. A temporary burgermeister has been appointed. Civilians (about 2,000 inhabitants of the normal 17,000 population) are quiet and apparently cooperative."

(17) First US Army, 23 March 1945.[22]

"Seven (7) minor officials were dismissed from the local government of AACHEN (K-8443) when investigations revealed their past connection with the Nazi party. The town of KALL (F-1716) is being set up as the temporary capital of Landkreis Schleiden because of its central location. Joseph Kleinberg, a local manufacturer, has been appointed acting Burgermeister of FRECHEN (F-3457). Alfred Clorowitz was dismissed from the local government of BLATZHEIM (F-2251) at the request of CIC."

(18) Ninth US Army, 28 March 1945.[23]

"The rapid advance of the front line permitted more extensive organization in rear areas, and raised the usual problems in newly uncovered areas. Landkreis along the border were free to function as governmental units. Plans were laid with the First US Army for starting an administration for Regierungsbezirk AACHEN at an early date. As new areas were uncovered, remaining officials were sought out, screened, and those found acceptable given provisional appointments to carry out the more essential functions. Most appointees are reported to be career civil servants with some ability and apparent willingness to carry out tasks imposed upon them, though some showed reluctance to accept. Ninth Army German area as a whole shows three main zones from the point of view of civil administration: A border zone, longest occupied, moderately damaged, not densely populated; an intermediate zone on either side of the Roer, heavily damaged but containing no large cities, almost totally depopulated; and a zone bordering the RHINE, heavily damaged in spots by earlier air raids, containing the largest concentration of enemy civilians yet to confront Military Government in Germany - present population estimated roughly at 500,000."

(19) Ninth US Army, 28 March 1945.[24]

"The newly uncovered population is described in reports as being mentally, morally and physically exhausted. No serious signs of resistance or resentment on their part have been noted. They show willingness to accept Military Government and to perform such menial or other labor as is required. Large scale evacuations have caused sorrow, but not protest."

(20) Ninth US Army, 5 April 1945.[25]

"Civil administrations are functioning at the local level throughout the area in a manner generally satisfactory. The problem of selecting adequate non-Nazi personnel is being vigorously dealt with. The de-Nazification of personnel has been given renewed emphasis in response to G-5 Operational Instruction No. 11, Headquarters 12 Army Group, 11 March 1945, which was forwarded to all staffs and detachments under the Ninth US Army. The wisdom of radical elimination of Nazi personnel from the beginning has been verified by field experience. One division reports: 'The inadvisability of using any Nazis, regardless of degree, as the head of any community or important department thereof, even in the initial stages of occupation, has been proved to the satisfaction of this Division. People of Nazi affiliations cannot secure the cooperation of all the people which is required. Eventually all Nazi-tinged people will have to be removed from office for successful military government and although it may be more difficult at first to deal with one not so familiar with the governmental set-up, the results after a few days, more than justify the course.' Administrations at Gemeinde are now functioning in all inhabited localities. Higher levels of administration are in abeyance in the more recently uncovered areas. Priests are serving as temporary Burgermeisters in cooperation, with the exception of two who showed reluctance to assist displaced persons; of these, one has been corrected, the other dismissed. Two Oberburgermeister, seven Burgermeister, three police chiefs, and a large number of police and other employees who were allowed to remain in office in the combat phase pending further investigation, have now been dismissed. Food and labor offices are in the process of reconstitution; considerable numbers of personnel and records have been found in the larger centers."

(21) Fifteenth US Army, 17 April 1945.[26]

"The AACHEN (K-8443) Detachment reported to 12 Army Group that Nazi officials had been removed."

(22) Third US Army, April 1945.[27]

"Civil control, due to the closest liaison with Counter Intelligence, was adequate, and the burgermeisters who were found to have any connection with the Party were summarily removed. Sentences for crimes against the Army were sufficiently severe to deter repetition. Everywhere the German public was learning that this was not 1918-1919. 794 German civilians were tried with fines totalling over $6,000 and sentences totalling 3,142 days imprisonment. The Legal sub-section also had control of approximately 90,000 prisoners in concentration camps and prisons in the Army Zone."

(23) G-5 Section, 6 Army Group, April 1945.[28]

"Continued pressure was exerted during April by 6 Army Group upon Military Government personnel to speed up and intensify the de-nazification program in occupied GERMANY.

"SHAEF issued a general warning that the screening process was lagging in certain places, according to surveys made in the field attributing it to a failure to realize the fundamental importance of the de-nazification program, to shortage of vetting personnel and to bottlenecks in the vetting procedure, and issued a memorandum and training guides designed to help Military Government detachments in de-nazification. This memorandum and guides were distributed by G-5, 6 Army Group.

"Among the suggestions made in the memorandum was that German civilian personnel, carefully chosen, be used to assist in the screening, to relieve the shortage of qualified help.

"The policy of the 6 Army Group, G-5 Section was that each functional division head was responsible for supervising de-nazification work in his special field, and for preparing and issuing any necessary special instructions. The Finance and Property Control Division issued during the month a guide for the de-nazification of German financial personnel.

"It was found that in actual operations in 6 Army Group area, during April as in March, that while some slight beginnings toward purging German civil administration of Nazis could be made by Division Military Government Officers and a little more by temporarily established Military Government detachments, the real work could be started only by the detachment pinpointed for the area.

"Reports from the field showed that many incumbent civil officials, especially burgermeisters, were removed and replaced because of their Nazi connections, but it was still noted as in the preceding month, that it was difficult for Military Government officers to know whether the men they chose as replacements were really more suitable than those they removed. On the whole, however, it was felt that few dangerous Nazis were left in office more than a minimum time after Military Government became established and that, considering the difficulties, reasonable satisfactory progress was being made.

"During April all Military Government detachments were furnished with lists of non-Nazis, as compiled from documents captured in STRASBOURG and from various intelligence reports. These names were forwarded to Military Government Officers, directly before they were ready to depart for

their pin-pointed areas, or as their city was uncovered by tactical operations, to assist them in the reconstruction of the local civil administration and in the purging of Nazi influences.

"This Headquarters issued a letter of information on 16 April 314.4, "Extracts from Captured German Document". Detachments were warned in this letter of Nazi "plants" left behind by the Party to collaborate with Military Government, in accordance with a decree of Himmler under the date of 12 October 1944. Reports from the field had confirmed a willing spirit of cooperation, particularly in the fields of welfare and supply, which were the special activities singled out in the above-mentioned decree."

(24) G-5 Third Army, May 1945.[29]

"With the war close to an end, the emphasis upon security and military expediency veered to the real mission of Military Government, the de-nazification and reorganization of the German Government. German officials with any of the odor of Nazidom about them were removed and replaced."

(25) SHAEF, G-5, 12 May 1945.[30]

"6 Army Group reports that due to the rapid advance, only the most immediate problems could be taken up--in some cases detachments remained but a day or two in a town and then moved forward. The task of replacing Nazi officials was partly eased by the presence of large numbers of refugees, who provided a larger choice of candidates."

(26) Third US Army G-5, May 1945.[31]

"As the cessation of hostilities approached, a chief objective of Military Government, the de-nazification and reorganization of the German government system was brought into relief. Security received first consideration, but it was recognized that the retention of German officials could no longer be generally approved upon the ground of military necessity or expediency.

"Clarification made it possible to begin the complete de-nazification of official personnel and the selection of non-Nazi successors."

115. Questionnaires. Selected answers to questionnaires returned by Military Government Officers are given below in order to present a representative cross-section of field experiences and opinions formed in the course of the appointment and removal of German officials. Some of the consultants submitted answers as to conditions up to the date of the return of the questionnaire (the date is listed with the name and address of each consultant) for the pur-

pose of showing comparisons or progress or clarification of the problems of appointments and removals. The subparagraphs under "b. Answers" correspond to the subparagraphs under "a. Questions"

a. Questions: In the appointment of officials to what degree were the following factors taken into account.

(1) Professional qualifications of appointees?

(2) Screening by Counter Intelligence Corps?

(3) Use of German Civil Service?

(4) Thoroughness of the removal of officials on black lists or in categories automatically demanding dismissal?

(5) Thoroughness of the dissolution of Nazi organizations and the elimination of those affiliated with subversive political and administrative activities?

b. Answers:

Major Elton W. Manning, Jr., 0360439
Detachment H-302 - 24 October 1945

(1) "Professional qualifications were considered as far as possible but as a rule denazification made it impossible to give qualifications adequate consideration."

(2) "CIC screening employed where possible. This was not always possible until some time after officials had taken office."

(3) "Not possible to make any use of the Civil Service System."

(4) "Public officials were ordered to be removed by U S Military authorities. Actual removals usually made by German officials upon instruction of military forces."

(5) "All organizations were either dissolved or suspended when U S forces moved in. Resumption or reorganization was prevented by proclamations and apparently successfully. Action of CIC in removing Nazi key officials by automatic arrests and arrests in other categories effectively destroyed the base around which Nazi elements might have organized. Cooperation of CIC and MG made it possible to make removals of dangerous element fairly complete and in relatively short time. Generally Nazi party officials were also town and city officials of some category. MG policy was generally to enforce order through Civil authorities, stepping in only when necessary."

Lt Col Frederich A Sansome 0208778
Detachment F-15 2 MGR 22 October 1945

(1) "Professional qualifications were primary requisites."

(2) "All personnel were screened by CIC before they were engaged."

(3) "Impossible to apply due to denazification program."

(4) "Persons in automatic arrest categories were brought into MG detachments and turned over to CIC. If sufficient Military Police were not available civilian police were used. German civilian officials were instructed as to whom should be removed and were then required to submit in writing that the order had been complied with. Every person classed as mandatory removal was immediately removed."

Capt Neil J Van Steenberg 0519178
Detachment G-31 2 MGR 22 October 1945

(1) "Next to political qualification, this was the most important."

(2) "All Fragebogens of German officials were screened by CIC and were approved before appointment."

(3) "No use made of the German Civil Service."

(4) "Because of the over enthusiasm of MG appointed officials to dismiss all people who had even the slightest innocent connection with members of the NSDAP, this detachment assumed exclusive right to dismiss employees from public service and industry. Every employee of Kreis or Stadt, every teacher, clergyman, everyone who had a responsible position in trade or industry, every leader of newly organized political organization, trade union, singing groups, football team, every person who exercised any leadership whatever had to execute a Fragebogen which was then processed by Special Branch. Army directives gave rule of thumb for retention or dismissal."

First Lt William W Stanhope FA 0524173
Company F 3 MGR 18 October 1945

(1) "To as great a degree as was compatible with the political acceptability of the candidates. In all cases of politically unobjectionable men, the most completely professionally qualified were chosen."

(2) "We always worked in the closest cooperation with the CIC. CIC clearance in advance was always secured for major appointments, and to a varying extent depending upon the volume of the work involved, for all Civil appointees."

(3) "No use made of the German Civil Service. It was thoroughly a nazified organization."

Lt Col Richard J Jackson 0525570
Chief Government Affairs Branch
G-5 Third U S Army
12 October 1945

(1) "This was given first priority, but usually we were unable to find any appointed men with adequate professional qualifications for his job."

(2) "This was done to check and see if the person was a security threat, or considered so by CIC."

(3) "I am of the opinion that where the German official understood that a person was to be removed, he removed him, but there have been many misunderstandings due to directives which are not at all clear. Of course I feel that some officials took advantage of this confusion and retained some in office, and too I feel certain that there were a great many civilian officials whom they did not remove because they themselves were not the right choice. There was a general misunderstanding about the directive and consequently some Military Government Officers were not so much concerned with denazification as they should have been, and undoubtedly would have been if it were not for this misunderstanding or misconception."

Maj John W Hall 0302073
Detachment H-261 APO 403
18 October 1945

(1) "Those qualifications were required insofar as personnel was available. Irrespective of professional qualifications a civil government was essential and in many ways it became necessary to supplant professionals with novices."

(2) "Screening by CIC was required on all doubtful cases resulting from examination of the Fragebogen. All of the higher officials were screened by CIC."

(3) "The use of the German Civil Service system was considered but not essential for so many officials under Civil Service were Nazis. In all, little consideration was given to civil service status of prospective employees. First consideration was Party affiliations, second, intelligence and ability, third, professional qualifications, and fourth, civil service status."

(4) "All were removed on order of Military Government to the German civilians. Upon order the Germans were cooperative. They wanted Military Government order."

(5) "From observation and information proclamations, laws, and ordinances dissolved Nazi organizations and subversive political and administrative activi-

ties. Through joint action of CIC and Military Government, by enforcement of laws and ordinances and special investigations, a thorough job was done. With the aid of CIC and intelligence targets furnished from higher level, a thorough job has been done in blocking the influence of Nazism on arrests and surveillances. It has been found that only through the impetus of Military Government did the German civilian officials attempt to carry out denazification. Had it been left to them, this plan would not have succeeded. It required the use of the "big stick" to eliminate Nazis in official positions. Both Military Government and CIC cooperated in ferreting out the Nazis and ordering their dismissal. It has been the tendency of employed officials to retain Nazis who were experienced so that they could better carry on their work."

Maj Ralph G Hill 0413081
Detachment I-364 Company F 3 MGR
22 October 1945

(1) "Professional qualifications were sought but seldom found among those acceptable on political grounds. Therefore in the highest posts men educated and trained in other fields than government such as law, newspaper field, medicine, and industry were used when free from Nazism."

(2) "Screening by CIC of little aid because the standards used by CIC were lower than those used by Military Government in approving persons for employment."

(3) "A complete breakdown of the German Civil Service as it was riddled with Nazism causing general shortage of suitable personnel. Such as were available were used at levels of government above the Kreis."

(General Comment) "From experience it is felt that the primary function of Military Government is the selection of personnel. The complete removal of all existing personnel made necessary the direct selection of the head of almost every agency and level of government. These selected men were charged to pick their own assistants but physically could not themselves find men to head agencies beneath them that met the strict requirements in a reasonable period of time. Military Government was burdened with many functions it had not expected such as Town Major, billeting, procurement and emergency aid to a large stream of transients."

Col Glenn D. Crawford 0214144
3 MGR (Regimental Commander)
18 October 1945

(General Comment) "Education is needed in the various branches of the service as to the functions of

Military Government. In too many cases have troops, other than Military Government made demands on Military Government for saddle horses, pet dogs and other items, utilizing the time of Military Government personnel that could have been well spent in restoring, instructing, and supervising German Government."

Capt Douglas H Alexander 0908544
Detachment H-259 3 MGR 16 October 1945

(General Comment) "Hard and fast rules regarding the elimination of public officials on the basis of the date of their party memberships resulted in the loss of men capable and willing to do a good job and who could be trusted politically."

Maj Albert C Schweizer 0532051
E-201 3 MGR (Civil Administrative and Local Government Officer for Military Government Detachment E1 H2 in Aachen, Cologne and Schwaven (21 Janaury to 20 August 1945); same for Bavarian Regional Detachment E-201 to date) 22 October 1945

(1) "In technical positions the professional qualifications were paramount. Since the strict policy of non-employment of any person who had ever been a NSDAP member was adopted it was almost impossible to fill many positions and efficiency had to be sacrificed to party reliability. All appointments were specified as temporary."

(2) "Screening was at first done entirely by CIC starting with top officials. Effectiveness and justice of the screening varied considerably with the CIC team acting. Main criticism was lack of objective investigation by CIC staff. No appointments were made counter to CIC recommendations."

(General Comment) "German officials appointed their assistants. All appointees were nominally approved by Military Government. Important appointees were interviewed. In some cases recommendations on personnel were made by Military Government, which in effect produced mandatory appointments. German officials in Cologne were required to take initiative in removing Nazis in prohibited categories. In general U S Military authorities did a thorough job of removal."

(General Comment) "Enactments clear and comprehensive on organizations. Prior to USFET 7 July 1945 directive, there was no clearly detailed uniform policy on elimination of individuals. Arrest of officials, though often difficult and incomplete due to circumstances, was crippling to any continued Nazi activity."

Capt Walter R Baylies 0192518
Detachment H-279 Company D 3 MGR
20 October 1945

(1) "Generally speaking, professional qualifications were the first consideration. But there were many instances, especially in the case of the Forestry Department and specialized services, where it was difficult to get a man who had the professional qualifications but was not a Nazi."

(2) "Where possible, all selections for appointments as schoolteachers were screened by CIC. In other cases, except for the highest positions, the appointments were made after clearance with Special Branch, but close coordination was maintained as much as possible with CIC."

(3) "The German Civil Service system was of very little use, if any. In the small detachments there is just not sufficient personnel to get tangled up with anything as complicated as Civil Service."

(General Comment) "The removal of officials was not at all thorough by civilian officials appointed or retained. In most cases the initiative had to be taken by Military Government. The removal by U S Military authorities was practically 100%. But the process is much longer and more difficult than anyone in higher headquarters who has not actually been out in the field doing the work himself, can imagine."

Maj Francis K Henchey 0472636
Detachment H-273 3 MGR 27 October 1945

(1) "While the CIC has made many investigations for this detachment, we consider that CIC is mainly concerned with security and place accordingly a corresponding value on their reports. Naturally a negative report from CIC means a negative report from Military Government, and an affirmative report is often used by this detachment in a discretionary manner."

Lt Col Harry M Montgomery 0529946
Detachment G-28 2 MGR 19 October 1945

(1) "In the combat phase professional qualifications were not as important. Later, this was a factor considered but, due to the denazification program, a majority of civil servants were automatic removals and therefore, professional qualifications, while desirable, were not necessarily required."

(2) "CIC screening was considered only a security measure. The political reliability and/or desirability of CIC recommendations did not always prove particularly fortunate. There was frequently a tendency by CIC to favor the leftist elements or those that proved useful informers to CIC."

(3) "It is our observation that certain phases of the German Civil Service system have worked as a serious handicap to the filling of public office under Military Government. The hide-bound hierarchy of jobs, the long tenures of of office, have removed the immediacy of public service from the life of the average citizen. He thinks of public service as a thing apart and of no concern to him. The Civil Service, developing into a bureaucracy, is not a system that nurtures public officials with a true democratic point-of-view. We have had to call together groups of people (who qualified for public office insofar as intelligence, honesty and non-Party affiliations are concerned) and "sell" them on the obligation of the individual to serve in a democratic society and the non-essentiality of being a long-trained civil servant in order to fill adequately a public office."

Capt William J Tonkin 01046670
Detachment I-334 3 MGR 20 October 1945

(2) "At the time when there were most appointments of German officials there were no CIC teams available. To that extent no screening from such teams was utilized in the appointment of German officials."

Capt Stanley R Jacobs 0140293
Detachment I-381 3 MGR 17 October 1945

(2) "It is felt that Military Government detachments should be operated with a pinpointed CIC team attached. This detachment operating in its earlier pin-pointed area, had the experience of seeing six successive CIC teams operate in the area, each of which took a week to get oriented. Rather than attach CIC teams to divisions, corps and armies, to follow one another, pinpointing of one team would accomplish the mission much better. Screening by CIC was one of the requisites for appointment to office. Applicants had to be passed favorably by CIC and Special Branch of Military Government."

Maj Stanley A Warren 0375042
Detachment H-55 2 MGR 18 October 1945

(2) "Most administrative officials had been appointed before a CIC detachment was available to screen them. Upon screening by CIC a few persons who had previously been retained were removed."

Capt William A Becker 0293132
Detachment G-21 2 MGR 15 October 1945

(2) "All appointees, when possible, were screened by CIC. In the combat phase this was in most cases impossible due to the fast moving situations. Most CIC teams have been understaffed for the job given them. The mandatory removals were

easy to handle but those who were members of the Party and not in this category had to be personally investigated to determine whether or not they were more than nominal Nazis. They did not have enough personnel to assist adequately the detachment in its mission."

Maj Lloyd S Laprade 0532046
Detachment G-32 2 MGR 29 October 1945

(1) "Denazification directives precluded the giving of more than secondary consideration to professional qualifications. Emphasis was placed upon the ousting of persons classified as Nazis."

(2) "Nominees for public office, employees, etc. were referred to CIC for checking, but directives expressly state that CIC clearance does not relieve MGO of responsibility for 'screening' persons he approves for appointment. In practice MGO's operated closely with CIC and to their mutual advantage."

(3) "No German Civil Services to speak of existed in area covered by this officer. The Civil Service is subject to denazification the same as the rest, leaving little hope of aid from that source."

(General Comment) "The abrogation and suspension of selective lists of laws made the restoration and reorganization of Civil Administration more difficult. First, local administrations where they existed found it hard to calculate what was abolished and what was not. Many agencies were abolished that normally performed essential services and nothing was done or could be instituted immediately to replace those abolished. In theory the abolition by decree adds up. In practice it does not work for the reason that people and their behavior do not change overnight simply because a poster says the change takes place. The proclamations, laws and ordinances were not comprehensive enough to advance the objectives of MG. They were more general than specific and desirable explanations were not given either to MG units in the field or to echelons supposed to pass them on to MG units in the field. It is the opinion of this writer that proclamations, laws and ordinances were written by one group and the problem of implementing them left to another, with little or no liaison between groups."

Capt Harlan W Newell 0452474
Detachment I-347 3 MGR 23 October 1945

(General Comment) "The initial material in proclamations, laws and ordinances was clear, concise and easily understood. There was no difficulty in the early stages over interpretation of orders. Later instructions have in general become more and more confusing and controversial not only to civilians but also to MG itself. In our experience

it is not felt that the presence or absence of any particular German law greatly affected the reorganization of civil administration. This was largely because the people remained passive, read the American regulations and wanted to see what would happen."

First Lt Milton L Shurr QMC 01586911

(4) "It has been SOP in our office to remove all who are mandatory according to CIC and Special Branch. Our Special Branch is more severe than CIC in its appraisals of Fragenbogens. If left to themselves the German officials would not be as severe in removals as American authorities. When we had mandatory removals we would get all sorts of excuses from our appointed officials why a certain party should be retained - he was necessary - he had to join the party, etc."

(5) "I believe that most of them went out of existence with the final defeat of the German army. The proclamations and ordinances gave the NSDAP their final burial. We have pretty well discredited prominent members of NSDAP by removal from office, blocking accounts and having them accept menial jobs."

Lt Col Richard A Norton 0346562
Detachment F-214 3 MGR (Formerly AC of S, G-5 of 17 Airborne Division 1 January to 15 June 1945) 20 October 1945

(4) "By U S Military authorities - completely thorough. Removals were not generally made until ordered by Military Government. There was an apparent reluctance on the part of officials to take any direct action until approval was obtained from Military Government."

(5) "To a reasonably high degree by proclamations, laws and ordinances practically complete dissolution through joint action of CIC and Military Government."

Maj Francis B Douglass 0535541
Detachment 243 Company H 3 MGR
20 October 1945

(4) "In the early days dismissal was made by U S Military authorities but later the Germans assisted materially in doing a thorough job."

Capt John D Cofer 0150924
Detachment G-229 3 MGR 17 October 1945

(4) "Removals were made on the advice of our own Special Branch German civilians. The actual removals were made by German officials on names furnished by U S Military authorities.

Capt Shale L Tulin 01037756
Detachment I-332 3 MGR 17 October 1945

(5) "Proclamations, laws and ordinances were effective in dissolving Nazi organizations as such individuals connected with them desisted immediately from all outward activities, although it is possible they retained their political beliefs. CIC and Military Government working together effectively removed from circulation those Nazis who could possibly conduct subversive activities. The seizure of Party records and other information was instrumental in interning many Nazis who otherwise might have gone underground. The arresting and imprisonment of Nazi Party officials, particularly at the Kreis level, broke the backs of any attempt of underground activity."

First Lt Benjamin M Zeigler 01043548
Detachment G-242 Kempten Allagii
18 October 1945

(4) "The German civil administration cooperated in carrying out policies only insofar as they were ordered directly to do so by Military Government. Officials felt uneasy toward the population in their capacity as appointees of Military Government and lacking support from any electorate, relied on Military Government to point the way and take the responsibility. Apparently concerned with their future in the community they preferred to take direct orders from Military Government to any decisive action on their own responsibility. Law and order were maintained almost solely by military personnel in the first weeks of occupation. The principal offenders were displaced persons, ones whom the local authorities had us control."

Capt Carl V Hanson 0119659
Company D 3 MGR 19 October 1945

(4) "Good, except that administrative efficiency was impaired in many cases. German civilian officials were either reluctant or unwilling to remove mandatory removal cases and frequently pleaded administrative efficiency as an excuse to retain such personnel."

(5) "The proclamations, laws and ordinances proved highly effective and invaluable as a means of eliminating all Nazi organizations and in several instances the German population were better informed on many of the fine points of the proclamations than the military personnel themselves. It is my opinion that much of the difficulty in the early stages was a direct result of confusions attending conflicting reports, overlapping jurisdiction and weakly defined policy."

Capt Charles E Buckheit Jr 0425256
Detachment I-354 LK Roding, Germany
8 November 1945

(General Comment) "The most significant criticism of the undersigned with Military Government is the complex and vacillating phases of our denazification program. The ever changing directives caused by lack of conception as to who is and who is not a dangerous Nazi has sapped not only the remaining strength of the German administration, but also that of the Military Government personnel commissioned to administer the program. There are many and varied plans voiced by the men on the ground for denazification of Germany, but none of them includes the establishment of a party date line to prove or disprove guilt, or the elimination as a reconstruction factor of from 60% to 80% of the nation's professional and educated class. Although comparative hoodlums founded and led the Nazi Party during its entire regime, classes were drawn in to protect position and property who today represent the most virile element for reconstruction of Germany on democratic principles."

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SECTION 2

SUSPENSION OF LAWS

AND

PUBLICATION OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT ENACTMENTS

116. Indigenous Law. German law was continued in occupied territory by the Allied Forces, except as modified to conform with Military Government directives.

a. A full set of legal codes, based on enactments and precedents established through centuries, had been in effect in GERMANY before World War I. Only relatively minor changes were made by the events of the first 45 years of the Twentieth Century.

b. Imperial GERMANY codified the basic criminal, civil and commercial law, added the Judicature Act, the Code of Civil Procedure, the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Bankruptcy Act, the Law for Levying Executions Upon Land, the Land Registration Act and the Law Concerning Non-Contentious Jurisdiction.

c. The Weimar Republic brought into being the following additions to German Law: the Labor Courts Act, the Juvenile Courts Act and the Youth Welfare Act.

d. All these laws became a part of the jurisprudence of Military Government in the regulation of civil matters.

e. The Hitler regime in GERMANY added few laws to German jurisprudence that were not abrogated by the Supreme Commander.

117. Reorganization of Legal System. Legal officers of G-5 Staff Sections of Army Groups and Armies were responsible for establishment and supervision of Military Government courts and reorganization of the German legal system. In Fifteenth US Army, however, this function was withdrawn from G-5 Section and assigned to the Judge Advocate Section. For further details, consult the Theater General Board study by Judge Advocate Section entitled, "Legal Phases of Civil Affairs and Military Government", Chapter 1, "The Jurisprudence of Military Government", Study Number 85.

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CHAPTER 3

PUBLIC WORKS AND UTILITIES

SECTION 1

LIBERATED TERRITORIES

118. Extent of Problem. Because the enemy did not resort to scorched-earth tactics, the necessary restoration of public works and utilities in liberated territories was much less of a problem than had been anticipated.

119. Civilian-Civil Affairs-Engineer Cooperation. As planned, public utilities officials of the countries involved did the bulk of the work. Civil Affairs specialists assisted them in two ways, namely: (1) short-term planning for restoration necessary to attain military objectives, including prevention of disease and unrest that might have impeded military operations, and (2) long-range planning for restoration for future civilian needs. The Corps of Engineers performed the planning and necessary work for the immediate, direct action required to facilitate military victory.[1]

120. The Principal Problem.

a. The supply of fuel, repair materials and skilled labor was the principal problem encountered in the restoration and operation of public utilities. Stock-piles of fuel and materials were practically exhausted due mainly to the German policy of removing these materials as they retreated. Through the Civil Affairs system which had been prepared for this contingency, the necessary fuel was estimated, allocated and delivered.

b. Due to transportation shortages, difficulties were encountered in distributing adequate supplies, especially of fuel, to each using point so that it could maintain an adequate stock-pile and function constantly at maximum efficiency. Fuel rationing was necessary.

c. In many instances, military demands required practically all the available output of electricity. Although there often was not adequate power for transmission to forward areas, the French electric power system was substantially restored through the cooperation of the civilian population, Civil Affairs, the Corps of Engineers, the Transportation Corps and the supply services.[2]

121. Hydro-Electric Power. Due to the shortages of fuel at many steam-generating stations, the first objective in restoring electric power in the French area of operations was repair of long-distance transmission lines in order to bring in power from undamaged, distant hydro-electric generating plants. Damage to those transmission lines had been greater than anticipated. For restoration work which they carried out, the French were furnished from military stocks a limited amount of auxiliary equipment and supplies. Where the military needs for electric power were critical, troop labor was utilized. Engineer troops, to give only three examples, restored 4,100 KW of generating capacity at CHERBOURG, reconstructed 150 miles of 60 KV transmission line in NORMANDY and restored the high-tension line river-crossing at DISTRE. By lending transportation facilities and critically important supplies, the Corps of Engineers also enabled the French to rebuild 1,700 miles of high-tension lines. These lines made it possible, among other benefits,

for PARIS to be furnished almost pre-war quantities of electricity from the distant hydro-electric plants and available steam-generating stations located near large supplies of coal. Engineer troops devoted 612,445 manhours of labor to electric power line repair in FRANCE.[3]

122. Supplementary Mobile Power Equipment Provided By The Corps of Engineers.

a. FRANCE.

(1) To serve the Port of CHERBOURG during a time when large amounts of electric power were critically needed, the Destroyer Escort USS Donnell was anchored there and connections made between its generating machinery and the port's power distribution system.

(2) To supply high-priority military installations such as hospitals with the electricity which they needed in addition to that furnished by their T/E equipment, 100 KW portable generating sets were used as available. However, only a relatively small number of these sets were received.

b. BELGIUM.

(1) The "Sea Power" and the "Resistance", two Engineer floating power plants, were hooked onto the Belgian national network in January and February 1945 at GHENT and at ANTWERP. The total of 152,645,000 KW supplied in their six months of assistance to the Belgian-Dutch area was an emergency measure of vital importance in providing for essential military production.

(2) Although power lines in that area had been repaired, for the most part, there would not otherwise have been power for transmission over them because the indigenous steam plants lacked coal. Disruption and destruction of transportation and coal-mining operations had reduced the Belgian coal production to about 50% of the pre-war figure.

c. THE NETHERLANDS. During 1939, the last year for which complete records were available, THE NETHERLANDS consumed 2,900,000,000 KW of electric energy. Only about 20% of this amount was being produced in the Dutch steam generating plants during the period that the Engineer floating power plants were in operation and servicing the area. Dutch coal production at the time was only about 30% of the pre-war rate.

d. LUXEMBOURG. Since this small, predominantly agricultural country had received comparatively favorable treatment by the Germans, neither its national economy nor its public utility system required an appreciable amount of direct assistance.[4]

123. Providing Electricity Solved Water and Sewage Pumping Problems. Throughout the Liberated Territories, one of the primary reasons for providing electric power was for the essential health services of pumping water and sewage and lighting hospitals. Gas

systems were repaired only where the damage was minor and local, and where there was a definite military need for these facilities. Such occasions were extremely rare.[5]

124. Repair of Water Supply Systems Was Necessary. The Army was obliged to provide safe drinking water for the civilian population in a number of instances. Where this became necessary, Engineer troops gave direct assistance in the cleaning and repairing of the water supply systems, and Engineer water supply equipment was installed. Such water supply and attendant sewer repairs required 250,875 manhours of labor by Engineer troops in FRANCE and 17,530 in BELGIUM. Where US Army troops were located, the water treatment equipment was augmented as necessary by military chlorinating equipment.[6]

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SECTION 2

OCCUPIED TERRITORY

125. Basic Policy of German Self-Help. In keeping with the basic principle of Military Government to exercise complete control by a system of governing not the people but their governors, the Allied Forces commanded the Germans to operate their own public works and utilities systems, then lent them exactly as much advice and supervision as were necessary to make sure the job was well done.[1]

126. Army's Work Limited to Planning and Supervision. Planning was the principal work done by the military forces. During the combat phases, the armies were not concerned with the long-range repair or restoration of utility services. There was little opportunity for doing any actual restoration because of the difficulties encountered in traveling and moving materials through combat areas. However, the Engineer specialists attached to Army Headquarters staffs did have an opportunity to make numerous surveys of facilities as the areas were uncovered. This information was very valuable in planning for the reactivation period. These specialists also supervised the restoration of generating and transmission facilities

supplying electricity for higher headquarters, hospitals and waterworks using electric power for pumping.[2]

127. Military Government Approved Management and Labor Used. The actual emergency work of repairing lines and plants was accomplished through German officials, acting under Military Government direction, and using German labor.

128. Long-Term Reactivation Necessities Planned. While this short-term, emergency program of supplying the immediate needs of the occupying forces was being carried on, a long-range rehabilitation program to make GERMANY capable of feeding, clothing and sheltering itself was being planned. The public works and utilities part of this over-all program was laid out by the highest-echelon German officials under the guidance and supervision of specialist officers from the European Civil Affairs Division pool.[3] Since GERMANY had been consuming vast quantities of electric power in her war industries, and these industries would not be reactivated in the reconstruction period, it was believed that a sufficient quantity of electric power could be made available by using the hydro-electric plants in the south, which were practically undamaged, and by operating a relatively few (25-50) large steam plants located near or at the coal mines.

129. High-Tension Electric Lines Planned to Save Coal Transportation. Since the institution of the above rehabilitation program depended upon the reconstruction or repair of sufficient high-tension lines (110,000 and 220,000 volts) to form a skeleton grid, aerial surveys of many high-tension lines were made by the Engineer services. In addition, German officials surveyed the fixed installations, recording the results on survey forms furnished by the Engineers. The information obtained was reviewed and instructions were issued by the Engineers, with the cooperation of Military Government, for the restoration of certain high-tension lines. The rapid implementation of this planning provided electric power for areas having little or no coal, thereby freeing the already overloaded transportation facilities for other essential purposes.

130. German Equipment, Transportation and Skilled Labor Made to Suffice. In practically all cases, it was found that the Germans had trained crews and repair materials but lacked gasoline and trucks. Only captured stocks were used where it was necessary to move materials into one locality from another. Customarily, the German officials knew where needed equipment and materials could be found. Through Military Government channels, they were assisted in finding them. When located, the critically-needed items were customarily hauled in trucks obtained from Military Government civilian motor pools.[4]

131. Over-all Supervision Had To Be From Highest Military Echelon. Since electric transmission lines cross Division, Corps, Army, Army Group and international boundaries, the overall plan for coordination of the electric facilities was the responsibility of SHAEF. On 26 April 1945, SHAEF authorized the formation of the Production Control Agency to deal directly between Headquarters European Theater of Operations and the Armies in all industrial matters including utilities. As a branch of G-4 Section, this agency acted as a coordinating and controlling body and an office of record. Through it, all Staff Sections pooled their needs and plans. Civilian utilities in GERMANY became the responsibility of the Corps of Engineers.[5] Due to its date of establishment, only 11 days before V-E Day, the work of Production Control Agency had hardly begun prior to the end of the period covered in this study. The success of plans begun previous to

V-E Day is observable, however, in the report by 12 Army Group on 23 June 1945 in which the reactivation of the necessary power lines was deemed "rather complete". By that time, hydro-electric power was being brought from the area near the Swiss border to as far north as FRANKFURT, thereby relieving the coal situation. Electric power generating facilities totaled 4,000,000 KW, or 33% of the total installed capacity.[6]

132. Gas Distribution Lines Delayed General Use Until After V-E Day. Not a great deal was done about gas prior to V-E Day. GERMANY had had a rather extensive long-distance high-pressure gas system connecting by-product coke-oven plants with large industrial areas such as the RUHR and the SAAR. Surveys disclosed that, while the gas-producing plants themselves were still operating in many areas, the pipe lines were badly damaged. The lack of repair materials, combined with the over-all inadequacy of the coal supplies, made the reactivation of the majority of gas systems a rather long-time project.[7]

133. Restoration of Utilities Telephone Network. It is impracticable to operate an electric utility system with long transmission lines and without suitable telephone communications. The reactivation of the German electric utility telephone systems, essential to the operation of the power systems, presented a problem in communication censorship. Close coordination and cooperation between Intelligence and Signal agencies were required since practically all utility systems had their own private telephone systems which were so interconnected that communication with all areas of GERMANY was possible.[8] To monitor such a vast network was a considerable problem. 12 Army Group was instrumental in the development of a plan, worked out in detail after V-E Day by Headquarters, United States Forces, European Theater (USFET), by which the various units of the utilities reopened their dispatching systems, with security being insured by spot-check monitoring carried on by G-2 personnel. This procedure enabled reactivation of the utilities system to proceed with a minimum of delay.[9]

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CHAPTER 4

JUDICIAL PROCEDURE IN OCCUPIED TERRITORY

SECTION 1

MILITARY GOVERNMENT AND GERMAN COURTS

134. Military Government Courts had jurisdiction over criminal cases only. No German courts, except one, were opened in occupied territory until exactly eight days before V-E Day. Therefore Military Government had no occasion to administer German law. The one German civil court which was opened just prior to V-E Day, at AACHEN, placed approximately 300 cases on its docket, but, due to a 10-day delay in commencing operations, held no trials.

135. Division of Responsibility. Legal officers in G-5 Staff Sections of Army Groups and Armies were responsible for establishment and supervision of Military Government courts and reorganization of the German legal system. In Fifteenth US Army and its subordinate commands, this function was withdrawn from G-5 and assigned to the Judge Advocate Section. In other Armies there was cordial cooperation between G-5 and the Judge Advocate Section, generally with the Judge Advocate Section furnishing legal advice, recommending procedure to be followed and reviewing important cases.[1] For a detailed consideration of these matters, consult the Theater General Board Judge Advocate Section study entitled "Legal Phases of Civil Affairs and Military Government," Part Two "Military Government," Chapter 4, "The German Judicial System," and Chapter 1, "The Jurisprudence of Military Government,"[2] (Study Number 85).

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CHAPTER 5

POSTAL SERVICES

SECTION 1

LIBERATED TERRITORIES

136. France. Security was the controlling factor in every move made in connection with the restoration of postal services in FRANCE between 6 June 1944 and 8 May 1945. The mails constituted one of the most important channels through which military information of value to the enemy might have passed. To achieve this security, co-operation between elements of the armies was necessary. Despite friction, co-operation was obtained.[1]

137. Responsibilities.

a. G-2 SHAEF held responsibility for the actual opening of postal services. After security was assured, the ability of the French national postal organization, PTT, (Postes, Telegraphes, Telephones) to handle the actual physical traffic of the mail was a governing factor.

b. Within FRANCE itself, the right to approve progressive openings of mail service was delegated by SHAEF to each Army Group for such traffic as was completely within its own boundaries. Whenever the mail movement was to cross either Army Group or Communications Zone boundaries, the authority was reserved to SHAEF. As the Allied Forces fought their way across FRANCE, G-2 and G-5 Sections of SHAEF cooperated in publishing authorizations to the French to expand communications. After the French Provisional Government was recognized on 20 August 1944 and a Zone of the Interior established in mid-October 1944, the French were given a free hand in solving their own problems of internal mail service within that expanding zone.

c. Outside FRANCE, the opening of international postal services for the French required a specific approval from the Combined Chiefs of Staff before SHAEF could publish authorizations.[2]

138. Opening of Internal Postal Services.

a. The first internal postal services restored in FRANCE were authorized by SHAEF on 19 August 1944. Citizens within the first few cantons in the Departments of CALVADOS and MANCHE were permitted to correspond with each other on non-illustrated postcards, with the subject-matter confined solely to personal and family matters. Official mail between government and semi-government agencies was likewise authorized. The communications were censored by the Services des Controles Techniques (the censorship department of the French Provisional Government), and the physical handling was done by the French PTT system. The affected cantons were those which SHAEF Censorship Sub-Division approved as meeting security requirements; they were DOUVRES, CREVELY, RYES, BAYEUX, CAEN, TILLY, BAILLEROY, TREVIERES and ISIGNY in CALVADOS; in MANCHE they were all cantons north of and including ST MALO DE LA LANDE, COUTANCES, ST SAUVEUR-LENDELIN, PERIERS, ST JEAN DE DAYE and ST CLAIRE SUR L'ELLE. The remaining cantons of CALVADOS and MANCHE were extended this service on 4 September 1944. Since the catalog of French departments and cantons, with the numerous exceptions that were necessary on account of enemy pockets of resistance, would be too long to recount

here, suffice it to say that these postal services were restored as rapidly as security considerations and the ability of the French PTT to handle the physical traffic could meet SHAEF standards. The remainder of NORMANDY was extended these limited mail privileges by 20 September 1944, along with portions of BRITTANY, ANGERS, ORLEANS and the PARIS area. On 10 October 1944, service was authorized for all of Metropolitan FRANCE (except CORSICA and ALGERIA and the 15 departments from which the enemy had not yet been cleared). Three of these 15 departments were included on 15 October 1944, three more on 1 November 1944, two more on 10 December 1944, one on 15 January 1945, two on 15 February 1945, one on 9 March 1945 and the remainder on 3 May 1945. There were numerous intervening restorations of service for small, specific areas.

b. Concurrently, the areas which had been granted the non-illustrated postcard and official internal mail privileges were progressively (beginning with CALVADOS and MANCHE) authorized to send and receive closed letters weighing a maximum of 20 grams, and registered and insured mail. The first such grant took place for part of NORMANDY on 25 October 1944. The last two departments to be cleared of the enemy, HAUT RHIN and BAS RHIN, were given this authorization only five days prior to V-E Day.

c. In the case of internal parcel post services, the same progression through the fully-secured departments in which the PTT had become firmly established was authorized. The Departments of HAUT RHIN and BAS RHIN were granted this privilege effective three days after V-E Day, completing the restoration of full internal mail and parcel-post service for FRANCE.[3]

139. Opening of External Postal Services.

a. The first international communications from FRANCE were authorized on 19 August 1944. Only non-illustrated postcards of personal and family matters were allowed at this time from the first few liberated cantons of the Departments of MANCHE and CALVADOS in NORMANDY. The French routed this mail through CHERBOURG to LONDON. The only foreign countries with which FRANCE was permitted to open international mail service at this time were:

(1) GREAT BRITAIN (exclusive of NORTHERN IRELAND).

(2) UNITED STATES of AMERICA (excluding ALASKA).

(3) ALGERIA and the French Empire (excluding enemy-occupied territories).

(4) French Expeditionary Forces in all countries.

SHAEF G-5 and the British General Post Office strongly desired to extend this service to all non-enemy countries not occupied. G-2 opposed this policy for reasons of security. However, the above-tabulated foreign destinations with which French mails could be exchanged were quickly expanded to include all of the UNITED KINGDOM and NORTHERN IRELAND; all British Dominions (excluding EIRE), colonies and possessions; CORSICA; British and American Expeditionary Forces. As quickly as the Allied Forces moved forward, additional areas of Liberated FRANCE (up to Army Group rear boundaries) received the same privileges.

b. Mail services to the above list of countries were progressively expanded to include 20-gram closed letters on personal

and non-transactional business matters on 1 November 1944; two kilograms maximum weight and registered and express letters with the same restrictions on 22 November 1944, and printed paper post, blind literature and commercial paper post, with a weight restriction of 500 grams, on 12 March 1945. At the request of Economic Warfare and Foreign Funds Control Agencies of the US and UK Governments, made through the Combined Chiefs of Staff, no insured mail service was opened prior to V-E Day. Transactional business communications were authorized effective 20 April 1945 with the US, UK and their colonies and possessions only.

c. Postal services were restored between FRANCE and BELGIUM on 27 November 1944, in the same order and with the same restrictions as those listed in par b. above, on a somewhat slower schedule but following the identical pattern. THE NETHERLANDS and LUXEMBOURG communications with FRANCE were opened soon after the restoration of those with BELGIUM and they followed the same pattern.

d. All remaining non-enemy countries were opened for French mails on a schedule following that outlined above, beginning with non-illustrated postcards on 10 December 1944. The definition of non-enemy countries was based on the British General Post Office List.

e. One exception to this procedure was SWITZERLAND. Shortly after the French-Swiss frontier came completely under Allied control, Swiss-US/UK postal communications were authorized to be carried across France (10 November 1944). Pressure from the French Government caused SHAEF to authorize French-Swiss terminal communications, 15 December 1944, for non-illustrated postcards on personal and non-transactional business matters.

f. Neither FRANCE nor any other of the Liberated Countries of Northwest EUROPE was authorized to restore postal services with GERMANY, AUSTRIA, HUNGARY, JAPAN or Japanese-occupied areas.

g. Mail routings followed normal international postal channels except that no mail was routed through enemy or enemy occupied territory. All France-Switzerland mail was routed via LYON after LYON was liberated, and all France-Latin America mail through the UNITED STATES.[4]

140. Captured Mail. Almost as soon as Civil Affairs and Counter Intelligence teams entered French towns after the invasion started, there arose the necessity for handling mail discovered in post offices. SHAEF G-2 Documents Section wanted it; SHAEF G-2 Censorship Sub-Division wanted it; 12 Army Group and 21 Army Group wanted it, each within its own area; so did the French Services des Controles Techniques and the British Postal and Telegraph Censorship in London. The compromise arrived at was that each Army Group should seize the mail for quick screening by its G-2 Documents Section, then pass civilian (but not Wehrmacht) mail on to the Allied Censorship Group (FRANCE) for final disposition.[5]

141. Prisoner of War Communications. For those areas in Liberated FRANCE where postal service was restored as the armies advanced, SHAEF authorized Prisoner of War and Red Cross communications with enemy and enemy-held territory through SWITZERLAND on 17 July 1944. The mail was routed through LONDON, censored and delayed 30 days. Only special POW and Red Cross forms printed on a specially

treated paper to facilitate censorship were permitted. With the later liberation of Southern FRANCE, this service was re-routed through LYONS effective 28 October 1944.[6]

142. Displaced Persons Mail and Parcels.

a. SHAEF G-5 authorized "Communications to, from and about Displaced Persons in Liberated Areas" in a directive published 14 September 1944 in an effort to grant a privilege paralleling that enjoyed by Prisoners of War to political deportees, workers taken from FRANCE by force and other Displaced Persons. One specification in the original directive made it completely unworkable, however. This was that only an "approved agency" could write and transport the correspondence. Since no such German organization, including the German Red Cross, could be found that was untouched by Nazi influence, the "approved agency" stipulation had to be removed. Instead the use of the Red Cross forms on specially-treated paper was authorized, and the Displaced Persons and their correspondents were allowed to write their own messages. The French PTT was designated to receive and transport the forms. These were censored by the French Service des Controles Techniques, delayed 30 days for security reasons and forwarded via existing international mail channels.

b. Granting of the privilege of sending parcels from FRANCE to Displaced Persons in enemy-held territory was resisted by SHAEF until the late winter of 1944-45 despite increasing pressure. But when smuggling of such parcels across the French-Swiss border became evident, SHAEF was compelled to regularize a channel for their transmission; it did so on 22 February 1945, setting a maximum weight of 10 kilograms. The French were required to exercise rigidly-specified controls and to route the parcels through LYON to the International Red Cross in GENEVA.[7]

143. Civil Communications by Army Personnel. From D-Day plus 1, a continuing leak in security and economic warfare controls was the carrying and passing on of civil communications by Allied personnel. Interceptions by British censorship brought to light a considerable volume of communications revealing that certain British and American Civil Affairs officers were not only renewing old business contacts but also carrying on business correspondence for them. The struggle to halt this practice was still continuing on V-E Day.[8]

144. Coordinating Committee Work. One of the most useful agencies born out of war necessities for expediting the restoration of postal services in FRANCE was the Censorship Co-ordinating Committee. Meeting for the first time at 12 Army Group Headquarters on 16 August 1944, this agency brought together representatives of both SHAEF and Army Group echelons of Civil Affairs, Counter Intelligence and Censorship; the French Services des Controles Techniques and French PTT, the G-2 and G-5 of SHAEF Mission to FRANCE, with the Chief, Allied Censorship Group (FRANCE) as chairman. Clearly defining responsibilities and removing much of the previously-existing friction, this committee's work served as a pattern for procedure in the other liberated Countries of Northwest EUROPE. The Committee could not, however, prevent an occasional "unilateral action." On 18 October 1944, the PARIS newspapers announced that a first-class letter service with a maximum allowed weight of 20 grams would be opened on 20 October between FRANCE and the French Empire. The French PTT had been demanding this privilege, but SHAEF had not yet been able to obtain approval for it from the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Impatient of delay, the French had proceeded without consulting SHAEF.

In the ensuing discussions, the French authorities rejected SHAEF requests for delay and opened the service on the date and in the manner they desired, without SHAEF sanction. Ten days later, SHAEF belatedly regularized the action.[9]

145. BELGIUM, THE NETHERLANDS and LUXEMBOURG. With policies modified by experience in FRANCE, SHAEF and the Army Groups were possessed of something like a Standing Operating Procedure for application to BELGIUM, THE NETHERLANDS and LUXEMBOURG. With only minor operating changes brought about by different physical conditions and personalities of leaders, this was successfully applied. In BELGIUM, adequate PTT facilities and an organized personnel headed by a competent public official smoothed the way. The opposite was true in THE NETHERLANDS, where physical facilities were largely wrecked, transportation was missing and most of the key personnel scattered, with the acting PTT chief official representing THE NETHERLANDS Military Administration inclined to obey orders grudgingly. In LUXEMBOURG, damage to physical facilities and transportation was relatively minor and the PTT management co-operative. Despite these variations, the postal SOP proved substantially correct.[10]

146. DENMARK and NORWAY. The restoration of external postal services from Liberated DENMARK and NORWAY, following closely the model which had been worked out in FRANCE, was effected shortly after V-E Day. Since the internal postal systems had never ceased to function, there was no necessity to interfere with these operations in either country. External service was closed for all mail to enemy countries and suspended for all mail to neutrals during a short period in order to give the indigenous censorship time needed to organize.[11]

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SECTION 2

OCCUPIED TERRITORY

147. Postal Communications Not Opened For Civilians. Security reasons prohibited the opening of mail communications for civilians in GERMANY prior to V-E Day. All mail found in post offices and collection points was impounded and turned over to G-2 for disposition. Stocks of postage stamps were inventoried and stored under guard.[1] Financial Officers of Military Government supervised the customary financial operations of the Reichpost in the payment of salaries, pensions and allowances and the Postal Savings Service.[2] Signal Sections took over the control and restoration of the telecommunications facilities that were necessary for the performance of the military mission.[3] Postal activities were confined to the making of surveys and the preparation for later reopening of intra and inter-zone mail services.[4]

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CHAPTER 6

CIVILIAN SUPPLY

SECTION 1

GENERAL

148. Factors Influencing the Problem. The supply of food, in sufficient quantities to prevent disease and unrest prejudicial to military operations, was the most important part of the Civil Affairs supply program in liberated territories. To what extent the Allied armies could rely on indigenous resources was an unknown factor, and therefore, planning for the importation of supplies to meet the civilian requirements was general in scope. Other factors entering into the supply problems were the rate of expected advance, the amount of destruction left in the wake of the armies, the available shipping space allocated and the phasing of supplies, and the liberation of areas in relation to the harvest season. Food, while the most important item of supply, was not the only item of issue that was required. In the order of their importance, transport, fuel, medical supplies, as well as many other items were given consideration in the planning phase.[1]

149. Planning for Import Requirements. The planning for Civil Affairs supply began approximately a year before D-Day and plans were made to include a six month period following liberation. Alternate plans were made to allow either for a complete German collapse shortly after the Allied landing on the continent. ("RANKIN 'C' PLAN"), or the "OVERLORD PLAN" for fighting across FRANCE.

a. In the development of the Civil Affairs supply program, the requirements were submitted by army groups and Com Z to SHAEF, which, in turn, submitted the combined requirements for the United States and British zones to the Combined Civil Affairs Committee (CCAC) in Washington for decision. Allocations were made by CCAC to SHAEF, and the latter allocated amounts for the British zone to 21 Army Group, and for the United States zone to First US Army Group (FUSAG), as part of the Administrative Staff of 21 Army Group. These allocations were then phased into the shipping program on the basis of available tonnage. The responsibility for the first 14 day's shipping schedule to the US zone was assigned to the First US Army. The second period, D plus 15 to D plus 41, was arranged by FUSAG. After D plus 41 the shipping program was prepared by elements of Com Z, based on priorities established by army commanders responsible for calling forward Civil Affairs supplies.[3]

b. Changes were being made in the supply program as more information was obtained regarding the requirements of the nations to be liberated. As late as 17 May 1944 SHAEF advised 21 Army Group, FUSAG and Com Z of increased allotments for the period D to D plus 90 in anticipation of higher requirements. This allocation, for food only, was given in gross long tons as follows:[4]

PERIOD	21 AG	FUSAG	TOTAL
D to D plus 30	8,276	24,880	33,156
D plus 31 to D plus 60	9,451	50,584	60,035
D plus 61 to D plus 90	11,768	42,637	54,405
	29,495	118,101	147,596

In the same correspondence an indication was given as to the tight situation concerning shipping space, and the difficulty anticipated in the increase of Civil Affairs lift:

> "Limitations of total movement capacities make it impossible for this headquarters to make any shipping in addition to the total allocations already made to you for all purposes, available for additional foodstuffs in the period D to D plus 30. The same factors make it unlikely that any additional shipping can be made available by SHAEF for the purposes mentioned in the subsequent periods listed. However, should this position change at any time, this headquarters will be prepared to discuss further shipping allocations for this purpose as a matter of urgency."

c. Coordination was effected with lower echelons to obtain a complete study of the indigenous resources of the target areas. Studies were made of the populations expected to be uncovered, and allowances given for the displacement of populations by the Germans. Also accomplished in the pre-D-Day period were the selection of the commodities considered most essential for the civilian population in order to ensure support of the military effort, the early procurement of supplies through the established channels, and the development and training of the necessary staffs to complete the execution of the Civil Affairs program in the field.[5]

150. Com Z Supply Organization.

a. With the passing of time during the late planning and the entire operational phase, G-4 Section of Com Z progressively assumed a large part of the Civil Affairs/Military Government supply functions. The Civil Branch was established in G-4 Section on 23 May 1944 and initially it reported directly to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4. On 20 February 1945 the Civil Branch was placed under the Supply Division. All activities were coordinated with the G-4 branches concerned but supervision and planning were centralized in the Civil Branch. G-5 Supply Branch planned requirements, screened all requisitions from the armies and approved the delivery of available supplies. Six officers assigned to G-5 were attached to G-4, with the senior officer having the title of Senior Civil Branch Officer.[6]

b. Mission of the Civil Branch.

(1) Recommend policies and procedures and coordinate actions of Supply Services pertaining to calling - forward, transportation and storage of Civil Affairs supplies (Coordination with Requirements and Distribution Branches).

(2) Recommend policies and procedures and coordinate actions of the Supply Services

pertaining to issue, receipt, and distribution of Civil Affairs supplies.

(3) Coordination and supervision of activities of the Supply Services regarding special accounting and reporting procedure for Civil Affairs supplies.

(4) Determination of policy and coordination of requirements for movement of Civil Affairs supplies by rail, truck, water and air (Coordinate with Program and Priorities Branch).

(5) Determination of policy and coordination of G-4 activities with regard to transportation, supply and housing of Displaced Persons.

(6) Special problems involving civilians and civil government affecting G-4 activities and planning.

(7) Maintaining close liaison with G-5 Section and provide an effective channel for implementing G-5 policies and coordinating them with G-4 policies and plans.

c. The conclusions and recommendations of the Civil Branch of Com Z are of material value to this Study. See Appendix 4 for the extract from "Report on the Responsibilities and Activities of G-4 in Civil Affairs Supply, Headquarters Theater Service Forces (Rear) European Theater, 1 October 1945."

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SECTION 2

FRANCE

151. Early Difficulties.

a. It was fortunate that the invasion was made in NORMANDY, the larder of France, for there was an excess of food stocks in NORMANDY at the time of liberation. The unloading of essential military supplies on the beaches under difficult conditions taxed the entire resources of the supply services. Added to this there was the three day storm in the English Channel which practically stopped the unloading of ships, and even military supplies on the continent reached an alarmingly low level. Although imports of food were not required immediately after D-Day, it was necessary to supply the French with medical supplies, to take care of the wounded civilians and to restock the civilian hospitals with drugs, instruments, bandages, etc. The Second British Army Civil Affairs report of 8 July 1944 indicated that the medical and surgical panniers that were phased in early were invaluable in the army refugee camps.

b. In the planning and early stages of operation, SHAEF was handicapped in that the French Government was not recognized by either BRITAIN or the U.S., and in dealing with the French on supply matters, the French Military Mission that was accredited to SHAEF was informally consulted. Agreements were reached upon which were based the supply program for FRANCE in the early period of liberation. As a result of conferences on 10 June 1944 between the Supply Branch, G-5 Division, SHAEF and Major Bernard of the French Military Mission, a mutually satisfactory program was agreed upon. The important points covered by the program were:[1]

> "It is the desire of the Supreme Commander, AEF, that authorized authorities agree that the responsibility for distribution and rationing of foodstuffs will be assumed by them, it being understood that in the operational areas this will in no way abrogate the authority and responsibility of subordinate Allied military necessity within such operational areas. Furthermore, that they agree that they will in no event authorize, without prior approval by or under authority of SHAEF, the provision of foodstuffs in amounts the food value of which will exceed 2000 calories per day per person, except in the case of heavy workers wherein this value might be higher. These food values will include both rationed and unrationed foods. That, in consideration of the necessity of taking into account the program for importing supplies, they agree that prior to the raising of any of the present national ration allowances, consultation will be had with representatives of the Supreme Commander; this does not preclude the possibility of authorized local or regional French authorities asking, without prior consultation, substitutions in the ration scale of those commodities which may not be available. That they further agree that the Supreme Commander, AEF, will be responsible for exerting the best possible effort to deliver imported supplies with the aim of raising, at the earliest possible moment, the daily diet of 2000 calories and will not be held or thought responsible for the delivery of any certain amount of any certain item."

It was apparent that the Allied Command was trying to give the liberated countries a clear conception of what might be ex-

pected of them and of the availability of supplies. It was understood by the French Military Mission that the reserve supplies in the United Kingdom represented a stockpile for all countries and not FRANCE alone.

152. Establishment of General Policy for Payment. It was originally determined that imported supplies turned over to the indigenous authorities would be sold to the French for cash at the time of delivery, and that supplies would be turned over to the governmental authorities and not to individual consumers or wholesalers. By July 1944, the French Regional Commissioner for NORMANDY, M. Coulet, had difficulty in obtaining sufficient funds with which to pay cash for all of the supplies received. As a result the following telegram from the Second British Army was sent to 21 Army Group:[2]

> "Supplies being received Regional Commissioner in bulk for redistribution deliveries start today. Sum involved July approximately five million francs. Coulet not willing pay cash but will sign form F-6. Coulet referring matter to Koenig. Have insisted upon payment this week's supplies in cash pending your order. Coulet agreed."

SHAEF agreed to this proposal but it was not until 31 July that a general policy was established concerning the payment for supplies at a later date.[3] The policy stated in part that the supplies were to be delivered to accepted central governments and their authorized agents against physical receipts only. The final settlements for goods were to be arranged between or pursuant to later instructions from governments. Where deliveries were made to local government authorities or private institutions cash payment in local currency was required at approximately the price level in existence in the country concerned. Cash proceeds received were held for account of the appropriate central government without prejudice to ultimate financial settlement between the governments. SHAEF developed the plan for payment with the officers of the Commission D'Importations et Exportations for FRANCE. This organization was to issue receipts for all of the supplies, both imported and civilian, which were turned over to the French. Later Sous-Prefets and Departmental officials were authorized to sign as the representatives of the Commission D'Importations et Exportations. This made the turn-over of supplies much more rapid and reduced the lag of the completion of the receipts and subsequent accounting by SHAEF.

153. Items Other Than Food Required. Other items of supply were required by the French, mainly for the care and welfare of the refugees that were coming back into the Allied territory and to their destroyed homes and villages. Sanitary supplies were in short supply, DDT and spray guns in particular, although cresol and chloride of lime had been received in sufficient quantities. Blankets were needed for refugees, civilian camps and disinfecting centers. Feeding equipment to care for the refugees was another item and although some stoves and other supplies were received from army supplies, there was not enough for the needs of Civil Affairs.[4]

154. Equipping of French Military Organizations. In July 1944 the problem of the use of Civil Affairs supplies in the equipping of French military and para-military organizations was brought forward by the French government. The use of Civil

Affairs supplies for this purpose had not been anticipated, and the SHAEF G-5 Section disclaimed responsibility. A letter signed by the Chief, Maintenance Section, G-5 Division, SHAEF, is quoted:[5]

> "For your information Civil Affairs supplies and equipment were never contemplated for use by any military or para-military organizations, and to require their use for such purposes would have adverse effect for the quantities computed for civil population.
>
> "I am quite certain that it is your policy to require the equipping of such units from American or British stores to be approved by G-3 and yourself, however, to make this point clear, it is requested that if you have not already done so, to advise US and British Formations of this fact, or if you have done so, that the policy be reiterated so that there can be no misunderstanding. It is our understanding that the policy will also apply to mobile labor battalions, military or otherwise, which might be recruited by the French or by US or British Military Services."

155. Requirements Not as Great as Expected. It became evident that the planning for supplies for FRANCE did not meet the conditions that were found after the invasion. It had been expected that the country would have been stripped of food and other supplies by the retreating Germans, and that the Allied armies would have to supply the majority of the food. The invasion, coming early in the summer, permitted the French to harvest and utilize their crops, and as a result the requirements were not as great as had been expected. Ten weeks after the invasion of FRANCE this fact became apparent, and the AC of S, G-5, SHAEF, on 19 August 1944 sent the following cable to 21 Army Group and Com Z, with information copies to COAC and the War Office:[6]

> "Reports being received on the standards of living and the reserves of food available in the areas uncovered in FRANCE indicate that there are no shortages and that the standard of diet is higher than in the UK. In view of this, imported food supplies will now only be issued where it is patently clear that there is genuine want. It must be impressed on all Civil Affairs officers that the extreme shortages of transport facilities and the necessity for conserving supplies for later requirements demand that such action be taken promptly. It should also be impressed strongly upon the French that it is their responsibility to accumulate all supplies possible, and that unless they commence this immediately, there will be, in the near future, areas of want for which no supplies can be made available."

This cable was sent, however, prior to the fall of PARIS, and before the needs of that city were fully known. At this time, plans were being made to feed PARIS upon liberation, and more stress was being placed on indigenous resources than on imported supplies, since the areas already uncovered by the Allied armies had surpluses of foods. However, as it would take time to arrange for the transportation of indigenous supplies in the amount needed by the city, large quantities of imported supplies were to be transported, both by land and air transport.

156. Techniques and Responsibility in Northern FRANCE. The responsibility for the procurement and handling of Civil Affairs supplies was delegated to the various Supply Services, and was to be handled in the normal supply channel.[7] Supplies in Northern FRANCE were cared for, insofar as was possible, in the same manner as other military stocks, with the Quartermaster Section responsible for the receipt, storage and issue of food. Difficulty was encountered from the first by poor marking of the supplies, which resulted in confusion on the beaches, since Civil Affairs supplies were included and issued with strictly military stocks. In many cases supplies were left on the beaches and spoilage of food resulted.[8] Supplies were carried inland by transportation furnished by the Allied armies and turned over to the indigenous authorities at the places they were to be used. Later, an attempt was made to turn over the supplies to the French at the beaches, but the French authorities lacked the transport to keep the beaches and ports cleared.

a. Supplies were obtained by the armies from Com Z and were handled in the manner set forth in the directives. G-4 of Com Z was responsible for the calling forward and delivery of Civil Affairs supplies to all liberated and occupied territories, and G-5 personnel were attached to G-4 of Com Z. See Appendix 3 for compilation of deliveries by Com Z to liberated countries of all supplies phased in by US Army authorities. Supplies were brought forward by normal military transportation, supplemented by the French truck companies and stocked in forward Com Z base depots, subject to requisition by the armies in accordance with allocations authorized by SHAEF and sub-allocated by army groups. Com Z had a second responsibility: that of the adequate feeding and clothing of the area it occupied. Because there was no clear division between this and the responsibility of phasing in and distribution, some confusion existed.

b. In practice there were deviations from the prescribed method for the distribution of supplies, and the actions of the First US Army were a notable example of this. During the early period after invasion the Supply Services were so engrossed in the enormity of the responsibility of furnishing military supplies to the combat troops that they had neither the time nor personnel to take on the added responsibility of Civil Affairs supply. The G-5 Section was thrown on its own resources to receive, store and issue supplies. In time, with the use of a Civil Affairs Detachment to operate the depot, indigenous civilian and displaced person labor, French truck companies, a pool of captured German vehicles, and an Ordnance maintenance section, a unit was organized to handle imported civilian supplies and captured enemy equipment released for Civil Affairs purposes.

c. Civil Affairs transportation was not strictly military transportation, but consisted of vehicles usually unfit for vigorous military operations, such as Canadian and British trucks which were of three-quarter ton capacity with one ton trailers. At a later date three and six ton trucks were furnished. French drivers were recruited, mainly from the ranks of the FFI, trained by the Allied armies and used to transport supplies from the beaches and ports to PARIS, and to depots in forward areas. Truck companies were formed under the command of French officers, and all of the companies were organized under American leadership into the 89 QM Truck Battalion and attached to Com Z Base Sections and to Armies for Civil Affairs purposes.

d. The supplies were still the property of the Allied armies at the time of transportation by the French truck companies, and in some cases there was wholesale stealing and black market activities.

157. Techniques and Responsibility in Southern FRANCE. Techniques of operation in Southern FRANCE contrasted with those used in Northern FRANCE. Instead of the supplies coming under the jurisdiction of G-4 Section it was a separate and distinct Civil Affairs operation. Ships arrived solidly loaded with Civil Affairs supplies, and a section of the docks at MARSEILLES was designated for the unloading of these supplies. All Civil Affairs supplies were turned over to the French at the port, on official receipts, for the French to distribute as they wished. The vehicles, brought in for transportation of Civil Affairs supplies, were issued to the French to take care of the necessary transportation and to supplement the indigenous transport. This procedure placed the responsibility of allocation, transportation, and distribution of supplies solely on the indigenous authorities, and relieved the Allied armies of the transportation, storage and accounting for supplies except at dockside.[9] It must be noted however, that the supplies brought in at the southern ports were for one country, and all of the supplies could be immediately turned over, while in Northern FRANCE supplies, all originally for the French, were later destined for FRANCE, BELGIUM, LUXEMBOURG, THE NETHERLANDS, and displaced persons in GERMANY. In this case the turnover of supplies at dockside would have been more difficult.

158. The PARIS Problem. In the feeding of PARIS the imported supplies brought in by the Allies were only a small percentage of the food required to feed the city. Imported food during the first month after liberation amounted to approximately 11,000 tons, and in the same period the indigenous supplies transported into the city were 137,000 tons.[10] Probably the greatest contribution of the Allies toward the feeding of PARIS was the release of gasoline and diesel oil in order that all of the French transportation could be utilized to bring in the indigenous food. At the time of liberation there were no railroads in operation into the city and supplies were dependent upon truck transport. From liberation, 25 August 1944, until the last of October 1944, 9392 tons of POL from Allied stocks and 7289 tons of captured petroleum products were turned over to the French. Without these supplies PARIS would have suffered greatly.[11]

159. Captured Enemy Supplies. Because of the rapid advance through FRANCE, much larger quantities of enemy supplies of all classes were captured than had been anticipated, and difficulty was encountered in trying to guard and control this property. Although SHAEF Memorandum Number 5 was prepared in April 1944, it was not until 30 September that an annex was published, setting forth the exact definitions of captured material and its ultimate disposal. A large percentage of the supplies captured in FRANCE were of French origin obtained by the Germans through seizure, requisition, or of French manufacture. The Rules of Land Warfare relating to captured materials did not apply to liberated territories. The annex divided captured materials into the following three categories for the purpose of requisition and disposal:[12]

a. Category 'A' -- Material which, prima facie, appeared to the French Authorities to have been in French

ownership prior to its acquisition and not to have been produced or constructed by order of the enemy. It made no difference whether or not the enemy had paid for such material. If the material was required by the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces (SCAEF), for purposes of conducting the war, requisitioning on the French Government was necessary. If not required, the material was returned to the local authorities.

b. Category 'B' - Material produced or constructed in FRANCE by order of the enemy. This material could be used by the Allied forces as long as required without resorting to requisition, but when no longer required it was to be returned to the French Central Authority. In cases of doubt the policy of the Supreme Commander was to favor French ownership.

c. Category 'C' - War material not in Category 'A' or 'B', and all war material manufactured or brought from GERMANY. This was the property of the Allies and as such was used by them. If the materials were not required by the Allied armies, they were turned over to the French authorities for payment at a later date.

d. The French misinterpreted or interpreted too loosely the provisions of the annex and as a result much of the captured enemy supplies was not reported to the Allies. SHAEF finally requested the French authorities to notify their representatives as to the interpretation that should be placed on the annex.

e. In most cases much time passed before material was released by the Allied armies, for by the provisions of the memorandum the Allied armies were authorized to use the material if it would further the war effort. Inventories of all materials were required, contributing to the delay. The release of captured equipment for Civil Affairs use initially required Com Z approval. Later this responsibility was delegated to lower echelons. The necessity for Com Z approval not only resulted in delay of release of material for French use, but in the loss of large quantities through theft and pilferage, because of the inability of the Allies to guard it effectively. Quoting from a SHAEF CASUM:[13]

> "The release of captured enemy war material for use by Civil Affairs has not been satisfactory up to the present date. Delays have been caused by the fact that large captured stocks had to be inventoried before release could be made to Civil Affairs. A recent directive has been issued by SHAEF which it is hoped will remedy this situation and which necessitates inventory only being made on general lines and detail inventory made as the supplies are turned over by Civil Affairs to the civilians."

One attempt to evade the rules of warfare for captured enemy equipment was made by the Germans when General Von Schochulitz, commander of PARIS, on 24 August 1944, the day before liberation, turned over to the International Red Cross all of the German food stored in PARIS. The Commanding General of Seine Base Section would not accept this transfer as authentic, and the food was released to the French authorities on official receipts.[14]

f. By November 1944 transportation was becoming critical in FRANCE. The military effort required the use of all of the main highways and railroads. The destruction of bridges had effectively blocked both rail and canal traffic, and tied up rolling stock and barges in blocked off sections of rail lines and canals, all adding up to the transportation difficulties.[15] The captured vehicles released to the French for the most part were those left behind by the combat forces as unusable, consisting of wood and charcoal burners, and those left by the Germans in garages for repair. Com Z made a concerted effort to release all captured German vehicles to the French to supplement their growing needs. Although several thousand vehicles were turned over, the French transport situation was not materially improved, since many were of little value except for cannibalization.

160. Requirements and Deliveries. The total of food imports received for Northern FRANCE from D-Day to the end of the year was only 21 percent of the advance estimates of requirements, due to higher priorities of the combat forces for shipping. Since the 1944 crop became available at about the time of liberation (25 August 1944), dependence was placed almost entirely on indigenous food to meet the immediate needs. For Southern FRANCE, imports during this period were 75 percent of the estimated requirements. Southern FRANCE was a major deficit region, specializing in the production of wines and vegetables, and fell far short of meeting its own needs for staple foods. By bringing food into the Mediterranean Area, the necessity of moving the equivalent amount of food southward over badly strained internal transport facilities was avoided.[16] Requirements and deliveries of Civil Affairs food for FRANCE from D-Day to 31 December 1944 in net long tons were as follows:

SOUTHERN FRANCE		NORTHERN FRANCE		TOTAL	
Required	Delivered	Required	Delivered	Required	Delivered
208,336	155,831	202,596	33,414	410,932	189,245

a. In the original planning for importing supplies into FRANCE, two omissions were made that might have had more far reaching consequences if the 1944 harvest had not been available to the French. No plans were formulated for supplying the "hiatus area" in Southwestern FRANCE, nor for the ALSACE-LORRAINE area. As a result the indigenous food that should have gone to PARIS had to be diverted into Southwestern FRANCE. This put a burden on the already strained transportation facilities of FRANCE as well as limiting the amount of indigenous food available for PARIS.[17]

b. Supplies were not coming into the continent fast enough and concern was expressed by all echelons as to the lack of Civil Affairs supplies. The high priority for the strictly military supplies, the lack of shipping space, and the diversion of supplies to HOLLAND, whose needs were urgent, contributed to the lack of supplies coming into Northern FRANCE. Major General Hilldring, Director of Civil Affairs Division, War Department, made a personal report of the supply situation to the War Department; quoting from his cable:[18]

> "Little likelihood exists that significant quantities of civilian supply imports will be possible before the close of December because of the extremely limited port and internal transport facilities.

"It is my feeling, in short, that because of the lack of port capacity and internal transport, there exists no reasonable possibility to increase substantially the rate of civilian supply importation into FRANCE, and that positive harm might result if at this time complete military responsibility were relinquished in view of existing uncertainties here. Under the present port and transportation conditions, of course, no commitments to the French or quantities or types of civilian supplies to be imported for certain periods can be given consideration now. There seems no reason, however, why the discussions on the transfer of procurement responsibility should not be continued."

c. In December General Grasett wrote to the Deputy Chief of Staff, SHAEF, regarding Civil Affairs Supply as follows:[19]

"The situation cannot be described as satisfactory and in the American Area we are only meeting our daily problems by hand-to-mouth methods. In the 21 Army Group area the situation is a little happier, and can be described as reasonably satisfactory, - in fact, the reserves of Civil Affairs stores available are equal to the reserves of other classes of military stores. The reason for the situation in the American Area being as it is, is largely due to factors well known to you, and the difficulty of the provision of military supplies for the Forward area, which has been evidently due to necessity to take a back seat in relation to military stores, and we have not pressed Com-Zone to improve the situation until recently, because we could not maintain that the immediate need was urgent.

"Captured German stores have gone a long way to meet emergencies and Com Zone has met spot demands for urgent relief of the civil population.....As a result of the lack of extreme urgency for Civil Affairs stores, it is probable that G-4 Com Zone is now aware that the moment has come when Civil Affairs stores can no longer be relegated to a low priority. During the fortnight Com Zone has been active in examining the problem; two officers have been sent out to America from Com Zone to accelerate the loading of ships with Civil Affairs stores."

The supply situation began to ease during January and by February 1945 reserves were being built up to take care of the anticipated needs of THE NETHERLANDS and of Displaced Persons.

161. Transfer from Military to Civilian Responsibility. The reference to the transfer of procurement responsibility in the previous paragraph, expunent 18, referred to the direct procurement of civilian supplies not included in the military program. A document, SCAF 122, 2 November 1944, represented the views of the French Government for the importation of raw materials and productive civil supplies necessary to the French economy, and was submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staffs (CCS). A cable from SHAEF to CCS on 3 November 1944 stated in part that the French Government was strongly urging that FRANCE

for political, social and economic reasons needed raw materials and productive civil supplies as soon as possible. These supplies, however, were not considered a military responsibility. SHAEF favored the establishment of a French civilian import program, separate from the Civil Affairs program, under which the French could import whatever supplies they wished as long as the imports did not exceed a port capacity of 3,000 tons daily in the northern ports. A special Four-Party Committee was established in PARIS, consisting of SHAEF, French Ministry of Supply and American and British economic advisors, which functioned in cooperation with SHAEF Mission (FRANCE) to guide and assist in the transitional period from military to civilian responsibility.[20] This program did not get under way until January 1945.

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SECTION 3

BELGIUM

162. Planning. Import requirements for BELGIUM were planned by Supreme Headquarters on the assumption of a gradual liberation with the anticipation of considerable destruction. Alternate plans were made covering the event of a German collapse. Liberation came rapidly and approximated a collapse, and only slight revisions were necessary in the advanced estimates of requirements made on the assumption of collapse.[1] The liberation came in September 1944, prior to the harvest season, and as the Government in Exile was advised prior to liberation to delay the harvest of crops, most of the harvested food was available.

163. Transportation Problems. Since BELGIUM, unlike FRANCE, is mainly industrial, the supply of the industrial cities of CHARLEROI (J-63), MONS (J-31), NAMUR (J-91), and LIEGE (K-42) presented critical problems. Because the port of ANTWERP (J-79) was not open for Allied use until December 1944, the supplies for BELGIUM had to come in through the badly congested beaches and small ports in FRANCE and move by truck over a long route to BELGIUM at a time when communication facilities were strained to support the military operations. In view of this, an agreement was reached with the Belgian Government to draw heavily on the indigenous supplies immediately after liberation with the understanding that imported supplies would be furnished at a later date to compensate for the depletion of the indigenous stocks.[2] Although there was very little destruction of food resources by the advance of the Allied armies, the widespread destruction of transportation facilities created a serious problem in the distribution of food. The supply situation was favored in having shorter distances to move the supplies in BELGIUM than in FRANCE.

a. The problem of relief supplies for BELGIUM was stressed by the Ministrie du Ravitaillment of the Royal Government of BELGIUM in a letter to SHAEF Mission (BELGIUM) prior to liberation:[3]

> "The question of immediate relief in food, clothing, shoes and medical supplies, is of the utmost importance in BELGIUM.
>
> "This task will be in the hands of the Civil Affairs Section, and I am convinced that they will do their best to help our stricken population.
>
> "However, the Belgian Government may be called upon to take control of the distribution at an early stage,

when relief supplies will still be a military responsibility.

"In that case, the Belgian Government would like very much to have attached to it an important section of your staff."

b. In October 1944 the food situation and other grievances resulted in a coal strike. An officer of the G-5 Supply and Economics Branch, SHAEF, after an inspection trip to BELGIUM reported the following:[4]

"The population is receiving sufficient supplies of bread, potatoes, green vegetables and fruit. Supplies of meats, fats and milk have not been available for some three or four weeks except through Black Market channels.

"In the industrial area around MONS, there were at the time of my visit some 35,000 workers on strike. Of these, some 5000 were coal miners and 3,500 cement workers. The cause of the strike was:

a. Insufficient wages.
b. Excessive working hours, and
c. Insufficient food.

a. and b. have already been taken care of, but the workers find it impossible to do any heavy work on a diet which is mainly bread.

"It seemed possible that the food situation might be expected to improve to some extent after the government's declaration of the new financial policy, and it may well be that there will be a return to work within a short space of time.

"The major problem, however, lies in so organizing the food supply for the country that it will be unnecessary to make special arrangements for isolated groups either by special collection drive, or provision from stocks held by 21 Army Group.

"Food collection by the government in BELGIUM has been made the responsibility of Major Feron of the Belgian Military Mission."

This problem remained critical until after the port of ANTWERP was opened.

164. Techniques and Responsibility. Planning contemplated that the British would be responsible for Civil Affairs supplies for BELGIUM. However, operations resulted in this responsibility mainly falling to the United States and presented a difficult problem because the supply points were limited and were at a relatively long distance from the distribution points. However, by utilizing captured supplies as well as imported supplies, especially food and medical, the critical conditions were met satisfactorily. When the Belgian government was able to operate on a national basis, all Civil Affairs supplies were issued in bulk at LIEGE.[5]

165. Policies on Captured and Civil Affairs Supplies. The

policies established for Civil Affairs and captured supplies in FRANCE were followed generally in the other liberated countries. The receipt procedure was utilized and cash transactions were not made. Annex 'C' of Administrative Memorandum Number 5 for captured equipment applied with few revisions until new annexes were prepared for BELGIUM, HOLLAND AND LUXEMBOURG. The revisions included:[6]

> "War material in Category 'A' will be used if required. If so used a record will be made, showing or referring to the facts upon which the indigenous authority concerned made its claim.....A copy of such record will be furnished to the headquarters of the appropriate commander, and two copies to the Central Authority of the country concerned.
>
> "War material in Category 'A' not required for operational purposes but usable for civil purposes will be released against receipt as provided in Annex 'C', except that a record will be made as specified above. Such release will be made through civil affairs channels .....
>
> "Paragraph 9 of Annex 'C' states that War Material in Category 'B' no longer required by the commanders specified, shall be returned to the French Central Authority. In other liberated countries this does not yet apply, and war material in Category 'B', ..., if not required by the Allied Commanders, will be reported to this Headquarters, ..."

166. Requirements and Deliveries. In accordance with the agreement with the Belgian Government, the Allied imports were limited until the port of ANTWERP was opened in December 1944. The situation in respect to requirements and deliveries of Civil Affairs imported food supplies to 31 December 1944 was:[7] estimated requirements, 11,138 tons; actual deliveries 6,790 tons. Even after the port of ANTWERP opened, a critical food situation developed in January and February 1945 as a result of continued stringent shipping conditions, the over-running of the ARDENNES area with the consequent loss of domestic food supplies, and severe weather conditions in December and January. Emergency measures were taken to make Civil Affairs food reserves available to tide over the situation. In the ARDENNES area the Germans seized all civilian food stocks and killed and destroyed cattle. Thus, feeding of refugees in the devasted areas after the German offensive had been repulsed, placed a further burden on the imported Civil Affairs supply requirements. However, reserve supplies enabled the armies to prevent starvation and actual distress among the civilians.[8] See Appendix 3 for compilation of deliveries by Com Z to liberated countries of all supplies phased in by U S Army authorities. The UNITED KINGDOM furnished the greater part of the supplies for BELGIUM.

167. Transfer of Responsibility. The transfer of procurement responsibility from military to civilian authority was accomplished in the same manner as with the FRENCH, with the formation of a Four Party Committee in BRUSSELS to determine the supplies required and arrange for shipping space and docks for unloading, all of which was coordinated with the military operational program. Initially this program did not function smoothly and prompted the following letter from SHAEF G-5 Division to the SHAEF Missions to FRANCE, BELGIUM and the NETHERLANDS:[9]

"Some confusion has been caused in the War Office and in the British Government Departments by requests coming from different individuals and agencies for civilian supplies not coming within the Military Program. These requests are not coordinated, often duplicate each other and usually differ.

"To permit the orderly and coordinated consideration of these demands, it is requested that the National Government, to which you are attached, be approached and asked to nominate a single agency to put forward requests in the UK for civilian supplies not included in the military program.

"Where established, it is thought that the National Supply Mission in London would be the most appropriate agency."

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SECTION 4

THE NETHERLANDS

168. The Liberation Outstripped the Planning. It was not expected that any sizeable part of THE NETHERLANDS would be liberated before 1945; however plans were made for the import of supplies under the "RANKIN 'C' PLAN", covering earlier liberation. The end of 1944 saw the liberation of small areas of THE NETHERLANDS, the food requirements of which were high. The area uncovered, which was largely south of the MAAS River,

included an important part of the country's agriculture but none of the larger cities. The area should have been self sufficient normally, but a critical condition of food supply existed, especially for the miners in the area around MAASTRICHT (K-55).[1]

169. Emergency Deliveries of Food. Much of the liberated portion of THE NETHERLANDS had been in or near the combat area since it was first liberated by the Allied armies in September. The extreme length of the supply lines from the French ports and beaches prevented substantial assistance during the early period following liberation. By the end of the year about 15,000 tons of imported food had been turned over to the Dutch authorities. The estimated requirements for the period D-Day to 31 December 1944 were 6,931 tons and the deliveries 14,825 tons. The Ninth US Army was responsible for the area around MAASTRICHT (K-55) after the First US Army withdrew, and adopted the same principle as the First US Army in establishing Civil Affairs depots operated by the G-5 Section, rather than having the supplies processed through the normal military supply channels.

170. THE NETHERLANDS' Problem the Most Critical. By October 1944 it had become evident that the food relief problem in THE NETHERLANDS would probably be the most critical to be faced by Civil Affairs in Northwest EUROPE. The most heavily populated areas then held by the Germans included the cities of AMSTERDAM (Z-12), ROTTERDAM (D-77) and THE HAGUE (D-69). This area was normally dependent for food upon the surplus producing areas of Eastern HOLLAND. A general protest strike by the Dutch railway workers tied up rail traffic and the Germans refused to move food into the deficit areas in adequate volume. Flooding destroyed a considerable part of what production there was in this region. Practically all usable vehicles were taken by the Germans and food collection came to a standstill. All rail and barge traffic was halted for an extended period and surpluses that existed could not be moved to deficit areas. It was also anticipated that the Germans would remove any surpluses that existed in the area when they did withdraw.[2]

a. To provide emergency feeding for the areas to be liberated a 14 day stockpile, sufficient to feed the entire population, was established at a safe distance south of the front line. The stocks were temporarily depleted to meet the urgent Belgian needs during January, but by 8 March 1945 the stockpile included 22,000 tons of food. Plans also included transportation, both by truck and by air, and for emergency feeding equipment.

b. By the end of the 14 day emergency feeding period it was expected that the port facilities would have been sufficiently restored so that food and other supplies could be brought directly into the large port cities. It was also planned for a large stockpile of 170,000 tons of food in ENGLAND to be available when the ports were opened.

c. THE NETHERLANDS Government wrote to SHAEF in November and offered the services of their country in an effort to speed up the supplies to be brought in after liberation of the remainder of the country; this letter is quoted in part:[3]

> "It is appreciated that the allied Commander in Chief has made a special call on the resources still available in the UK and in the USA to assist

in the relief supply for Western HOLLAND under the special circumstances which may arise in the course of operations on the continent. These resources to be organized separately from the stockpiles now being built up in the liberated parts of THE NETHERLANDS and to be distributed by inland transport facilities. It is appreciated that the committee on Relief Supply to Western HOLLAND now formally constituted under the general direction of the Quartermaster General of the British Army, has for its terms of reference 'to formulate plans for the provision of relief supplies and their delivery to selected ports and points of discharge in Western HOLLAND, from the UK'. It has been noted that the various possibilities of bringing supplies directly by way of sea and inland water routes, to certain vital points of discharge, have been taken into consideration by the authorities concerned, and that the conclusions reached so far are that:

"The landing of supplies over the beaches in Western HOLLAND is not considered feasible.....

"The opening of ports ..... will be undertaken, but it must be expected that these operations will take from two to four weeks from the clearance of German coastal defense positions during which time no supplies can be delivered through these ports.

"The opening of the estuaries between the New water way and the Wester Schelde ..... cannot start before the islands between and to the North of these estuaries are occupied by the Allied forces".

The letter continued to the effect that the Royal Netherlands Navy was prepared to undertake the opening of routes to the estuaries and ports for the purpose of bringing in supplies, and to undertake any special operations which might be helpful in the liberation and to the relief of their countrymen. THE NETHERLANDS Government was prepared to mobilize manpower for any operation or special work in connection with the relief supplies for THE NETHERLANDS.

d. As late as 1 February 1945 SHAEF was still very much concerned about the flow of Civil Affairs supplies to the continent, although by this time the situation had eased to some extent. A cable from The Supreme Commander to General Marshall stated in part:[4]

"I am very much concerned about the food situation in BELGIUM and liberated HOLLAND.

"We are committed to a program of importing food ..... formally approved in your cable LEM 417. Unless this program is carried out as scheduled, the civil population will receive less and less food, and the results will be increasing unrest, civil disturbances, and disorders in the rear areas of 21 Army Group.

"We have already been threatened with such disorders, and Field Marshal Montgomery has been greatly worried by incipient dock and railroad strikes of

large proportions. Serious difficulties which would inevitably have militated against our military operations have been averted by rather drastic measures on our part and by recent changes in government.

"Food shortage is at the bottom of all the trouble. The new Prime Minister gives the impression of being a strong man and I have been informed by my representative that he intends to take what I consider a very courageous line of action to insure continued production of coal and operation of the docks and railways. The best, and in fact, the only support we can give this new government is to make our food commitments on schedule.

"We now have no reserves on the continent of supplies for the civil population ..... Arrivals from both United States and the United Kingdom are falling gradually but steadily behind scheduled deliveries, and as a result the situation is progressively deteriorating.

"I regard the situation produced in BELGIUM and HOLLAND by the lag in the arrival of Civil Affairs ships as being sufficiently serious to warrant Civil Affairs requirements being treated as a matter of operational urgency".

e. With the liberation of the remainder of HOLLAND in March 1945, the majority of the Civil Affairs supplies were diverted to HOLLAND for the relief of the stricken country. See Appendix 3 for compilation of deliveries by Com Z to liberated countries of all supplies phased in by U S Army authorities.

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SECTION 5

LUXEMBOURG

171. General.

a. During the German occupation the Grand Duchy of LUXEMBOURG fared better than other occupied countries, and, in fact, was treated as a part of the German Reich insofar as the food economy was concerned. The country is sparsely populated and the pre-war production was only slightly less than the

country's requirements. The supply of feed for livestock had been reduced sharply, resulting in a drastic cut in hogs, but the normal number of cattle had been maintained.[1]

b. LUXEMBOURG was liberated quickly, without much destruction, and the food situation was quite satisfactory; fats were the only item in short supply. Imports of about 400 tons of food a month had been planned, but the situation was so favorable that the program was not carried out. The only deficiency area was a narrow strip along the eastern boundary where the combat lines had been stabilized, resulting in the loss of the majority of the crops there.

172. Policies. The policies that were set forth in the other liberated countries for imported civilian supplies and the release of captured enemy materials for civilian use, were applicable to LUXEMBOURG with few minor exceptions. The same conditions of inadequate transportation facilities were found, with the railroads inoperative at first, and truck transportation at a low level, since the Germans had taken most of the transportation with them. Petroleum products were non-existent, and POL was furnished to the Duchy of LUXEMBOURG from military stocks to meet the minimum civilian requirements.[2]

173. The ARDENNES Offensive Created a Critical Problem. The ARDENNES offensive completely changed the entire food situation in LUXEMBOURG. The northern half of the country was overrun by the German Forces. Since most of the population evacuated the area ahead of the German drive and moved to the southern portion of the country, the food requirements for that area were increased. With the reliberation, widespread destruction was left in the wake of the advancing armies. Northern LUXEMBOURG, an important grain area, was left in a state of devastation, and nearly half of the commercial grain supply was lost as well as a large percentage of the potatoes. Further, there was an acute shortage of seed, animals and other agricultural supplies. As a result of the loss of the indigenous food resources an import program was instituted, and plans were made to import approximately 4,000 tons of food per month through August 1945, or about 40 per cent of the food supply necessary to maintain a daily per capita average of 2,300 calories, for the non-farm population. Agricultural equipment and seed were called forward to replace losses.[3] See Appendix 3 for compilation of deliveries by Com Z to liberated countries of all supplies phased in by US Army authorities.

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SECTION 6

OCCUPIED TERRITORY

174. General. The decision of the Supreme Commander not to use imported Military Government supplies for relief of German civilians, and the added responsibility of the Germans for the feeding of Displaced Persons, indicated at first that the supply problems of the occupational armies would be of minor importance. The main objective of the Military Government supply and agricultural officers was to help the Germans to help themselves. Inasmuch as the directives authorized the feeding of civilians only in the event of disease or extreme unrest prejudicial to military operations, and then only with the approval in each instance by Supreme Headquarters, it followed that reserve stocks would have to be built up sufficient only to meet this contingency. It was known that the US occupational area in GERMANY would normally be only 60 percent self-sufficient; that widespread destruction of the large cities, and damage and disorganization of transport facilities had been accomplished by the Allied Air Forces; that destruction of crops, livestock and German food stocks, dislocation of thousands of German civilians, and disorganization of the German control and administrative system for food and agriculture would result as areas were progressively overrun; and that vast numbers of United Nations Displaced Persons would be found, especially in the highly industrialized and destroyed areas. These conditions all pointed to a badly disrupted food distribution system and the possible need for drastic action by the Allied Armies in the early stages of occupation to equalize the distribution between deficit and surplus areas in the time necessary to prevent disease and unrest.[1]

175. Food Situation at the Time of Occupation. The military operations which had been static in Western GERMANY since September 1944, swept across the area west of the RHINE in March 1945. Few crops had been planted, much of the farm population had been evacuated leaving the productive COLOGNE Plain practically deserted, livestock killed or evacuated, and the ground unprepared for spring planting. The fall plantings had been reduced by military operations, and it appeared that 300,000 hectares of farm land normally planted to crops in this area would not be used during 1945. However, through military supervision and assistance, more than 92 percent of the arable land was planted.[2]

a. It was estimated that there would be a shortage of seed potatoes and other seed for the plantings of crops throughout GERMANY. To meet this contingency all indigenous supplies of potatoes were reserved for seed purposes. Stockpiles of more than 20,000 tons of potatoes were located in the MAYEN (K-51) and POLCH areas and were distributed for planting. Unused stocks were released to ADSEC to feed German prisoners of war, and to the armies for the feeding of Displaced Persons. After the liberation of Eastern GERMANY large stockpiles of seeds of all types were uncovered at QUEDLINGBURG (M-52), and, with the aid of military transportation, these supplies were distributed to the deficit areas.

b. Imported agricultural seed was authorized for release to the German authorities since it was imperative that all available land be planted to enable the Germans to feed themselves during the coming winter without resort to imported

supplies. Seed released during April and early May amounted to 2,200 tons of spring wheat, 22,400 pounds of seed beans, 20,100 pounds of cabbage, 5,800 pounds of radish, 2,300 pounds of carrots and 10,100 pounds of turnip seed.

176. Supply to German Civilians. In accordance with the SHAEF directives, imported food was not released to the German civilians except in a few minor instances, although large stockpiles of food and other Military Government supplies were established by the armies in forward areas on the authorization of 12 Army Group, and a stockpile of 40,000 tons was held in reserve in ADSEC depots, for it was not known, prior to the March offensive, the exact conditions that existed in GERMANY, especially in the highly industrialized area in the RUHR. Although food stocks were very short in that area, imported food was not released to the Germans in the RUHR area prior to VE-Day.

a. In the control of the food supplies that were available to the Germans, maximum ration scales were established to conserve food until harvest time. These scales insured that the Germans did not subsist at a scale higher than those of liberated countries but were considered sufficient to maintain health and prevent disease and unrest. The ration scales prescribed by 12 Army Group were as follows:[4]

Consumer Group	Maximum Calories per person per day to be obtained from rationed food.			
	9 Dec 44 to 7 Feb 45	7 Feb to 12 Mar	12 Mar to 15 Jun	After 15 Jun 1945
Normal consumers	1400	1550	1150	1550
Expectant and nursing mothers	1800	2700	2200	2700
Heavy and night workers	2100	2250	2250	2250
Very heavy workers	2700	2800	2800	2800
Children & young consumers				
Under 3 years	1000	1000	1000	1000
3 to 5 years	1250	1250	1250	1250
6 to 9 years	1400	1600	1500	1600
10 to 17 years	1550	1750	1600	1750

Other steps taken to conserve food included:

(1) Prohibiting the use of cereals and potatoes for making beer and other alcoholic spirits for civilian consumption.

(2) Securing the maximum quantity of flour from bread cereals by efficient milling processes.

(3) Limiting fat and meat consumption to 75 grams of fat and 175 grams of meat per person per week.

b. Higher headquarters were 'food conscious' and alert to any changes that would conserve indigenous food and thus eliminate the necessity for use of imported Military Government foodstocks. Some of the more important instructions issued prior to VE-Day are quoted below:

(1) "To insure maximum food production in GERMANY it is desired that measures be taken

insofar as military operations permit to safeguard and keep in operation flour mills and other food processing plants and facilities actually required for storage of food. When it can be avoided, such plants and facilities will not be used for troop billets or other military purposes." (5)

(2) "It is desired that available German labor be used in food production to the fullest extent, after meeting the labor requirements of the Allied Military Forces, and with due regard to the operation of essential public services and the production of essential civilian commodities other than food." (6)

(3) "In the areas of GERMANY occupied by Allied Expeditionary Forces stringent measures must be taken to restrict unauthorized mass movement of German civil population and Displaced Persons from east to west to alleviate serious food and accomodations difficulties.

"Along general line of ELBE and MULDE Rivers and GEBIRGE you will set up barrier zone aimed at preventing unauthorized civilians from entering Allied Expeditionary Force areas." (7)

(4) "In view of the serious food shortage, it is desired that immediate arrangements be made to permit fishing in the RHINE River, subject to appropriate local security restrictions." (8)

c. Petrol, Oil and Lubricants (POL) was released to the German authorities in sufficient quantities to accomplish essential functions such as sanitation, public health, food processing, garbage disposal, utilities, clearing of rubble, operation of farm equipment and motor transport. POL was brought forward through normal military channels and released to the Germans at army POL depots after requisitions had been processed by Military Government and approved by the Army.

d. Allied medical supplies, especially DDT and medical panniers, were released to the German authorities in an effort to control typhus and other diseases. Captured German medical supplies were also issued for civilian use; all supplies, including DDT, were charged to the Germans on official receipts.

e. Transportation in GERMANY, as in the liberated countries, was badly disrupted. Railroad systems capable of operation were almost wholly required for military use. Many trucks had been taken by the Germans as they retreated, while the Allied combat forces seized large numbers to supplement their transport, and many were destroyed through military operations. In the early stages of the occupation Allied military transportation was utilized to some extent to expedite delivery of seed including seed potatoes. In an effort to correct the transportation difficulties in GERMANY, 12 Army Group sent the following instructions to the armies within its command:[9]

"In occupied GERMANY, seizure and removal by Allied Forces of operating load-carrying and other vehicles has paralyzed essential sanitary and other public services as well as food production and distribution. It is desired that all vehicles required for these purposes be left in occupied areas, where they may be impounded or requisitioned by Military Government or appropriate authorities under pooled arrangements. Vehicles withdrawn from US and British ultimate areas of occupation by advancing US units will be returned to the Military Government authorities in the areas in which the vehicles were seized, unless prevented by urgent operational necessity."

177. Supply of Displaced Persons. German authorities were required to make necessary provisions from German resources for food and other essential requirements, to meet the minimum basic requirements for Displaced Persons. In the distribution of supplies Displaced Persons were given priority over German civilians, and the German authorities were instructed to make maximum use of all indigenous resources, and to provide food, shelter, clothing, medical attention and other services within their capabilities.

a. It was soon determined, however, that there were not sufficient indigenous stocks to feed both the Displaced Persons and German civilians until the 1945 crops were harvested, and that imported stocks would have to be used. In anticipation of this situation the following instructions were sent by 12 Army Group on 10 April 1945 to units under its command:[10]

"It is desired that procurement of food from German sources for feeding Displaced Persons normally be made through Kreis German officials, and that consideration be given to adequacy of local stocks to meet minimum civilian food requirements from now until harvest when requiring German authorities to provide all or part of the food needed for Displaced Persons. Your attention is directed to the fact that the use of German foodstocks in areas where there is not sufficient food to provide for the minimum needs of the civilian population until next harvest will result either in civilian starvation, accompanied by disease and unrest, or the importation of food to Germans. Imported food supplies are available for feeding Displaced Persons in food deficit areas. Imported food supplies will be made available for German civilians only in extreme emergencies to prevent disease and such disorder as might endanger or impede military operations."

b. Imported food was issued when necessary to augment that furnished by the Germans to bring the daily caloric value for each Displaced Person to 2000. This food was charged by receipt, to the German authorities. The proportion of imported food to indigenous food furnished Displaced Persons for a three month's period for the US zone is given below. For complete tonnage figures for all supplies, see Appendix B.

Month	Average Number Displaced Persons in 12 Army Group area.	Estimated total Food Requirements of Displaced Persons. (Millions of calories).	Imported Food used by Displaced Persons	
			Millions of Calories	Percent total Requirements.
March	75,000	4,500	1,540	34
April	850,000	51,000	10,460	20
May	2,290,000	137,000	21,550	15

c. Other imported Military Government supplies issued to Displaced Persons were medical, sanitary, such as chloride of lime, creosol, calcium hypochlorite and soap, cleaning materials, feeding equipment, blankets and clothing. Items in short supply were supplemented with captured and indigenous stocks. The conditions in the Displaced Persons camps placed a heavy demand on sanitary supplies necessary to prevent disease and epidemics. Blankets also were a critical item and taxed the resources of all the sources of supplies, imported, captured and indigenous, to meet the demands.

d. French truck companies were utilized to a great extent in the supply of Displaced Persons, and it is fortunate that this transportation was available, otherwise the supply problem would have been much more difficult. These companies, augmented as necessary by military transport, were used to move supplies from LDSEC and Com Z base depots to Army depots, and for the movement of imported and indigenous food turned over to Displaced Persons camps. They also aided materially in the movement of Displaced Persons, especially Western Europeans, from the camps to the country to which they belonged.

178. Priorities for Captured and Indigenous Foodstocks. With the Allied offensive, which started at the German border in March and ended with the unconditional surrender of GERMANY on 8 May 1945, large numbers of German prisoners were taken and many Allied prisoners of war and Allied internees were uncovered. The feeding of this personnel resulted in a severe drain on the operational rations. Scheduled shipments from the United States were insufficient to support the rate of consumption and concern was expressed regarding this critical situation. To alleviate this condition priorities were established on captured and civilian foodstocks, which enabled the Armies to build up their reserve of operational rations. The messageform from 12 Army Group, 23 April 1945, covering this subject, is quoted in part:[12]

"1. ..... Food supplies obtained from German sources, either military or civilian will be used exclusively for individuals listed in Paragraph 2 below, and except in emergency, will not be used for Allied Forces without prior approval of this headquarters.

"2. The following priorities are established for use within the army areas of all German food supplies uncovered:

a. German Military Stocks (Captured Stocks):

(1) Allied Prisoners of War, US/BR Civilian Internees.

(a) .....

(2) Allied Displaced Persons in Approved Camps or Centers.

(3) German Prisoners of War.

(4) German Disarmed Forces.

b. German Civilian Stocks (Commodities).

(1) Allied Prisoners of War and US/BR Civilian Internees, (When US military rations and captured stocks are not available).

(2) Allied Displaced Persons in Approved Camps and Centers.

(3) German Prisoners of War (when captured stocks are insufficient).

(4) Enemy Internees and Detainees.

(5) Allied Displaced Persons not in approved centers.

(6) German Civilians.

(7) German Disarmed Forces.

c. Food stocks in excess of needs of army commanders may be made available to ADSEC for use in GERMANY as outlined above.

"3. Considered desirable that army commanders centralize control of distribution of all substantial stocks of food, clothing and other available supplies for above outlined uses, and that all available civilian stocks of such supplies be brought under control of Military Government Detachment as rapidly as possible. Requirements for each of the above categories should be considered and distribution for present and expected future needs effected as equitably as practicable under above priorities. All large enemy military and civilian depots or dumps containing food and clothing supplies will be placed under strict control and safeguarded.

"4. .....

"5. It is desired that maximum discovery, conservation, and proper utilization be made of all German food products in accordance with the above priorities and ration scales. Every effort will be made to conserve US ration stocks and to restrict to the maximum extent practicable the use of such rations to Allied Forces and US Prisoners of War and US/BR Civilian Internees. ....."

179. The Mechanics of Supply Procedures. Imported Military Government food supplies, as allocated by Combined Civil Affairs Committee (CCAC), were called forward by G-4 Section of Com Z and placed in Quartermaster base depots in the Com Z area. Twelfth Army Group received an overall allocation from SHAEF for the Army Group area, and sub-allocated these supplies to Armies.

based on estimated monthly requirements submitted by each Army. The Armies then placed requisitions on the G-5 Section, Com-Z through their respective Regulating Stations, and the supplies, if available, were included in the Army lift and brought forward to Army depots. At this point the similarity in procedure stopped, and the storage and issue of Military Government supplies varied with each Army, but two extreme methods in procedures were made by the First US Army and the Fifteenth US Army.

a. The First US Army had a Military Government organization for handling supplies. This organization, started in June 1944 in FRANCE as a necessity, continued to operate in GERMANY in the same manner. The receipt, storage and issue of Military Government supplies was the responsibility of the G-5 Section of First US Army, and Military Government personnel were utilized in the operation of the supply organization. The Military Government supplies were stored in one large warehouse area with a Military Government detachment in charge of the depot operations. French truck companies were assigned to furnish transportation for the distribution of the supplies. There was also a pool of civilian vehicles, manned by civilian drivers. An Ordnance maintenance section, assisted by civilian mechanics, was assigned to care for the maintenance of the vehicles. Civilian labor was utilized to load and unload trucks and to stack supplies at the warehouse. An officer at the depot was authorized to approve requisitions submitted by detachment or Displaced Persons camp commanders. This resulted in a smooth running organization with a minimum of difficulty in the requisitioning of supplies. Official receipts were completed by the requisitioning officer upon delivery of the supplies at the final destination.

b. The Fifteenth US Army, also through necessity, developed an entirely different type of an organization. Since the Army was faced with a labor shortage and unable to obtain a Military Government detachment to be in charge of depot operations, procurement and handling of Military Government supplies were made the responsibilities of the Supply Services.[13] The supplies were placed in Medical and Class II & IV depots and separate stock records were maintained. Accounting, handling and movement were accomplished in the normal supply manner. French truck companies were assigned to the G-4 Sections of Corps, who in turn further assigned many of these trucks to Displaced Persons camps as organic transportation. Because of the use of the Quartermaster facilities, it was possible to establish more than one depot, and a maximum of four QM and two medical depots were in operation at one time. This provided a shorter haul for the Displaced Persons camp transportation, and minimum time was lost in transit. Approval of Corps G-4, however, was required for the issue of all supplies requisitioned, but as the supplies were requisitioned for a four to 10 day period, this procedure did not present too difficult a problem. Accounting for the supplies followed the same pattern as that for the First US Army, with the camp commanders completing the official receipts and obtaining the German authority's signature at the time of the delivery of the supplies.

c. POL supplies were drawn from Quartermaster POL depots on requisitions submitted by Military Government detachments and approved by Army. This supply was, without exception, handled well and with a minimum of difficulty.

d. The accounting procedure for Military Government supplies did not function as well as was expected, but was rather complicated. For the completion of one transaction two copies of the official receipt and one copy each of the requisition and tally-out had to be forwarded to 12 Army Group. This resulted in excessive paper work, and for those who were not conversant with the procedure, was involved and confusing. Considerable difficulty was encountered with the procedure when organic units such as Field Artillery and Anti Aircraft were placed in charge of Displaced Persons camps.

180. Emergency Imports for German Civilians. Prior to VE-Day provisions were made for the import of wheat and flour into GERMANY to meet emergency conditions encountered during the following fall and winter. As of 16 September 1945, for the US zone in GERMANY, flour on hand in base depots and in GERMANY, was 223,356 net long tons. Wheat for GERMANY, US Zone, as of 31 October totaled 91,193 net long tons, and for the US Zone in AUSTRIA, 52,713 tons.[14]

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CHAPTER 7

TRADE AND INDUSTRY

SECTION 1

LIBERATED TERRITORIES

181. General.

a. The purpose of this section is to review the Civil Affairs operations pertaining to Trade and Industry in liberated territories in Northwest EUROPE.

b. The Trade and Industry Officers of Civil Affairs units were mainly concerned with:

(1) Protection and preservation of industrial plants and coal mines.

(2) Delivery of coal and POL to essential industries in forward areas.

(3) Collection and transmission of data.

c. G-5 Sections of Army Groups and SHAEF Staff reviewed the Trade and Industry reports prepared by Armies and advised Armies regarding further action necessary on their part.[1]

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SECTION 2

FRANCE

182. Industrial Plants and Manufacturing.

a. Although SHAEF had no primary responsibility for the economic rehabilitation of FRANCE, it was recognized that the minimum economic needs of the country must be maintained if any substantial contribution to the Allied war effort was expected from French industry. It was also evident that these needs could not be met by the planned Civil Affairs Supply Program and that serious economic and political difficulties might result if no further assistance was given. Preliminary surveys disclosed that as much as 40% of potential production had been eliminated by war damage, but the remaining 60% was capable of a substantial contribution toward the supply of critical items.

b. The shortages of coal, merchandise and raw materials were the principal difficulties encountered in the reestablishment of French industry and trade. The Germans had thoroughly de-

pleted the material resources of the country and there was a tremendous need for consumer goods. For five years the average French household had not been able to replenish its household needs or to make adequate repairs. The black market had penetrated everywhere. Manufacturers, to keep on producing, had resorted to it, paying high prices for raw materials and labor; since many of the materials were unavailable outside of the black market.

c. Financial difficulties were encountered in the textile industry as the French national authorities had requisitioned large stocks of goods for relief purposes without making prompt payment. Factory owners were thus required to make unemployment compensation payments to workers without immediate reimbursement from the government.[1]

d. In order to coordinate French industry and to confirm the plan formulated by the Supreme Commander, cable SCAF 122, 2 November 1944), AC of S, G-5, of SHAEF on 9 November 1944 appointed a Four-Party Working Group for the consideration of French requirements. This group consisted of a representative of the French Government, the US embassy, the UNITED KINGDOM embassy, and SHAEF Mission (FRANCE). The first working meeting was held the following day with Major General Lewis, head of SHAEF Mission (FRANCE) presiding. At this time the French presented an import program for the eight months through June 1945, which provided that SHAEF would continue to import essential items, substituting raw materials for finished products when possible. Visits to FRANCE were arranged by SHAEF Mission (FRANCE) for technical experts from the US and the UNITED KINGDOM, and visits to the US, UNITED KINGDOM and ITALY by French technicians and engineers. French manufacturers, particularly those with army supply contracts, were interested in learning the scientific and technical advances and methods for expediting production which had proved successful in the Allied countries. British Ministry of Supply representatives were interested in the French production of cordage, battle-dress serge, khaki shirting, army socks and storage batteries. The US War Production Board was investigating the leather situation in relation to French shoe production. With these combined efforts, all aimed toward the furtherance of the common Allied purpose, considerable progress was made in the rejuvenation of French industry. By the end of January 1945, the SHAEF Mission (FRANCE) reported that:[2]

(1) The principal French rubber factories were then beginning production of truck tires and industrial rubber items from imported synthetic rubber and other ingredients. If programs were realized, production of truck tires for the January - March period would reach approximately 50,000; 50% for military and 50% for French civil needs.

(2) Production of photographic film, film base, and paper for Allied military and French needs had been resumed at Kodak Pathe SAF.

(3) Following an investigation in the UNITED KINGDOM by French governmental representatives of salvage campaign methods and the channels of utilizing salvaged materials, details were being worked out for a campaign to recover waste paper and for the recovery of iron and steel military scrap from dumps in FRANCE.

(4) Then under consideration was an Allied Textile Committee in which US and UNITED KINGDOM experts and executives were to cooperate to enable the extensive French textile and making-up plants to make their most effective contribution to military and civilian needs.

183. Mining.

a. A report by the Civilian Supply Section, SHAEF French Country Unit, of a POL-Coal meeting held 5 August 1944, stated that the French policy was to use the pre-war and exist organization and pools to operate and govern the coal industry. There were to be no immediate or extensive changes in the coal rationing regulations. Production and distribution were to continue subject to regulation by the Section du Charbon de l'Office Central de Repartition des Produis Industriels; the mines and producers having no control over the distribution of their products.

b. The paramount obstacle to coal production was the shortage of transportation for supplies to the mines and for hauling the coal from the mining areas. As of September 1944, mines in the PAS DE CALAIS area were limited to operating three days a week because of lack of pit-props. Whereas several trainloads daily were required for normal operation, only one train was arriving, though arrangements had been made for three more to start operation by the end of the month.[3] By the end of January 1945, coal production was being maintained at the rate of 585,000 tons per week in the northern and southern French mines; approximately 80% of the normal pre-war production. Moreover, mining operations were starting in the MOSELLE region, though all coal then being mined was being used at the mines and in the mine power plants.

c. The coal import program, though showing a steady improvement, repeatedly fell short of monthly targets at some ports -- a factor which could also be attributed to transportation difficulties.[4]

184. Labor.

a. Labor was procured exclusively by General Purchasing Agents and Civil Affairs with the cooperation of the local Mayors who opened and supervised the operations of local labor exchanges. The Engineer Labor Procuring Service began operations on D plus 34 by the establishment of Town Major Labor Offices. Within four days 12 such offices had been established in the US area.[5]

b. In the Second British Army area, steps were taken as early as mid-June to register labor, and for this purpose a Civil Affairs detachment of US and British personnel was specially detailed to cooperate with the indigenous authorities and work with representatives of the Department of Labor.[6]

c. In September 1944, an instrument for the administration and payment of wages for civilian labor in FRANCE instituted the following program:

(1) Under the terms of the agreement entered into on 25 September 1944 between the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, and the Minister of Labor, the French authorities were to administer and pay the wages of civilians employed (other than British and US nationals) by the Allied forces.

(2) US forces in need of civilian labor were to apply to the Engineer Service, in accordance with ETO SOP 29, "Civilian Labor."

(3) As soon as the French authorities were administratively able, in a given area, to assume the direct payment of civilian labor, they notified the commanders concerned (i.e., of Armies and Com Z sections) and arrangements were effected for the change-over to French payment and administration. Such payment and administration by the French would include payrolls, wages, social insurance, workmen's compensation, family allowances and income taxes. After the change-over the US forces, on behalf of the French authorities who were the official employers, maintained complete supervision over all civilian personnel. The US forces, when consistent with security, would supply the French with such data as was requested for purposes of preparing the payrolls.

(4) When the French took over the payment of wages they submitted a copy of the payroll upon which payment had been made to the employing unit. The personnel officer of the using unit then certified that the numbers of employees and man-hours worked by each employee as shown on the payroll were correct and in accordance with the records of his command.[7]

185. Imports and Exports.

a. It was evident in FRANCE that imports would far outweigh any exports. It had also been determined prior to invasion that any indigenous production beyond the immediate minimum essential needs of the country, would be reserved for the benefit of the Allied armies fighting on the continent. Tonnage allocations had been made by the War Shipping Administration for the operation of the Civil Affairs Military Relief Program. This provided items essential to economic stability to the extent that military operations would not be impaired. That these allocations would be insufficient to assist appreciably in industrial rehabilitation was a foregone conclusion.[8]

b. With the formation of the Four-Party Working Group in November 1944, French authorities, with the cooperation of SHAEF Mission (FRANCE), prepared and presented a civilian import program for the period 1 November 1944 to 1 July 1945 that totaled approximately six and three-quarter million tons.[9]

c. Also formulated at this time was a Civil Affairs Military Target Relief Import Program for the period 1 November 1944 to 1 March 1945, on the basis of which it was planned that military responsibility for landing Civil Affairs supplies in FRANCE would end on 1 March 1945. Thereafter the French authorities would be responsible for all civilian supply imports. SHAEF Mission (FRANCE) played an important part in coordinating these two programs and in supporting the French Government in them before the combined authorities.[10]

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SECTION 3

BELGIUM

186. Industrial Plants and Manufacturing.

a. No true picture of economic conditions prevailing in BELGIUM during the early months of liberation can be given without reference to the state of mind of the people. Essentially an industrial country, BELGIUM has produced a body of industrialists who in the past, despite many adverse factors with respect to the position of the country in the European economic framework, have competed in the world markets and have gained a measure of success which reflected favorably on their acumen, effort and organizing ability. The recent years of German occupation, however, had created a general state of mind with such defensive prejudices as were seldom encountered in other nations and the cause of which was not always clearly understood. Distrust of the financial

measures, open contempt for and hostility to the Pierlot government, and the hoarding of stocks with an eye to regaining lost markets at the earliest possible moment were included among those factors which combined to cause mass apathy (often rising to deliberate sabotage) towards Governmental efforts to restore some measure of economic equilibrium in the country. Only a country that, on the whole, had for several years revelled in the grim game of fooling the occupying power would have so obviously delighted in confounding the efforts of its own government to such an extent. Only the combined effort of the Allied Nations and the installation in February 1945 of a government more acceptable to the masses enabled the country to reestablish a measure of public spirit.[1]

b. During the early part of October 1944 extensive planning progressed toward the rehabilitation of Belgian industry to meet military and essential civilian requirements. Much was done in coordinating the functions of the economics group of SHAEF Mission (BELGIUM) with the work of the Government's committee on priorities for domestic requirements which was tentatively organized but was backward in becoming operational. On 11 November 1944, a meeting was called by Lt. General Grassett, AC of S, G-5, SHAEF, with the Belgian Prime Minister and Ministers of Economic Affairs, Communications and Supply. Also present were Major General Napier, SHAEF G-4, Maj General Scowden, SHAEF G-5, Maj General Edgerton, Chief International Division War Department, Washington, Head and Officers of SHAEF Mission (BELGIUM) and other officials of the Ministries concerned. The statement of the Supreme Commander's objectives in the coordination of Belgian industry for essential, minimum civilian needs and military procurement seemed to meet with the complete understanding of the Ministers. The establishment of a four party commission, comprising representatives of the government, the economic advisers of the British and US embassies and a representative of the SHAEF Mission (BELGIUM), was proposed with the following aims:

(1) "The essential civilian needs of the country will be established at such a level as to represent an irreducible minimum below which supplies cannot go without jeopardizing the military effort.

(2) "Between this level and the maximum possible production is the field in which contracts can be placed in Belgium for military procurement. Any surplus over and above essential civilian needs and military requirements will be available for other areas.

(3) "The Government intends to bring about the formation of associations within the various industrial groups through which contracts can be equitably distributed and raw materials allocated.

(4) "It is hoped to arrange that military procurement contracts will pass through SHAEF Mission for transmittal to the Joint Priorities Board for allocation.

(5) "The Joint Priorities Board will include representatives of army procurement agencies as well as of SHAEF Mission G-5".[2]

c. This board was not only to coordinate military and civilian requirements during the military period, but to assure the transition after that period to one of normal civilian economy. The proposal was accepted by the Prime Minister, who designated Baron Snoy, Secretary General of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, as the representative of the Belgian Government.

d. Chief military demands were for cement, textiles, (particularly tent fabrics and tarpaulin), tires, roofing, paving, barbed wire, telephone and electric cables. Considerable interest was also shown in pre-fabricated barracks for which production sufficient to house 40,000 persons per month was possible. Civilian interests centered about the production of coke and artificial gas, the restoration of the packaged foods industry, and the manufacture of clothing and blankets. The critical needs for such items is evidenced in the October 1944 report of the Commission d'Assistance Publique which states:

(1) "40% of the families visited have no bed coverings and are using jute sacks. Investigations among 100,000 children reveal that 40% are without shirts, 30% with too little underwear".[3]

e. To these ends all indigenous supplies of textiles and raw materials for textile manufacture were promptly released. Surveys were completed by SHAEF Mission (BELGIUM) and the necessary trade agreements formalized permitting the use of US synthetic rubber in the Englebert tire factory at LIEGE (K-4729), the Bergangnan tire factory at GHENT (J-18), and the Michelin factory at ZUEN. Supplies for the resumption of production at the Hadir steel works were arranged. Such essential supporting plants as chemical works, tar distilleries, rolling mills and tool and die makers were reopened and a closely knit plan for import and internal fuel and transport requirements was formulated.

f. To suppose that such an extensive plan of industrial rehabilitation could be effected, even in a normal state, without difficulties would be presumptuous, and the constant domestic and political strife in BELGIUM during the winter months, coupled with the German ARDENNES offensive, often threatened to completely disrupt the industrial program. The acute shortages of coal and food and the consequent labor strikes in January and February 1945 caused the temporary suspension of such important industries as Gavaert, one of the largest photographic material factories in Europe; and Dierman, the largest producer of fabrics for conveyor belts and tires.

g. However, with the coming of spring, the successes of the Allied armies in GERMANY, and the revamping of the national government, the industrial picture brightened. In April 1945 the SHAEF Mission (BELGIUM) report reveals that:

(1) "A sizeable number of articles are now being manufactured in Belgium for the armed forces, such as battle-dress, bridge material, tires and tubes, cotton goods, mess equipment and yeast. By furnishing only needed supplementary raw materials and taking advantage of local resources and productive capacity, the Allies are saving much tonnage on imports."[4]

h. Exactly how great was Belgian industry's contribution to the Allied war effort cannot be related as no accurate and current summary of the amounts and values of the products supplied to the Allied armies is available. The Belgian Office of Mutual Aid of the Ministry of Finance, however, estimated that up to April 1945, the total commitments for material and services amounted to 6,093,000,000 Belgian francs.[5]

187. Mining.

a. Perhaps the greatest single contributing factor to the stagnation of Belgian industry was the acute shortage of coal. There was coal in the mines, but strikes and unrest among the miners, shortages of pit-props and other essential material, sabotage and flooding of the mines by the retreating Germans, lack of transportation, and the sale of existing stocks on the black market all combined to make coal in civilian homes and industries alike desperately short.

b. During the last days of the German occupation mining operations came to a virtual standstill and during September 1944, stocks at factories, power stations, ports and railway yards were practically depleted. Soon after liberation with the full agreement and support of the Belgian Government, arrangements were made for all coal to be moved under military priority and supervision. After receiving SHAEF Mission (BELGIUM) reports on conditions in the coal mining areas, the Minister of Labour discussed causes of industrial unrest with representatives of the employers and later with those of the miners. A meeting of the National Mixed Commission of the mining industry was convoked during the last week of October 1944, and with agreements as to wages, rations and the procurement of emergency materials, most of the liberated mines began operation. By 1 December 1944, average daily coal production stood at 43,000 tons and 21 Army Group and Communications Zone set up a joint organization known as the Coal Distribution Section - BELGIUM with a representative at each mine to supervise the labelling and consignment of all trains, barges and lorries. Though labor disputes were ever prevalent, the issue of a supplementary ration and urgently needed clothing to the miners so improved their spirit that they voluntarily worked on Christmas Day in all coal producing areas except LIEGE.

c. So critical was the coal supply in January 1945, that only 204,920 tons of coal and 7,000 tons of coke could be allotted to meet the domestic ration for 2,400,000 homes.[6] The black market price in BRUSSELS rose to 11,000 francs a ton and coal was hard to obtain at that figure. Special allocations were made to such firms as were engaged in work of high operational priority, but the widespread strikes and suspension of work in numerous mines made the future of this practice precarious. The cessation of bitter weather in March and the firm and decisive methods employed by the Van Acker government in handling the miner's problems did much to alleviate the situation, but the impression it had made is well marked in the SHAEF Mission (BELGIUM) report with the terse comment:

(1) "The acute coal shortage has prevented Belgian industry from playing a more important role in the production of supplies for the military".[7]

188. Labor.

a. At the time of liberation there was no lack of labor supply in BELGIUM, but this situation changed gradually with the resumption of industry. ETO SOP 29 was the guide for the using services in the employment of Allied civilians. Initially civilian officials claimed that the using services, which had had requisitions for labor filled by the local burgermeisters or by the local employment offices, often moved to new locations without paying workers for services rendered, or failed to furnish the burgermeister with a statement signed by a Purchasing and Contracting Officer (P&C.C) so that payment could be made legally. It is believed that this negligence was caused by the difficulty in finding a P &C O who often was stationed miles away. However, with the completion of agreements whereby the Government would both furnish and pay laborers for the military forces, conditions improved and laborers who had failed to receive payment for their work were able to present their claims for adjustment.

b. In October 1944, a general strike of Belgian coal miners threatened to aggravate the existing acute coal shortages of the country. The issues stressed were increases in pay and supplementary food for heavy workers. The primary issue, however, appeared to be recognition of a new leftist union which emerged after the Germans withdrew. The Government called a meeting of the mine operators and the representatives of the old miners' union, as well as the new organization, at the suggestion of the Civil Affairs staff concerned. It is believed that recognition by the Government of the new labor organization averted a general strike at the time. Later the two unions merged.[8]

c. By December 1944, the labor situation in BELGIUM showed marked improvement, and there were no strikes of any importance in effect. Causes of irritation between employers and workers, concerning wages, hours and working conditions, had been removed largely as a result of:

(1) Recognition by the Ministry of Labour of the claim of the communist labor units for a hearing as representatives of workers in certain industries, primarily coal mines.

(2) Clarification of the Belgian wage scales in major industries through meetings of national mixed committees, presided over by a representative of the Ministry, and containing representatives of organized labor and employers.

(3) Improvement in the distribution of rationed foods among the working population.

(4) Improvement in transportation and a consequent increase in the production of coal, leading in turn to some upswing in industrial activity.

(5) A gradual increase of employment made by military hiring of civilians.[9]

d. The first long stride toward fixing firm rates of pay for civilian labor employed by Allied military forces was taken in January 1945. The government decided to arrange wage

scales on the basis of 12 regions centering around points of greatest present and potential employment. The first wage scale, applying to the BRUSSELS region, was negotiated and signed by the Minister of Labour and the accredited union representatives. This set wages for 112 categories of workers.

e. During the latter part of January 1945 and the first part of February 1945, the failure to provide the civilian population with even the inadequate basic ration of food and the utter lack of household coal precipitated widespread strikes. Production in many mines was suspended or reduced and there were general strikes among dock workers in the ports of ANTWERP (J-79) and GHENT (J-18). A refusal of 950 quarry men to go to work at LESSINES (J-24), because of a dispute over working conditions with the contractors was settled by Ministry of Labour conciliators, brought to the scene by the SHAEF Mission (BELGIUM), but the Mission report for 5 February 1945, stated that:

(1) "The labor situation in general shows a gloomy aspect and reflects in a rather strange fashion in a people who quite recently were celebrating with hysterical abandon the removal of their Nazi taskmasters".[10]

f. With the fall of the Pierlot government and the installation of M. Van Acker, former Minister of Labour, as Prime Minister, the press expressed pleasure at the choice of the new men heading the critical posts of Supply and Economic Affairs. There was an uneasy peace existing throughout the mining areas and reports from the field indicated that the miners were waiting to see what improvements the new government could or would make. The National Wages Commission quickly established firm wages for some 200 occupations in the regions of BRUSSELS (J-6156), ANTWERP (J-79), TURNHOUT (E-00), GHENT (J-18), MONS (J-31), BRUGES (C-60), OSTENDE (C-60), LA LOUVIERE (J-41), and CHARLEROI (J-60). The passage of the renovated special powers bill gave the government emergency powers and marked improvements were made in handling the labor situation. All in all, it could be said that BELGIUM, as far as labor was concerned, had emerged from the black days of late January and early February 1945, and gotten a footing on firmer ground. It is of interest to note that the agreement under which the government undertook to administer and pay civilian labor used by the Allied forces had worked satisfactorily, in most places, from the military point of view.[11]

189. Imports and Exports.

a. At a conference early in October 1944, attended by representatives of 21 Army Group, 12 Army Group and SHAEF Mission (BELGIUM) it was agreed, subject to the agreement of the Communications Zone (Com Z) (which was not represented at the conference), that:

(1) 21 Army Group, 12 Army Group and Com Z would continue to bear responsibility for Civil Affairs supplies in emergency operations.

(2) Approximately one month after the opening of the port of ANTWERP responsibility for distribution would be turned over to the Belgian Government, while responsibility

for importation, to the dockside probably, would be vested exclusively in SHAEF Mission (BELGIUM).

(3) SHAEF Mission (BELGIUM) was to prepare at once the minimum import requirements for the first months of its responsibility.

(4) SHAEF Mission (BELGIUM) would submit to SHAEF a suggested procedure for the coordination and fixing of priorities of contracts for military and essential civilian needs.[12]

b. With the formation in November 1944 of the Four-Party Supply Committee, a working body was thereby established to review:

(1) Procurement and import of Civil Affairs foodstuffs and raw materials and supplies which, integrated with national resources, would meet essential civilian needs during the military period.

(2) Planning by the National authorities to meet the needs of BELGIUM during the military and post-military period.

(3) The relation of Allied military demands to BELGIUM's industrial production and requirements.

(4) Import and Export requirements as necessary.[13]

c. The Belgian Government was encouraged to make every effort to coordinate civil imports with military imports and to institute such import planning as would meet post-war essential requirements. In January 1945, M. Paul Kronacker was made Minister Without Portfolio and designated Chief of the government's purchasing mission to LONDON and WASHINGTON. This was a non-politicel appointment of an industrialist of considerable international experience, especially in NEW YORK, LONDON and WASHINGTON during the war. In March 1945, the Four-Party Supply Committee was advised by SHAEF Letter that supplies earmarked to be brought in under military responsibility, together with shipping facilities, could not be handed over to the government by the suggested target date. It was apparent that the government could not assume full responsibility for total imports until a definite guarantee of sufficient shipping was assured, and SHAEF was asked to allocate a minimum of 600,000 tons port capacity at ANTWERP for period April-May-June 1945 for Belgian Government civil import.[14]

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SECTION 4

LUXEMBOURG

190. Industrial Plants and Manufacturing.

a. The close economic ties existing between LUXEMBOURG and BELGIUM were resumed soon after the principal parts of the Duchy were liberated. Though it was not definitely known at that time to what extent LUXEMBOURG would employ all features of the Belgian stabilization program, it was presumed that the essential parts of the plan would be adopted. So far as its own economy was concerned, LUXEMBOURG was relatively in a very favorable position. A large part of its population was engaged in agriculture with the result that the Duchy was practically self-sufficient in food. Industry consisted mainly of iron and steel production which was initially at a stand-still for lack of coal, but arrangements were quickly made through SHAEF Mission (LUXEMBOURG) for coal imports.[1] That the import program attained only partial success is attributable mainly to transportation difficulties, coal shortages and mining problems in the exporting countries, rather than to a lack of effort either on the part of the SHAEF Mission (LUXEMBOURG) or the Government.

b. As LUXEMBOURG had no substantial volume of middle

or small industry, the heavy industry, centered in the Great Hadir, Rodange, and Arbed steel works, was the key to its economy. Except for partial operation of the Hadir Steel Works this industry was idle from the liberation to the end of the war. Re-opening of Hadir 30 days after liberation, and the continuous operation since of from two to four blast furnaces, there, was an outstanding achievement of the Corps of Engineers, ADSEC, and the management of this concern. The SHAEF Mission (LUXEMBOURG) maintained close contact with the plant throughout the period and assisted the government and the officials of the company in the progressive re-activation of the steel industry, such re-activation being imperative to the economic and political stability of the country. Bridge girders produced by the company during this time were used from the Atlantic coastal area to the DANUBE River.[2]

191. Mining. Though there are no coal mines within the Grand Duchy the country was, until the occupation, considered largely self-supporting in solid fuels. This was accounted for by the ownership of mines in the AACHEN (K-8443) area by the Arbed Steel Works. The SHAEF Mission (LUXEMBOURG) initiated a request to return Arbed to the management of these mines and at the time of the Mission's final report the proposal was concurred in by all echelons below the SHAEF level. In order to secure even a part of the minimum essential coal requirements, the SHAEF Mission (LUXEMBOURG) maintained constant contact with the military solid fuels authorities and arranged imports from BELGIUM, THE NETHERLANDS, and GERMANY. It is worthy of note that the first export of solid fuels from occupied GERMANY was negotiated on behalf of LUXEMBOURG and commenced in February 1945.[3]

192. Labor. There were at no time any appreciable labor difficulties in LUXEMBOURG. The burden of unemployment was for the most part assumed by the steel companies who continued to retain their employees on their payrolls despite the absence of sufficient productive work. A certain number were at times loaned to the government for reconstruction work. SHAEF Mission (LUXEMBOURG), in conjunction with the General Purchasing Agent (GPA), concluded arrangements with the government covering the employment of LUXEMBOURG workers by the Allied forces and furnished liaison between the using services and civilian agencies. The SHAEF Mission (LUXEMBOURG) also assisted in setting up a special supplementary food ration from US Army stocks for the workers at Hadir Steel Works. This was maintained for several months, being discontinued with the consent of the workers.[4]

193. Imports and Exports. These operations were very limited in the Grand Duchy as food, a critical import item in the other liberated countries, was for the most part procured indigenously, and the low productive status of industry left no surplus for export. SHAEF Mission (LUXEMBOURG) assisted in negotiation with Swiss manufacturers for the purchase of shoes, baby food and pharmaceutical goods; and with the Belgian Government (through SHAEF Mission, BELGIUM) for shoes, finished textile products and raw hides. Procurement of the latter allowed the reopening of the important Ideal Leather Factory at WILTZ (P-7154) which before the war provided 65% of the cured hides for Western EUROPE.[5]

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SECTION 5

THE NETHERLANDS

194. Industrial Plants and Manufacturing.

a. Due to a variety of causes, industrial rehabilitation in THE NETHERLANDS was negligible as compared to work done in FRANCE and BELGIUM. Paramount among these were:

(1) The size and location of the liberated areas in relation to the front.

(2) The lack of indigenous materials of all kinds.

(3) The acute food shortage during the entire period necessitating the utilization of all available import facilities for the procurement of food.

Nevertheless, SHAEF Mission (NETHERLANDS), in cooperation with THE NETHERLANDS Government, did considerable work to preserve the industrial potential. By the end of the war, in the area liberated in September 1944, industries were approximately 75% in working order, but their output was only about 20% of normal because of lack of raw materials. In the late liberated areas, apart from certain shipyards and heavy engineering works, damage was only about 20%, though production was at a standstill for lack of coal, power, and raw materials.[1]

b. Directly following the uncovering of the initial area, surveys were made by Trade and Industry sub-section, SHAEF Mission (NETHERLANDS), of the important cotton manufacturing district of TWENTE (V-20). These showed that factory towns in the district had suffered comparatively little damage, only 12 - 14% of the total number of spindles being unusable.

c. Another sub-section survey revealed that from the date of the Allied entry into HOLLAND until the end of December 1944, no general soap ration had been issued. Some emergency issues had been made by separate Civil Affairs detachments from captured and army supplies, and small distributions of substitute soap from local stocks. As a result SHAEF Mission (NETHERLANDS) arranged for soap imports and from January to July 1945, 6,840 tons of soap were brought into THE NETHERLANDS, all from Civil Affairs supplies.

d. Civil Affairs detachments assisted the important cement and rubber industries by arranging for the use of transport vehicles to deliver coal and rubber stocks to the factories.

e. Approximately three and one-half million bicycles were in use in THE NETHERLANDS before the war and an estimated two and one-half million were still being ridden. The majority of these bicycles were in a poor state of repair and in view of the absolute minimum of transport available it was imperative that steps be taken to improve the situation. Accordingly, the Trade and Industry sub-section obtained new and second-hand bicycles from ENGLAND.[2]

195. Mining.

a. Problems in THE NETHERLANDS mining industry (principally coal mines) were similar to those encountered in FRANCE and BELGIUM. Soon after liberation the SHAEF Mission (NETHERLANDS) assisted in the establishment of a Committee of Assistance at each pit, composed of three members representing labor and two members representing management. The Committee had full authority to handle all problems concerning labor, wages, safety, sanitation, living conditions, etc.[3]

b. Coal mining was practically at a standstill in LIMBURG Province due to damaged transportation facilities, labor and food shortages, and lack of electric power. A survey by local Civil Affairs detachments showed that 80% of the generating equipment in the area was out of service either by destruction or need of repair. In the MAASTRICHT area, mines were in working order together with sufficient generating capacity to allow for the pumping of the mines. Through SHAEF Mission (BELGIUM) arrangements were made to bring in a certain amount of power from BELGIUM to restore potential production to about 50% of peace-time requirements. This was estimated as being sufficient for the needs of the country as a stop-gap measure only. Civil Affairs local detachments also rendered assistance in the distribution of coal and in making barges available for its transport.[4]

196. Labor. The overall labor attitude was good. None of the wholesale strikes that plagued BELGIUM and FRANCE were manifested in THE NETHERLANDS. Of great assistance to our military forces in the employment of Dutch civilian labor was the agreement of THE NETHERLANDS Government to assume the procurement, administration and payment of all civilian labor. Since these arrangements were to be handled on a local burgomaster basis, it took some time before all the necessary instructions filtered down. SHAEF Mission (NETHERLANDS) and local Civil Affairs units gave much advice and assistance in this matter and by 1 March 1945, 43 communities had already begun the payment of civilian labor employed for military purposes. At this time approximately 19,000 workers were employed in the British zone, and 3,000 in the small corner of South LIMBURG in the US zone. By 1 April 1945, 21 Army Group was able to order the payment of civilians by military units to cease. Payment was accomplished by the transmission of civilian payrolls from the military units to the Burgomasters, who made necessary computations and payment, then sent them on to the Finance Section of THE NETHERLANDS War Office where the Mutual Aid or Lend-Lease accounting was done.[5]

197. Imports and Exports. Imports to THE NETHERLANDS consisted almost entirely of Civil Affairs relief supplies; mainly food, clothing, medical supplies and other items necessary to the public welfare. Though the ports were all undamaged, except for ROTTERDAM (D-77) (65% destroyed), the shortage of

shipping and the excessive need for the above supplies made any expensive civilian import program impossible. SHAEF Mission (NETHERLANDS) gave assistance in the importation of some soap-making materials (see paragraph 194 above) and made arrangements through SHAEF Mission (LUXEMBOURG) for the exchange of Dutch coal for LUXEMBOURG pit-props. Exports, other than coal, were virtually unknown as the demand within HOLLAND, both by the Dutch and the military, far surpassed the capacity to produce.[6]

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SECTION 6

OCCUPIED TERRITORY

198. General. The Technical Manual on Trade and Industry was prepared by SHAEF and incorporated the recommendations submitted by G-5 staffs of subordinate units. The directive provided that only those industries would be rehabilitated which were essential to meet the needs of the Allied military forces, or to prevent or alleviate epidemics, civil unrest and disorders which would hinder military operations. Included in the needs of the Allied military forces were the requirements of the liberated countries. Positive control measures, including dismantling and other appropriate means, were to be enforced to prevent redevelopment of German industry for the production of arms and other implements of war.[1]

199. Industrial Plants and Manufacturing.

a. On V-E Day German industry, as such, no longer existed. All major plants and factories had been destroyed by bombardment or forced to suspend operations for lack of raw materials, fuel, and labor. The managements of the powerful war-producing enterprises either fled before the Allied onslaught or were apprehended and promptly interned. Communications and transport systems were disrupted and the interdependence of

the over-all industrial establishment hampered production in the undamaged factories. Under the Nazis, and with growing impetus during the war, German industry became the most rationalized* and dispersed in the world. Centralized control, and the excellence of the communication and transportation systems before the bombings and collapse, held this web of inter-dependent, but specialized, plants together. Each unit, though separate, was vital to the whole, and the system functioned smoothly only so long as there were central controls and an unimpeded flow of material and goods.

b. The problems confronting Military Government in reestablishing production to conform with the rather meager SHAEF policies, were numerous and varied. The vagueness and generality of the policy of only "essential production" left much doubt in the minds of local Military Government Industrial Officers as to which plants fell into that category. Consequently, little was done in any except those enterprises which were very obviously necessary, or where the using services requested production of a specific item. For example, as a result of requests from the Corps of Engineers, some plants in the AACHEN (K-8443) area were opened in November and December 1944, to produce bricks for road repair work.[2]

c. Initially work consisted mostly of surveys and analyses of all major industries, which entailed many field trips and long hours of surveying statistical records by officers of detachments located at or near the plants. G-5 staffs reviewed and evaluated field reports and made recommendations to SHAEF. Typical of these is the following from the Civil Affairs/Military Government Weekly Field Report for March 1945:

(1) "A preliminary survey has been made of one of the most highly industrialized sections of Koeln (K51/F45) in which are located 24 of the largest plants in the area. All of these plants were found in very bad condition. Approximately 80% of the machinery from the Ford plant north of Koeln has been moved to the other side of the Rhine, but enough machinery remains to make possible the production of a considerable number of trucks. About 60 key employees and 300 foreign workers are still in Koeln and available for work. At the Glansstaff-Courtaulds plant, which was only five percent destroyed, there are 1,000 tons of white sulphite pulp in sheets, 400 tons of sulphuric acid and 150 tons of zinc sulphite. The Standard Gummi-Werke Baungarten & Co., manufacturers of sheet rubber and rubber strings, was only slightly damaged. Two tons of synthetic rubber are on hand. The Rheinische Apparatebau-Anstalt, manufacturers of tin cans, was 95 percent destroyed, but 50 tons of sheet iron were found. The Karntonagenfabrik Seybel plant, manufacturers of folding paper boxes, was

*As employed by economists, "rationalization" is the efficient organization of industry into non-competitive entities.

40 percent burned. Thirty tons of cardboard and 3,000 - 4,000 corrugated boxes were found there. The Ehrenfelder Maschinenbau-Anstalt, manufacturers of heavy mining machinery, is undamaged. Ten thousand tons of flat and round hot rolled steel, 70 tons of pig iron and 70 tons of scrap iron were found".[3]

d. The rehabilitation of plants manufacturing agricultural necessities was necessary in the development of indigenous food resources and to this end G-5 Section, 12 Army Group, with the cooperation of army staffs and detachments, conducted a field survey of plants producing grain bags and insecticides.

e. In March, 1945, a production priorities list published by SHAEF G-5, Supply and Economics Branch, listing specific items to be produced, helped to clarify the situation and permit definite planning for the reopening of factories, but by the war's end any appreciable production was only in the planning stage.[4]

200. Mining.

a. Perhaps more was done toward the rehabilitation of the German mining industry than in any other industrial field, though production by V-E Day was negligible when compared to pre-war standards. Mines, by virtue of their location, were less susceptible to damage from Allied bombing than were factories and railroads, and the basic importance of their products to the economic picture afforded them priority consideration by Military Government Industrial Officers. The SHAEF policy which included consideration of the needs of liberated countries in the reclamation of German resources was especially concerned with German mines as it was hoped that coal and mineral shortages in the liberated areas could be alleviated by surpluses from GERMANY. Moreover, prior to the war, FRANCE, BELGIUM and LUXEMBOURG, all had extensive interests in German coal mines and were impatient for their restoration.

b. There were several large mines in the AACHEN (K-8443) area and Military Government officers immediately investigated the possibility of putting them on a productive basis. The enormity of the task is reflected in the Military Government Weekly Operations Summary for 9 December 1944, which stated that in the Carolus Magnus mine near UEACHPALENBERG (K-8659) only 120 of its normal force of 3,000 employees were working. Army Engineers were being used to repair damage to the mine and generator but the supplies necessary for operation had been depleted by military requisitioning, looting, and bad weather.[5]

c. The subsequent occupation of the SAAR Basin in March 1945, added substantially to the mining potential, but multiplied enormously the problems of the Industrial Officers to supply labor and materials for operation. At the time the Nazi regime collapsed 80 percent of the miners at coal faces underground were imported slave workers. When hostilities concluded most of them precipitately departed. This gap could not be filled by German Miners as most of them were in the Wehrmacht, and those who were available were either unfit for heavy work or preferred, and had found, surface employment.

d. Military Government Supply Officers worked in close liaison with G-4 to arrange transportation to fill the critical need for pit-props; and still other problems were revealed in reports of officers working in the field, such as:

(1) "The director of the lead mine at Ikchernich (K51/F22), which has not been in operation for the past few months, has fled with the Wehrmacht. Information is being secured about former operations of the mine. Two officers from SHAEF Solid Fuels Section are working on the problem of extinguishing fires in the Fortuna mine pit and getting coal production under way for use in the power plant".[6]

201. Labor.

a. When the Allied armies entered GERMANY it became evident that the Nazis had planned a systematic destruction of employment offices and insurance records, and had made provisions for the forced evacuation of able-bodied workers from towns about to be occupied. In spite of this, all former local employment offices in the US zone were rapidly reestablished as the conduct of major labor operations was of direct concern to Military Government.

b. The initial action taken by a Labor Officer upon entering a city was to find suitable quarters to reestablish an Arbeitsamt (Labor Office). Former Arbeitsamt officials were interviewed, vetted, and if thought reliable, appointed temporarily. In many cases, former Arbeitsamt officials who had been separated from the office since Hitler's rise to power were returned to leading positions in the reorganized plan. The next step was the registration of available manpower. In the early stages of Military Government, the Public Safety registration was deemed sufficient for this purpose, but it was soon learned that this system was inadequate. A separate labor registration was then devised in which all employable labor filled out detailed questionnaires and received a certificate which had to be carried on the person for identification purposes. The progress in registration was reported on special forms.

c. Supplying the civilian labor needs of the Allied forces remained a problem. Consequently, a survey was conducted by 12 Army Group in December, 1944, covering the principal communities then in the US zone: AACHEN, STOLBERG, ESCHWEILER, BRAND, and KORNELIMUNSTER. Although in general civilians were cooperative, the following problems were reported:

(1) Years of forced labor had caused workers to hate the Arbeitsamt. Reluctance was shown by some in complying with a work request of the Arbeitsamt as they expected a changed policy to give them choice of work. Aachen officers recommended a change of name of the Arbeitsamt to Arbeitsvermittlungsstelle (Employment Office).

(2) Skilled mechanics were reluctant to report for road repair or farm work.

(3) Workers wanted to make repairs to prevent further damage to their property before accepting other employment. Houses were damaged, windows had been blown out, and the roofs leaked.

(4) Many individuals spent the daylight hours looking for clothing, food, etc., in the ruins of their own and their relatives' houses.

(5) Others were not immediately concerned with wages as they had saved sufficient funds for the limited supply of food available.

(6) At the time of the survey, no payment of wages had been made by either municipalities or the Corps of Engineers, although some AACHEN municipal workers had been on the job for eight weeks. This was no encouragement to those who may have been in need of money.

(7) Clothing was inadequate, especially shoes for outdoor work. Some civilians had completely ruined their last pair of shoes by potato digging.

(8) Fear of looting while away from their houses was prevalent.

(9) Food was inadequate for outdoor or heavy work. For example, THE STOLBERG food kitchen supplied less than 1,000 calories per person per day.

(10) Men who were left behind were inferior. Able-bodied men had been evacuated.

(11) It was difficult to locate and notify available labor because of lack of communication.

(12) Travel restrictions on workers by troops prevented them from reaching their places of employment.

(13) Lack of transportation for workers forced them to walk long distances.

(14) Workers were afraid to leave home as they wanted to be on hand to move furniture and other possessions in the event the military forces requisitioned their homes for billets.

d. After the crossing of the RHINE by our armies, large territories were uncovered swiftly, resulting in many Arbeitsamter being found intact with their records. It was now also impossible for the Germans to evacuate all able-bodied men in their retreat. Consequently, the labor shortage was somewhat relieved. A shortage remained, however, in transportation

and agricultural workers and in coal miners. A list of priorities for the disbandment of Wehrmacht members and for the release of prisoners of war was established, whereby the above categories were given preference. Directives were also sent to the armies directing that all unemployed be shifted to the farms. It was anticipated that by the end of July sufficient labor would be available for agricultural work.

e. Compliance with work orders was satisfactory. In isolated cases arrests were made and fines imposed in accordance with provisions of Allied Military Government Ordinances. In order to force compliance with the registration order, a system was instituted whereby ration cards could not be issued until the person had been registered with the Arbeitsamt. In general, military needs were filled wherever able-bodied persons were available. Instructions to German Arbeitsamt officials in English and German were furnished, listing the obligations of German officials in supplying civilian labor needs to the using services and in setting priorities.

f. The regulation of wages and hours was the responsibility of the using services when they paid workers. The Arbeitsamt or the Burgermeister was responsible when the municipality assumed payment. The directives provided for the return to an eight hour day, 48 hour week, and to the wage scales which were set by German Tarifordnungen (tariff orders) in 1943, which had undergone no material change up to the time of surrender. Arbeitsamt officials were notified to enforce all existing Tarifordnungen. Special enforcement sections in the Arbeitsamt were created. As a result, wages remained stable in the entire US area. Exceptions to the eight hour day still existed in agriculture, surface mining and in some other industries. Payment of civilian labor employed by the military forces and agencies of the United States was made by the using services until local German municipal authorities were in a position to take over the administration and payment. Armies were then directed to make an immediate transfer of this responsibility to municipal authorities. This action was deemed advisable for the collection of social insurance and income tax deductions. Such deductions were not made under army directives, and workers on army payrolls were obtaining a 20% higher purchasing power than those paid by municipalities or private industry. These deductions were also necessary to augment the depleted social insurance funds.

g. Liquidation of the DAF (German Labor Front) has been thorough insofar as abolishing DAF control over workers in industry was concerned, and in the DAF's control of welfare, health and insurance functions. The national records of the organization were found in a castle at LOBEDA (J-76), and were removed to MUNICH for safe keeping. In some instances the cooperative housing settlements reverted to their pre-Hitler management, and Nazi members were evicted from their apartments.

h. In the field of labor relations Military Government Officers were faced with many complex problems:

(1) The Military Government Handbook, the Technical Manual and SHAEF broadcasts stated that workers would be given the right to form democratic trade unions and other forms of free economic association. These same publications also stated that political

activity of any nature was banned. It was therefore necessary to examine each application for union recognition with considerable care, on the basis of current conditions and activity. Some unions formed at the time of the Weimar Republic were political in character. The majority of workers were in the Free (Social Democratic) Unions, with the Christian (Catholic) Unions second in importance. Numerous requests were granted, however, to form works councils (Betriebsrate) and organizing committees such as the one formed in AACHEN (Freier-deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund). Only a few craft or industry organizations were formed, mainly in the coal mining industry. A departure from the old dual organization system has been noted throughout GERMANY. In most cities where organizing activities were in evidence, the former Social Democratic and Center Party (Catholic) union leaders voiced a desire to build one union. A few communist leaders also advocated the one union plan.

(2) Wages and hours were set by Tarifordnungen and were not subject to arbitration. As the right to strike in any industry which threatened military security was prohibited, the works councils and other organizations limited their activities to denazifying their plants and to protesting against any retention of former Nazis in responsible managerial positions, as well as any Nazi in minor governmental office who concealed his identity.

(3) In May, 1945, the Engineer, Advance Section, Communications Zone, requested 12 Army Group to make a comprehensive survey of the labor situation in the Rhine-Westphalian coal mining industry. Unrest had been reported among the miners and production had fallen to one-third of normal. Solutions were sought to the problems of labor supply, productivity, food distribution, personnel transportation, housing, wages and hours, and labor organization. Various recommendations were accepted, resulting in shorter working hours, uniform wages, and increased food rations. These adjustments in general eased the situation.

i. The complicated German social insurance system was in a chaotic condition when Allied forces took over. Funds and records of the sickness, invalidity, pension and other insurance schemes were missing and former officials had disappeared. Where funds existed, payments were usually stopped, and needy persons were treated as public charity or relief charges. Social insurance deductions from wages, however, were ordered to be continued and turned over to municipal treasuries for safe-keeping until the insurance offices could be reestablished. By the end of June 1945, local insurance offices

(Versicherungsamter), which supervise the public, semi-public and private operating companies, had been reestablished in nearly all cities, and operating companies in some instances had been given permission to resume payments. Methods and amounts of payments were considered and pensions to veterans of former wars were stopped, and former beneficiaries subjected to a means test before a resumption of payment was made. Pensions to former Stahlhelm members and "Old Fighters" (early Nazi storm-troopers) were discontinued.

j. The housing activities of the Deutsche Arbeits Front (German Labor Front) were abolished. This created a deficiency in the administration of activities directed toward the rehousing of bombed-out persons. In addition, it was anticipated that little or no coal would be available to heat dwellings during the coming winter of 1945 -46. Burgermeisters of most large cities were directed to appoint Housing Commissions (Wohnungsamter) to study material needs and salvage problems and make recommendations for the prevention of unrest and disease. Instructions were issued specifically directing German authorities to initiate the repair and complete utilization of all buildings, with priority to houses for workers producing commodities essential to the military occupation. Civilians who had been evacuated from cities to escape Allied bombing were required to remain in the country until authorized to return.[7]

202. Imports and Exports. As can be seen from the foregoing facts, the volume of production did not allow for any extensive import or export trade. Limited quantities of surplus stocks found in warehouses were released; e.g., in February, 1945, some coal from captured stock-piles was sent to LUXEMBOURG, and in March 1945, 110,000 kilograms of textile raw materials in AACHEN (K-8443) were released to THE NETHERLANDS Mission.[8] However, the majority of the limited trade was between Armies, with G-4 and G-5 Sections acting as the coordinating agencies to effect the transfers. G-5 staffs examined and recorded requests for imports and prepared instructions for the guidance of the Armies in clearing requests for items which were surplus to their requirements. Information copies of the cleared messages, covering commodities approved for export, were then sent to other armies. If the items cleared were required by the other armies, the tentative clearance would be withdrawn by the initiating headquarters and the supplies would be made available to the army where the need existed, in accordance with procedure established by Supreme Headquarters.[9]

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PART THREE

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CHAPTER 1

CONCLUSIONS

203. Civil Administration in Liberated Territories.

a. The non-recognition of the Provisional Government of FRANCE prior to 23 August 1944 and the absence from BELGIUM of the politically suspect King created delicate, internal problems on the governmental-political level which were not encountered in THE NETHERLANDS or LUXEMBOURG. However, the Allied national authorities, once established and recognized in each country, quickly assumed complete responsibility for civil administration. The standard of administration in the reconstructed governments was uniformly good. The planning for civil administration was generally carried out successfully without any unanticipated difficulties beyond those caused by the delay in the recognition of the French Provisional Government and by the national political situation in BELGIUM.

b. The support rendered indigenous officials by Civil Affairs materially assisted in the reorganization of local and national administrations. Confidence and prestige were restored and initiative developed.

c. Resistance groups were of assistance to Civil Affairs in the early combat stages, but their later activities and inter-group differences often retarded effective civil administration. The few French liaison officers were available during the early days of liberation, and they exerted no authority over resistance groups.

204. Civil Administration in Occupied Territory.

a. The appointment and removal of officials were the basic considerations in the reorganization, restoration and supervision of government. The fundamental policy was the removal of Nazis from office. Initially civil administration suffered because the most competent personnel, in or out of the Civil Service, were affiliated with the Nazi Party. However, since the primary objective of the war was the eradication of Nazism, the resulting incompetency and uncertainties of administration had to be ignored for the common good of the Allies and the future of the German people.

b. The screening of prospective officials by CIC detachments was excellent for security and counter-intelligence purposes, but insufficient for the closer scrutiny needed for denazification. In fast-moving situations coordination between CIC and Military Government was difficult. The establishment of the Special Branch in Military Government detachments improved the situation after a comparatively static condition was reached.

c. Initially plans and operational directives for denazification were vague and confusing to officers in the field. On 12 and 14 March 1945, 12 Army Group issued operational directives which resolved many of the uncertainties. Similar directives were issued by Sixth Army Group shortly thereafter. Failure to implement denazification policies fully in the combat stage resulted in the appointment of some persons who became ineligible to hold positions as denazification policy was clarified. Thus, the seed was sown

before VE-Day for much misunderstanding and misinterpretation of the problem of denazification in its later and more extensive aspects.

205. Public Works and Utilities.

Civil Affairs and Military Government acted as the co-ordinating agency between the indigenous officials and the Engineers in the restoration of public works and utilities. The Corps of Engineers provided required equipment, material, technical advice and assistance as conditions and objectives permitted.

206. Postal Services.

a. The formation of the Censorship Coordination Committee consisting of representatives from G-2 Section, G-5 Section, and Allied national administrations solved the vexing problems in liberated territory.

b. In occupied territory no Civilian Postal Services were open prior to 8 May 1945, due mainly to security conditions.

207. Civilian Supply.

a. In Northern FRANCE the estimates for needed supplies were too large, and in THE NETHERLANDS too small. Motor transportation allocated to Civil Affairs was insufficient to distribute available supplies.

b. The Civil Affairs/Military Government supply system could have been more effectively and economically handled if the regular supply services of the army had been used, with advice by Civil Affairs and Military Government being given on requirements and distribution.

208. Trade and Industry.

a. The Four-Party Working Group, appointed 2 November 1944 in FRANCE, and similar groups appointed later in other liberated countries, were effective in the restoration of industry for civilian and military purposes. SHAEF Missions serving as liaison agencies between SHAEF and the national authorities concerned were also effective especially in matters in connection with essential production of coal and petroleum products.

b. The SHAEF policy of essential German production was vague. There was no general restoration of German industry prior to VE-Day with the exception of a few industries capable of producing non-military items for the using services of the Allied Armies.

CHAPTER 2

RECOMMENDATIONS

It is recommended that:

209. Civil Affairs and Military Government. Policies and procedures pertaining to Civil Affairs and Military Government be included in all War Plans.

210. Civil Administration in Liberated Territories.

a. Allied national governments be recognized and operational agreements promulgated prior to initiation of liberation operations.

b. Allied national governments be encouraged to restore and reorganize departmental, provincial and local governments without delay.

c. In the absence of a National authority or Nationally appointed officials, Civil Affairs appoint temporary key indigenous officials necessary to the military effort.

d. Indigenous officials control and operate all governmental agencies.

e. Civil Affairs, acting in a coordinating capacity, assist and advise the civilian authorities as required at all governmental levels.

f. National liaison officers of the country to be liberated accompany the first Civil Affairs units to enter the country and have national authority to control organized resistance elements.

211. Civil Administration in Occupied Territory.

a. Temporary key civilian authorities at all echelons of government in occupied territory be appointed by Military Government without delay.

b. Subordinate civilian authorities be appointed by the senior civilian authorities under the supervision of Military Government.

c. Military Government policies and directives pertinent to the appointment and removal of officials and functioning of government be published prior to occupation in brief, concise, clear form, preferably in one document, and distributed to all tactical commanders and Military Government officers.

d. Special Branch be incorporated as a permanent part of the Military Government organization in order to accomplish detailed screening of governmental officials and other personnel required by Military Government.

e. Close liaison be maintained between CIC and Special Branch.

212. Public Works and Utilities.

a. The restoration of Public Works and Utilities required

in the interest of the military effort be the responsibility of the Corps of Engineers.

b. Civil Affairs/Military Government function in a liaison and advisory capacity with the Corps of Engineers and the civilian administration on matters pertaining to Public Works and Utilities.

213. Postal Services.

a. The policies and procedures pertaining to the restoration and operation of civilian postal services be effected through a Postal Censorship Coordinating Committee consisting of representatives of the Supreme Commander (G-2, G-5 and Mission to the country or countries concerned) and the indigenous government.

b. The functioning of the Postal Censorship Coordinating Committee be a responsibility of G-2.

214. Civilian Supply.

a. The planning for, and supervision of, activities concerning procurement, storage and distribution of supplies for civilian use be a General Staff responsibility of G-4.

b. The compilation of civilian requirements be the General Staff responsibility of G-5.

215. Trade and Industry. Prior to initiation of operations, a Trade and Industry Committee composed of representatives of the Supreme Commander and Allied governments be appointed to devise plans and procedures for the conservation and utilization of resources and industries essential to military and civilian needs.

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH ARMY GROUP
APO 655

G-5 OPERATIONAL INSTRUCTIONS) 11 March 1945
:
NUMBER 11)

REMOVAL OF NAZI AND GERMAN MILITARY PERSONNEL
FROM GOVERNMENTAL AND IMPORTANT
CIVIL POSITIONS

1. References:

a. Directive and Instructions for Military Government of Germany Prior to Defeat or Surrender, 23 November 1944, par. 5 b (4); Annex III, Section I, 2 a, b, 4 a, 7 d, page 54, Section IV, 5.

b. Proclamation No. 2, par. 1.

c. Laws Nos. 1 and 5.

d. Handbook for Military Government in Germany:

(1) Chapter I, Part III, pars. 246, 251 (b).

(2) Chapter II, Part III, pars. 275 a and d, 276, 283, 284, 287, 291.

e. Public Safety Manual of Procedures, par. 186 - 195.

f. The foregoing are not intended to include all the references relating to policies and instructions for the elimination of NAZISM - FASCISM, GERMAN MILITARISM, THE NAZI HIERARCHY AND THEIR COLLABORATORS, but they are the principal references and should be studied carefully by all concerned.

2. Thus far Military Government officers have tended to lay emphasis on the removal of only active Nazis and ardent Nazi sympathizers whereas it is the objective and desire of this Headquarters to eliminate all Nazism - Fascism, German Militarism, the Nazi Hierarchy and their collaborators from all offices and other positions of influence and trust in the Government and certain important civil positions.

3. No Nazi, ardent Nazi sympathizer, nor member of any affiliated, attached, controlled or supervised Nazi organization, and no militarist nor leading military figure shall occupy any office nor other position of influence or trust in the Government, nor any important civil position.

a. The term "all offices and other positions of influence or trust in the Government or important civil positions" shall include all policy making or executive positions in all governmental agencies, and in civil agencies, or businesses directly supervised, controlled or utilized by Military Government.

b. The term "German militarism - militarists" shall include persons considered likely to perpetuate the militaristic tradition from a position of influence; all persons who have at any time been members of the German General Staff or who have been National Socialist Indoctrination officers; career officers of the German Navy or Air Force.

APPENDIX NO 1
(No of pages 3)

c. In determining whether persons, not members of the Party and not otherwise prescribed, fall within the category of an "ardent sympathizer", the following will be considered as tending to establish an objectionable political character:

(1) Persons who have denounced or contributed to seizure of opponents of the Nazi Regime.

(2) Persons who have instigated or perpetrated acts of violence against political and religious opponents of the Nazi Regime.

(3) Persons who have disseminated Nazi or Facist ideology.

(4) Persons who have benefited by acceptance or transfer of property incidental to spoliation of occupied countries, "Arianization", or confiscation of property, on political, religious, or racial grounds.

(5) Persons in civil service who have been favored by rapid promotions since 30 January 1933.

(6) Persons who have been employed in political or administrative posts in occupied territories.

(7) Persons who have made substantial contributions to the Party (sums large in themselves or large in proportion to means). In this connection it should be noted that contributions to German political parties, including NSDAP, were frequently made by companies, cartels, etc., and prominent sympathizers with the Party may have used this method rather than that of personal subscription to support the Party.

(8) Persons who have held memberships in other political parties in Germany which ultimately provided support for the National Socialist Party at the time of its coming into power, e.g., the conservative "Deutsche Nationale Volkspartei", the somewhat more liberal "Deutsche Volkspartei", or the "Stahlhelm" of KyffhHuser.

(9) Persons who have received important party decorations or honors.

4. On entry into a German city or other administrative unit, Fragebogens (questionnaires) will immediately be completed by all officials and employees (except clerks or laborers) holding offices or other positions of influence or trust, and all candidates for such offices or positions in accordance with existing instructions.

a. The Fragebogens will be checked by Special Branch, which in coordination with CIC, will make such investigations as are necessary to determine the status of the persons involved. They will promptly complete and submit their recommendations to the Military Government officer who will make appropriate decisions upon removals or appointments.

APPENDIX NO 1
(No of pages 3)

b. Persons guilty of making fraudulent entries on a Fragebogen, or false statements in connection with their employment, appointment or investigation will be punished promptly and severly.

5. All persons who are or who have been members of the Nazi Party or who come within the provisions of paragraph 3 above will be immediately removed from office, from other positions of influence or trust in the government and from important civil positions.

a. Removal as used herein shall mean the suspension or discharge immediately of an individual from the position he occupies and the termination of his influence and participation, directly or indirectly, therein.

b. No such individual may be re-employed in the position from which he was removed or employed in another position of governmental importance without the approval of this headquarters. In cases considered by commanding general concerned to affect military operations adversely, such persons may be temporarily reinstated, prior to approval by this headquarters.

6. The selection of persons for key positions, with adequate educational background, practical experience and freedom from Nazi and German militaristic contamination, collaboration and influence is of prime importance and will be given priority. Diligent search will be made for residents of the city or other governmental unit to be served who were not members of the Nazi Party or any of its affiliated organizations, nor who had belonged to, or collaborated with, the Nazi or German militaristic group.

a. From the foregoing will be selected an acting Burgermeister or other appropriate chief or head of the governmental unit.

b. Such person will submit to the Military Government officer a list of those whom he desires to appoint to key positions. Prior to appointment these shall likewise complete the Fragebogen and shall be investigated by CIC and Special Branch.

7. The difficulty of finding a sufficient number of persons of acceptable character, qualified for essential administrative functions under combat conditions, is fully recognized. Therefore, it is emphasized that the immediate objective of Military Government does not require the full restoration of peace-time services, but rather such organization of government as is essential to the success of the military operations, with due regard to the basic well-being of the civil population.

By command of Lieutenant General BRADLEY:

/s/ C. R. Landon
/t/ C. R. LANDON
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:
Omitted

APPENDIX NO 1
(No of pages 3)

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH ARMY GROUP

G-5 OPERATIONAL INSTRUCTIONS)

NUMBER 12) 14 April 1945

REMOVAL FROM OFFICE OF NAZIS AND GERMAN MILITARISTS

1. Pending the issuance of a revised directive on the above subject and to meet the requirements of rapidly advancing operations, the first four lines of par. 3, G-5 Operational Instructions No. 11 of this headquarters, 11 March 1945, are deleted and the following substituted:

"3. Members of the Nazi Party (NSDAP), ardent Nazi sympathisers, militarists or leading military figures shall not occupy any office, other position of influence or trust in the Government or any important civil position. Officers or officials of an affiliated, attached, controlled or supervised Nazi organization shall come within the same category. Membership alone in an affiliated, attached, controlled or supervised organization shall not necessarily act as a disqualification."

2. Members (other than officers) of such organizations, in which membership was compulsory in order to obtain work or engage in a trade or profession, may be found acceptable, and if so they may be used. Such organizations known to be in this class are: Reichsbund der Deutschen Beamten; Deutsche Arbeitsfront (DAF), including NS Reichsbund der Deutscher Schwestern; NS-Bund Deutscher Technik (NSBDT); NS-Deutscher Arztebund (NSDAEB); NS-Leherbund (NSLB); and NS-Rechtswahrerbund (NSRB). Membership in the Nazi Party itself (NSDAP) will continue as a disqualification for employment in positions of influence or trust or any important civil position.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL BRADLEY:

/s/ C. R. LANDON
/t/ C. R. LANDON
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant General

APPENDIX NO 2
(No of Pages 1)

US ARMY ISSUES OF DEPARTED CIVIL AFFAIRS/
MILITARY GOVERNMENT SUPPLIES FROM D-DAY

Prepared by G-4, TSFET (R) 29 November 1945

		FRANCE		BELGIUM	
		VE-DAY	31 OCT 45	VE-DAY	31 OCT 45
Food	# NLT	338,736.33	422,735.30	1,005.56	1,337.06
* Med and San	"	753.19	753.19	16.75	16.75
ø Clothing & Shoes	"	704.68	704.68	42.20	42.20
P.O.L.	"	328,497.17	967,403.85	10,940.01	22,476.07
Soap	"	7,246.97	10,217.32	344.20	542.46
Blankets	"	1,117.00	1,117.00	3.80	3.80
Newsprint	"	3,279.38	4,509.06	-	-
Coal	"	468,159.89	1,317,262.87	-	-
x Miscellaneous	"	15,304.69	15,304.69	-	-
TOTALS		1,163,799.30	2,740,007.96	12,352.54	52,262.34
Blankets	ea	29,694	30,394	15,544	15,544
Vehicles	"	2,321	4,062	42	147
Trailers	"	213	457	42	61
Tires	"	87,044	234,287	-	-
Tubes	"	23,707	117,246	-	-
Comforters	"	117,407	117,407	-	2,580
Flags	"	9,704	69,547	-	-
Motorcycles	"	120	121	-	-
Clothing	"	13,177	1,953,928	-	1,972,864
Shoes	pr	15,137	335,344	16	374,550
Cloth	yd	-	61	-	-
Penicillin	Unit	2,900,000	2,900,000	-	-
Insulin	"	5,000,000	5,000,000	-	-

Net Long Tons

* Medical and Sanitary Supplies reported in tons up to April. From May to October, reported by units.

ø Clothing and Footwear reported in tons up to April. From May to October, reported separately by units.

x Miscellaneous supplies reported in tons up to April. From May to October, reported by units.

APPENDIX NO 3
(No of pages 4)

US ARMY ISSUES OF IMPORTED CIVIL AFFAIRS/
MILITARY GOVERNMENT SUPPLIES FROM D-DAY

Prepared by G-4, TSFET (R) 29 November 1945

		HOLLAND		LUXEMBOURG	
		VE-DAY	31 Oct 45	VE-DAY	31 OCT 45
Food	# NLT	15,621.98	42,975.95	11,301.65	29,505.83
* Med and San	"	38.64	38.64	10.80	10.80
ø Clothing and shoes	"	2.52	2.52	11.80	11.80
P.O.L.	"	435.52	435.52	917.26	1,615.00
Soap	"	303.80	594.71	125.25	379.40
Blankets	"	2.00	2.00	6.64	6.64
Newsprint	"	-	-	-	336.00
Coal	"	-	-	-	-
x Miscellaneous	"	-	-	-	-
TOTALS		16,404.46	44,049.34	12,373.40	31,865.47
Blankets	ea	1,756	2,006	1,008	13,618
Vehicles	"	-	50	-	290
Trailers	"	-	-	-	3
Tires	"	-	26	-	4,615
Tubes	"	-	26	-	
Comforters	"	-	520	-	13,002
Flaps	"	-	-	-	-
Motorcycles	"	-	-	-	-
Clothing	"	-	-	-	220,610
Shoes	pr	-	2,988	-	97,164
Cloth	yd	-	-	-	163,005
Penicillin	Unit	-	-	-	-
Insulin	"	-	-	-	-

Net Long Tons

* Medical and Sanitary Supplies reported in tons up to April. From May to October, reported by units.

ø Clothing and Footwear reported in tons up to April. From May to October, reported separately by units.

x Miscellaneous Supplies reported in tons up to April. From May to October, reported by units.

APPENDIX NO 3
(No of pages 4)

US ARMY ISSUES OF IMPORTED CIVIL AFFAIRS/
MILITARY GOVERNMENT SUPPLIES FROM D-DAY

Prepared by G-4, TSFET (R) 29 November 1945

		GERMANY		DISPLACED PERSONS	
		VE-Day	31 Oct 45	VE-Day	31 Oct 45
Food	# NLT	307.42	307.42	611.46	2,730.39
*Med and San	"	45.92	45.92	7.01	7.01
∅Clothing & Shoes	"	-	-	7.05	7.05
P.O.L.	"	33.51	33.51	210.60	210.60
Soap	"	9.17	9.17	24.37	40.68
Blankets	"	-	-	-	-
Newsprint	"	-	-	-	-
Coal	"	-	-	-	2.00
xMiscellaneous	"	-	-	-	-
TOTALS		396.02	396.02	860.49	2,997.73
Blankets	ea	6,395	6,395	8,600	21,668
Vehicles	"	-	-	-	-
Trailers	"	-	-	-	-
Tires	"	-	-	-	-
Tubes	"	-	-	-	-
Comforters	"	-	-	36,210	42,400
Flaps	"	-	-	-	-
Motorcycles	"	-	-	-	-
Clothing	"	-	-	-	10,200
Shoes	pr	-	-	-	1,167
Cloth	yd	-	-	-	-
Penicillin	unit	-	-	-	-
Insulin	"	-	-	-	-

Not Long Tons

* Medical and Sanitary Supplies reported in tons up to April. From May to October, reported by units.

∅ Clothing and Footwear, reported in tons up to April. From May to October, reported separately by units.

x Miscellaneous Supplies reported in tons up to April. From May to October, reported by units.

APPENDIX NO 3
(No of pages 4)

TOTAL OF US ARMY ISSUES OF IMPORTED CIVIL AFFAIRS/
MILITARY GOVERNMENT SUPPLIES FROM D-DAY FOR LIBERATED
AND OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

Prepared by G-4, TSFET (R) 29 November 1945

		TOTALS	
		VE-DAY	31 OCT 45
Food	# NLT	367,854.42	499,591.95
* Med and San	"	872.31	872.31
ø Clothing & Shoes	"	768.25	768.25
P.O.L.	"	341,034.07	992,174.55
Soap	"	8,053.76	11,763.74
Blankets	"	1,129.44	1,129.44
Newsprint	"	3,279.38	4,845.06
Coal	"	468,159.69	1,345,108.87
x Miscellaneous	"	15,304.69	15,304.69
TOTALS		1,206,186.21	2,871,576.86
Blankets	ea	62,997	97,625
Vehicles	"	2,363	4,549
Trailers	"	255	521
Tires	"	87,044	241,928
Tubes	"	23,707	118,570
Comforters	"	153,617	175,909
Flags	"	9,704	69,547
Motorcycles	"	120	121
Clothing	"	12,177	4,157,602
Shoes	pr	15,153	811,123
Cloth	yd	-	163,066
Penicillin	Unit	2,900,000	2,900,000
Insulin	"	5,000,000	5,000,000

Net Long Tons

* Medical and Sanitary Supplies reported in tons up to April. From May to October, reported by units.

ø Clothing and Footwear reported in tons up to April. From May to October, reported separately by units.

x Miscellaneous Supplies reported in tons up to April. From May to October, reported by units.

APPENDIX NO 3
(No of pages 4)

HEADQUARTERS
THEATER SERVICE FORCES (REAR)
EUROPEAN THEATER

REPORT
on
THE RESPONSIBILITIES AND ACTIVITIES OF G-4
in
CIVIL AFFAIRS SUPPLY

G-4 Section
Hq TSFET (R)
APO 887 US Army
1 October 1945

EXTRACT

* * *

13. RECOMMENDATIONS.

It is recommended that before a similar operation is undertaken again, study be given to the following points:

a. Either the establishment of a separate or parallel civil affairs Supply Service, such as the quartermaster service, which could permit:

(1) More accurate accounting.
(2) Complete regulation of stocks.
(3) Handling of specialists of special items such as farm machinery.
(4) The formation of an organization prepared to meet sudden emergencies.
(5) Determination of priorities at the general staff level.

Or placing the responsibility squarely on the services, which would involve:

(1) Using the same standard of accountability for civil affairs as for other items.
(2) Determination of requirements as much in advance for civil affairs items as for other items.
(3) Prescribing a basis for issue which the services could apply as objectively as they apply standards for other issues.
(4) Determination of priority at the Supply Service level.
(5) Less flexibility to meet emergency demands.

b. G-5, G-5 Responsibilities. Assignment of duties to G-4 and G-5 is dependent upon determination of a. above. If, however, as in the present operation, planning, coordination and control is retained at the general staff level, with only limited supply responsibility placed on the Supply Services, the division of responsibility between G-4 and G-5 must be carefully considered and clearly defined. If the entire responsibility in civil affairs supply were placed on G-4, the likelihood of a lower priority for civil affairs supplies, the necessity for attaching to G-4 specialists capable of analysing local or indigenous resources, determining supply requirements, and controlling the issue of these supplies, must be consid-

APPENDIX NO 4
(No of Pages 2)

ered. Such assignment might either duplicate in part or remove from G-5 the control essentialto fulfilling the G-5 mission of studying the conditions among the civilian population, which might lead to disease and unrest, and coordinating action to prevent such conditions.

If the responsibility for civil affairs supply were placed on G-5, this might mean competition between two general staff sections for shipping, use of ports, depots and transportation, determination of priorities on the chief of staff level; the Supply Services receiving supply instructions from two general staff sections; and determination of requirements for civil affairs supplies on a different basis from that for other supplies.

Should the civil affairs supply responsibility be divided between G-4 and G-5, careful consideration must be given to the most satisfactory assignment of the four major divisions of the supply operation - determination of the overall requirements including indigenous and imported; procurement, movement, storage of imported requirements; basis of issue; and accounting. It must be remembered that G-5, in fulfilling its responsibility, is in a position, through planning, coordination, and supervision of the production and movement of indigenous supplies, to reduce requirements for imported supplies. Should specialized personnel be required by G-4 or G-5 for this operation, such personnel should be assigned rather than attached or used as liaison officers.

c. Packing and Marking. That civil affairs items are subjected to the same field conditions as other Army supplies, and that similar packing and marking standards be applied.

d. Priority. Establishment some tangible basis for determining priority to be accorded civil affairs. When not needed, they are normally given the lowest priority with the result that when an urgent need arises, no even the highest priority will assure delivery when needed.

e. Standardization of Items. Limiting items of civil affairs issue to those furnished by the Army for its other requirements. This would involve the use of only one pipeline and directing items to civilian needs in quantity and type, according to the urgency of the situation. Types of supplies not imported by the Army for other needs, except clothing, are usually not essential until later in the occupation, when they could be imported through civilian channels. In this way, a reserve smaller than the total of separate civil affairs and Army reserves, would enable a larger and speedier fulfillment of an emergency requirement. Also the number of different items estimated at more than twenty thousand, many of which are peculiar to civil affairs, could be materially reduced.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4:

s/t/ CHARLES W. BARNSHAW
Colonel, GSC,
Civil Division, G-4

1 October 1945

Appendices: Fourteen (14)
as listed in Index

APPENDIX NO 4
(No of Pages 2)